Evaluation of self-administered rational emotive therapy programs for interpersonal anxiety

Self-administered rational emotive therapy (RET), withA New Guide to Rational Living (Ellis & Harper, 1975), as the treatment manual, was evaluated by comparing three groups which varied in terms of therapist contact (therapist administered, minimal contact, self-administered). University students who volunteered for the research program involving the treatment of interpersonal anxiety were randomly assigned to one of these treatments or to a wait-list control group. The results for 72 subjects who completed the 5-week program indicated the three treatment groups made significant gains over untreated controls on some of the self-report measures. No between-group differences appeared on ratings by significant others. A four- to five-month follow-up, which obtained data from 41 (58%) of the subjects, provided some support for the maintenance of treatment effects for the therapist administered and minimal contact groups. Correlations of assessed irrational beliefs with outcome measures provided some support for the RET model.Norris D. Vestre, Ph.D., is a Professor in the Department of Psychology, Arizona State University. Terrence J. Judge, M.C., R.N.C., is a nurse therapist at Camelback Vista Treatment Center, Scottsdale, Arizona.     

Confidence intervals for the parameters of psychometric functions

A Monte Carlo method for computing the bias and standard deviation of estimates of the parameters of a psychometric function such as the Weibull/Quick is described. The method, based on Efron's parametric bootstrap, can also be used to estimate confidence intervals for these parameters. The method's ability to predict bias, standard deviation, and confidence intervals is evaluated in two ways. First, its predictions are compared to the outcomes of Monte Carlo simulations of psychophysical experiments. Second, its predicted confidence intervals were compared with the actual variability of human observers in a psychophysical task. Computer programs implementing the method are available from the author.     

A multidimensional scaling model for the size-weight illusion

The kinds of individual differences in perceptions permitted by the weighted euclidean model for multidimensional scaling (e.g., INDSCAL) are much more restricted than those allowed by Tucker's Three-mode Multidimensional Scaling (TMMDS) model or Carroll's Idiosyncratic Scaling (IDIOSCAL) model. Although, in some situations the more general models would seem desirable, investigators have been reluctant to use them because they are subject to transformational indeterminacies which complicate interpretation. In this article, we show how these indeterminacies can be removed by constructing specific models of the phenomenon under investigation. As an example of this approach, a model of the size-weight illusion is developed and applied to data from two experiments, with highly meaningful results. The same data are also analyzed using INDSCAL. Of the two solutions, only the one obtained by using the size-weight model allows examination of individual differences in the strength of the illusion; INDSCAL can not represent such differences. In this sample, however, individual differences in illusion strength turn out to be minor. Hence the INDSCAL solution, while less informative than the size-weight solution, is nonetheless easily interpretable.This paper is based on the first author's doctoral dissertation at the Department of Psychology, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The aid of Professor Ledyard R Tucker is gratefully acknowledged.     

Reciprocal relations among motivational frameworks,math anxiety,and math achievement in early elementary school

School-entry math achievement is a strong predictor of math achievement through high school. We asked whether reciprocal relations among math achievement, math anxiety, and entity motivational frameworks (believing that ability is fixed and a focus on performance) can help explain these persistent individual differences. We assessed 1st and 2nd graders’ (N = 634) math achievement, motivational frameworks, and math anxiety 2 times, 6 months apart. Cross-lagged path analyses showed reciprocal relations between math anxiety and math achievement and between motivational frameworks and math achievement. Entity motivational frameworks predicted higher math anxiety. High math achievement was a particularly strong predictor of lower math anxiety and less entity-oriented motivational frameworks. We concluded that reciprocal effects are already present in the first 2 years of formal schooling, with math achievement and attitudes feeding off one another to produce either a vicious or virtuous cycle. Improving both math performance and math attitudes may set children onto a long-lasting, positive trajectory in math.     

The line-motion illusion can be reversed by motion signals after the line disappears

In the line-motion illusion, a briefly flashed line appears to propagate from the locus of attention, despite being physically presented on the screen all at once. It has been proposed that the illusion reflects low-level visual information processing that occurs faster at the locus of attention (Hikosaka et al 1993 Vision Research 33 1219-1240; Perception 22 517-526). Such an explanation implicitly embeds the assumption that speeding or slowing of neural signals will map directly onto perceptual timing. This 'online' hypothesis presupposes that signals which arrive first are perceived first. However, other evidence suggests that events in a window of time after the disappearance of a visual stimulus can influence the brain's interpretation of that stimulus (Eagleman and Sejnowski 2000 Science 287 2036-2038; 289 1107a; 290 1051a; 2002 Trends in Neuroscience 25 293). If the online hypothesis were true, we should expect that events occurring after the flashing of the line would not change the illusion. Consistent with our hypothesis that awareness is an a posteriori reconstruction, we demonstrate that the perceived direction of illusory line-motion can be reversed by manipulating stimuli after the line has disappeared.     

Content: Covariation,control and contingency

The Representational Theory of the Mind allows for psychological explanations couched in terms of the contents of propositional attitudes. Propositional attitudes themselves are taken to be relations to mental representations. These representations (partially) determine the contents of the attitudes in which they figure. Thus, Representationalism owes an explanation of the contents of mental representations. This essay constitutes an atomistic theory of the content of formally or syntactically simple mental representation, proposing that the content of such a representation is determined by the intersection of the representation's correlational and control properties. The theory is distinguished from standard information-based accounts of mental content in allowing that the relevant correlations be contingent while insisting on an efferent aspect to mental content. The theory on offer allows for a natural explanation of misrepresentation, finds a niche for the notion ofnarrow content, welcomes radical first person fallibility with respect to questions of content, admits of mental ambiguity and recognizes that the future of a psychological agent is a factor in determining the content of the agent's present psychological states.