Reconsidering qualitative and quantitative research approaches: A cognitive developmental perspective

Rather than embracing the notion that contextualism requires purely qualitative methodologies, Westerman and Yanchar argue that there is a place for quantification in post-positivist research. Both authors provide compelling arguments for this position. From our cognitive developmental perspective, we see this as a move toward a new level of integration in psychology. Whereas reactive shifts between positivist quantification and radical contextualism exemplify the kind of pendulum swing we see in individual development immediately before the emergence of a new developmental level, the moves suggested by Westerman and Yanchar are in the direction of a qualitative shift—a new level of differentiation and integration. We argue that the arguments put forward by Westerman and Yanchar do not quite achieve consolidation at this new level, because they remain embedded in a post-positivist contextualism that demands an a priori rejection of psychological universals and strong forms of quantification. In our view, consolidation at this new level requires a shift to a problem-focused methodological pluralism that assimilates a wide range of methodological approaches, critiques them, and adapts them in light of the problems researchers seek to solve.     

What gene-environment interactions can tell us about social competence in typical and atypical populations

Social competence is a complex human behaviour that is likely to involve a system of genes that interacts with a myriad of environmental risk and protective factors. The search for its genetic and environmental origins and influences is equally complex and will require a multidimensional conceptualization and multiple methods and levels of analysis. Behavioural genetic research can begin to address the fundamental yet complex question of how children develop social competence by uncovering the various influences on social development and disentangling variance due to multiple genes, environments and experiences. In this paper, we review the current status of research on sociability, face recognition, emotion recognition, and theory of mind (TOM)--well defined and measured constructs that are likely to be useful indices for detecting genetic and environmental influences on social competence. We also propose specific milestones as indices of further progress in the field: the development of an operational definition of the construct of social competence, the identification of social endophenotypes-psychological processes that are validly and reliably measured components of social competence, and improving specificity and homogeneity with regard to social endophenotypes within a population of study by employing 'extreme social phenotypes'. These efforts will lead to a better understanding of the specific contributions to the normal variation of social competence in the general population as well as to atypical social development.     

Psychoeducation for hypochondriasis: a comparison of a cognitive-behavioural approach and a problem-solving approach

In this study, two 6-week psychoeducational courses for hypochondriasis are compared, one based on the cognitive-behavioural approach, and the other on the problem-solving approach. Effects of both courses on hypochondriacal complaints, depression, trait anxiety, and number of problems encountered in daily life, are measured pre-treatment, post-treatment, and at 1- and 6-month follow-up. Participants (N=48, of whom 4 dropped out), suffering from DSM-IV hypochondriasis, were randomized into one of the two course conditions. Results showed beneficial effects of both courses. Few differential treatment effects were found: in both conditions all effect measures decreased significantly over time (p<0.01). However, between- and inter-individual variability in decrease-patterns was of considerable size, leading to large deviations from the mean pattern. Acceptability and feasibility of both courses were rated highly by their respective participants. It is concluded that both courses can be considered equally beneficial and effective over time, with the effects evident immediately after treatment and maintained over the follow-up period.     

Dream content: Individual and generic aspects

Dream reports were collected from normal subjects in an effort to determine the degree to which dream reports can be used to identify individual dreamers. Judges were asked to group the reports by their authors. The judges scored the reports correctly at chance levels. This finding indicated that dreams may be at least as much like each other as they are the signature of individual dreamers. Our results suggest that dream reports cannot be used to identify the individuals who produced them when identifiers like names and gender of friends and family members are removed from the dream report. In addition to using dreams to learn about an individual, we must look at dreams as telling us about important common or generic aspects of human consciousness.     

Positive Psychotherapy’s Theory of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Capacity to Know</Emphasis> as Explication of Unconscious Contents

Positive Psychotherapy (PPT), founded by Dr. Nossrat Peseschkian, a Persian Bahá’í who has lived in Europe for many years, assumes the functional capacities of the unconscious to be ‘basic capacities.’ PPT makes a distinction between actual capacities and basic capacities. The basic capacities are the capacity to love and the capacity to know. These basic capacities are comprehensive categories underpinning primary and secondary capacities. Based upon Bahá’í teachings, this therapy accepts belief as an implicit aspect of healthy psychological functioning. Moreover, contents of the unconscious in PPT are the conflicts between capacities, and undifferentiated and undeveloped actual capacities.

Empirical Progress and Truth Approximation by the ‘Hypothetico-Probabilistic Method’

Three related intuitions are explicated in this paper. The first is the idea that there must be some kind of probabilistic version of the HD-method, a ‘Hypothetico-Probabilistic (HP-) method’, in terms of something like probabilistic consequences, instead of deductive consequences. According to the second intuition, the comparative application of this method should also be functional for some probabilistic kind of empirical progress, and according to the third intuition this should be functional for something like probabilistic truth approximation. In all three cases, the guiding idea is to explicate these intuitions by explicating the crucial notions as appropriate ‘concretizations’ of their deductive analogs, being ‘idealizations’. It turns out that the comparative version of the proposed HP-method amounts to the likelihood comparison (LC-) method applied to the cumulated evidence. This method turns out to be not only functional for probabilistic empirical progress but also for probabilistic truth approximation. The latter is based on a probabilistic threshold theorem constituting for this reason the analog of the deductive success theorem.

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The Dual Foundation of Qualitative Truth Approximation

The main formal notion involved in qualitative truth approximation by the HD-method, viz. ‘more truthlike’, is shown to not only have, by its definition, an intuitively appealing ‘model foundation’, but also, at least partially, a conceptually plausible ‘consequence foundation’. Moreover, combining the relevant parts of both leads to a very appealing ‘dual foundation’, the more so since the relevant methodological notions, viz. ‘more successful’ and its ingredients provided by the HD-method, can be given a similar dual foundation. According to the resulting dual foundation of ‘naive truth approximation’, the HD-method provides successes (established true consequences) and counterexamples (established wrongly missing models) of theories. Such HD-results may support the tentative conclusion that one theory seems to remain more successful than another in the naive sense of having more successes and fewer counterexamples. If so, this provides good reasons for believing that the more successful theory is also more truthlike in the naive sense of having more correct models and more true consequences. In the dual foundation of ‘refined truth approximation’, HD-results remain of the same two kinds, but ‘more successful’ is taken in the refined sense of accommodating counterexamples while saving relevant successes, in which case ‘more truthlike’ can be taken in the refined sense of improving relevant models while saving relevant consequences. In this way one gets a realistic dual account of qualitative truth approximation by the HD-method. The model foundation can also be extended to the methodological notions, but not in a very plausible way. The consequence foundation only seems specifiable for naive truth approximation, in which case it is plausible. In sum, the dual foundation is superior to both. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.