TRANSVALUATIONISM ABOUT VAGUENESS: A PROGRESS REPORT

The philosophical account of vagueness I call “transvaluationism” makes three fundamental claims. First, vagueness is logically incoherent in a certain way: it essentially involves mutually unsatisfiable requirements that govern vague language, vague thought‐content, and putative vague objects and properties. Second, vagueness in language and thought (i.e., semantic vagueness) is a genuine phenomenon despite possessing this form of incoherence—and is viable, legitimate, and indeed indispensable. Third, vagueness as a feature of objects, properties, or relations (i.e., ontological vagueness) is impossible, because of the mutually unsatisfiable conditions that such putative items would have to meet. In this paper I set forth the core claims of transvaluationism in a way that acknowledges and explicitly addresses a challenging critique by Timothy Williamson of my prior attempts to articulate and defend this approach to vagueness. I sketch my favored approach to truth and ontological commitment, and I explain how it accommodates the impossibility of ontological vagueness. I argue that any approach to the logic and semantics of vagueness that both (i) eschews epistemicism and (ii) thoroughly avoids positing any arbitrary sharp boundaries (either first‐order or higher‐order) will have to be not an alternative to transvaluationism but an implementation of it. I sketch my reasons for repudiating epistemicism. I briefly describe my current thinking about how to accommodate intentional mental properties with vague content within an ontology that eschews ontological vagueness. And I revisit the idea, which played a key role in my earlier articulations of transvaluationism, that moral conflicts provide an illuminating model for understanding vagueness.     

Exploring the utility of functional analysis methodology to assess and treat problematic verbal behavior in persons with acquired brain injury

Functional analyses were conducted on four adults with acquired brain injuries who regularly displayed instances of inappropriate verbal behavior including depressive, aggressive, suicidal, profane, and sexually inappropriate utterances. After the functional analysis yielded a maintaining variable for each participant, a function‐based intervention consisting of differential reinforcement of alternative verbal behavior was implemented. Results of the behavioral interventions show that instances of vocal behavior can be assessed and subsequently treated using the functional analysis methodology often reserved for nonverbal forms of behavior. The utility of functional analysis for assessing complex human behavior is discussed. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.