The Individualised Patient‐Progress System: A decade of international collaborative networking

Background: The backstage of research projects is seldom presented to the general audience, in particular, how the research questions emerged, how the team interacted and how the methods and design were decided upon. Aim: In this paper we will recount the story behind an international practice‐based research network for personalising health assessment, the joint journey of researchers and therapists from three different countries in creating the Individualised Patient‐Progress System (IPPS). Results: We first describe how the idea of the IPPS emerged; then we show how IPPS is being piloted and integrated into clinical practice. Next, we present the views of therapists and researchers who have been part of this project. Conclusions: We discuss some lessons learned from this 14‐year collaborative research programme.     

“Editing” Genes: A Case Study About How Language Matters in Bioethics

Metaphors used to describe new technologies mediate public understanding of the innovations. Analyzing the linguistic, rhetorical, and affective aspects of these metaphors opens the range of issues available for bioethical scrutiny and increases public accountability. This article shows how such a multidisciplinary approach can be useful by looking at a set of texts about one issue, the use of a newly developed technique for genetic modification, CRISPRcas9.     

Executive function in early childhood: longitudinal measurement invariance and developmental change

This study tested the longitudinal measurement invariance and developmental changes of a newly developed battery of executive function (EF) tasks for use in early childhood. The battery was administered in the Family Life Project-a prospective longitudinal study (N = 1,292) of families who were oversampled from low-income and African American families at the birth of a new child-at assessments conducted when the child was 3, 4, and 5 years old. All 6 individual EF tasks exhibited strong measurement invariance over time. The EF battery, which was derived from the 6 individual tasks, exhibited partial strong invariance over time. Second-order latent growth curve models revealed individual differences in the levels but not rates of change in latent EF ability. The functional form of change was nonlinear; 60% of the total change in EF ability that was observed between the 3- and 5-year assessments occurred between the Year 3 and Year 4 assessments. Results are discussed with respect to the importance of establishing scalable measures of EF ability prior to investigating experiences that predict or are predicted by changes in EF during early childhood.     

Dimensions of belief about miraculous healing

Although social scientists have convincingly demonstrated relationships between religious beliefs/practices and mental health, almost none of the empirical findings or related theory apply specifically to Jews. To address this limitation, we investigated the role of Jewish religiousness in anxiety, depression, and happiness, in a large Jewish community sample (n = 565). Several facets of global Jewish religiousness were examined, as well as a theoretically based Jewish religious variable, trust in God. A self-report measure of trust in God was created, and factor analyses yielded two reliable and valid subscales: trust in God and mistrust in God. Contrary to our hypotheses, global Jewish religiousness was on the whole unrelated to mental-health functioning. As expected, higher levels of trust in God were associated with less anxiety and depression, and greater personal happiness, whereas inverse associations emerged for the unanticipated but robust mistrust subscale.     

Reason explanation a first-order rationalizing account

In this article, I discuss whether intuitive moral judgements have epistemic value. Are they mere expressions of irrational feelings that should be disregarded or should they be taken seriously? In section 2, I discuss the view of some social psychologists that moral intuitions are, like other social intuitions, under certain conditions more reliable than conscious deliberative judgements. In sections 3 and 4, I examine whether intuitive moral judgements can be said not to need inferential justification. I outline a concept of moral intuition as a seeming whose seemingness resides in special, phenomenological features such as a felt veridicality, appropriateness, familiarity, or confidence, and whose justificatory force is influenced by the reliability of the belief-producing procedures and by a subject's competence in applying moral concepts. I argue that subjects can come to realise that the beliefs expressed in their intuitive judgements evoke a sense of non-inferential credibility. In section 5, I first discuss the contribution of moral expertise to the non-inferential credibility of a person's intuitions. Subsequently, I discuss whether Walter Sinnott-Armstrong is right in saying that we can never claim non-inferential justification for our intuitions because they are subject to all kinds of distorting influences.