Successive reversal of concurrent discriminations by macaques (Macaca mulatta): proactive interference effects

Rhesus monkeys received concurrent within-session training on eight, two-choice object pairs and then underwent successive reversals of these problems. Initially, reversals required about six times more training than acquisition with no improvement over seven successive reversals. Surprisingly, performance on these eight problems was unimpaired if they were embedded in different eight-problem tasks, thereby indicating a release from proactive interference. When the original eight problems again underwent successive reversal, no improvement was seen over seven reversals, although there was significantly less error-per-reversal than in the initial test. Subsequently, monkeys appeared to be developing a learning set for successive reversal because performance on successive reversal of eight novel problems was not different from that seen with the old familiar task. Set acquisition was confirmed when proficient reversal was eventually achieved on both old and new concurrent tasks. Thus, concurrent reversal set did develop, but it required arduous training to overcome proactive interference effects on memory. The ubiquitous influence of measurement context on organization of monkey memory was noted.     

Most People are Pretty Happy,but There is Cultural Variation: The Inughuit,The Amish,and The Maasai

Diener and Diener (1996; Psychological Science 7: 181–185) suggested that most people are happy, and offered support for this claim from surveys in industrialized societies. We extend their findings to include people who lead materially simple lives and live in cultures far removed from those of typical survey respondents. We found that the Kenyan Maasai, the United States Amish, and the Greenlandic Inughuit, all reported positive levels of life satisfaction, domain satisfaction, and affect balance (more frequent positive emotions than negative ones). Across satisfaction and affect measures, including methods in addition to global self-reports, our 358 respondents from these cultures were one average, positive on all 54 scales, and significantly above neutral on 53 of them. Across all measures and samples 84% of participants scored above neutral. However, nobody was perfectly happy and satisfied, and the groups reported unique configurations of satisfaction and affect. Although all three groups were high in satisfaction with so cial domains, the Amish reported lower satisfaction with self-related domains, and the Maasai and Inughuit were relatively lower in satisfaction with material domains. All three groups reported frequent positive emotions, but only the Maasai reported frequent feelings of pride. Thus, the fact that most people tend to be moderately happy does not mean that they are ecstatic, or that there is no variation across cultures in happiness.     

“Hands up Who Wants to Die?”: Primoratz on Responsibility and Civilian Immunity in Wartime

The question of the morality of war is something of an embarrassment to liberal political thinkers. A philosophical tradition which aspires to found its preferred institutions in respect for individual autonomy, contract, and voluntary association, is naturally confronted by a phenomenon that is almost exclusively explained and justified in the language of States, force and territory. But the apparent difficulties involved in providing a convincing account of nature and ethics of war in terms of relations between individuals has not prevented liberal theorists from attempting this task. This paper examines a recent attempt by Igor Primoratz to sketch out the implications of a consistent liberalism for just war doctrine and, in particular, as regards the question of who may be a legitimate target of attack in wartime. Primoratz’s paper itself is a critique of Michael Waltzer’s authoritative exposition of just war theory for failing to be sufficiently and consistently liberal. The debate between these two authors is a productive site for investigating the potential and limitations of liberal theories of just war.     

The tie that binds? Coherence among emotion experience, behavior, and physiology

Emotion theories commonly postulate that emotions impose coherence across multiple response systems. However, empirical support for this coherence postulate is surprisingly limited. In the present study, the authors (a) examined the within-individual associations among experiential, facial behavioral, and peripheral physiological responses during emotional responding and (b) assessed whether emotion intensity moderates these associations. Experiential, behavioral, and physiological responses were measured second-by-second during a film that induced amusement and sadness. Results indicate that experience and behavior were highly associated but that physiological responses were only modestly associated with experience and behavior. Intensity of amusement experience was associated with greater coherence between behavior and physiological responding; intensity of sadness experience was not. These findings provide new evidence about response system coherence in emotions.     

Effects of direct and averted gaze on the perception of facially communicated emotion

Research has largely neglected the effects of gaze direction cues on the perception of facial expressions of emotion. It was hypothesized that when gaze direction matches the underlying behavioral intent (approach-avoidance) communicated by an emotional expression, the perception of that emotion would be enhanced (i.e., shared signal hypothesis). Specifically, the authors expected that (a) direct gaze would enhance the perception of approach-oriented emotions (anger and joy) and (b) averted eye gaze would enhance the perception of avoidance-oriented emotions (fear and sadness). Three studies supported this hypothesis. Study 1 examined emotional trait attributions made to neutral faces. Study 2 examined ratings of ambiguous facial blends of anger and fear. Study 3 examined the influence of gaze on the perception of highly prototypical expressions.     

The odd-even effect in addition: an analysis per problem type

The odd-even effect is a well documented finding in the literature on mental arithmetic, at least for multiplication. It implies that false answers with the same parity as the correct answer are rejected more slowly than false answers with a different parity. For addition, this effect is not so well documented. The study by Krueger and Hallford (1984) is the only one that investigated odd-even effects for addition. However, they did not investigate odd-even effects per problem, even though there are indications that problem type can modulate odd-even effects for multiplication (Lemaire & Reder, 1999). Therefore, we wanted to get more insight into odd-even effects for addition by investigating odd-even effects per problem type. Our results extended the findings of Krueger and Hallford. First of all, we found an interaction between split and problem type. The most important and new result of present study, however, was a strong parity effect for E + E problems. We discuss our results in terms of two alternative explanations for odd-even effects, namely use of a parity rule on the one hand and familiarity with even outcomes on the other.