全文获取类型
收费全文 | 21411篇 |
免费 | 73篇 |
出版年
2023年 | 7篇 |
2022年 | 9篇 |
2020年 | 10篇 |
2019年 | 28篇 |
2018年 | 3501篇 |
2017年 | 2840篇 |
2016年 | 2272篇 |
2015年 | 214篇 |
2014年 | 100篇 |
2013年 | 181篇 |
2012年 | 590篇 |
2011年 | 2410篇 |
2010年 | 2536篇 |
2009年 | 1513篇 |
2008年 | 1735篇 |
2007年 | 2206篇 |
2006年 | 60篇 |
2005年 | 246篇 |
2004年 | 199篇 |
2003年 | 147篇 |
2002年 | 95篇 |
2001年 | 53篇 |
2000年 | 73篇 |
1999年 | 41篇 |
1998年 | 38篇 |
1997年 | 35篇 |
1996年 | 28篇 |
1995年 | 15篇 |
1994年 | 19篇 |
1993年 | 11篇 |
1992年 | 11篇 |
1991年 | 17篇 |
1990年 | 20篇 |
1988年 | 10篇 |
1987年 | 9篇 |
1986年 | 16篇 |
1985年 | 20篇 |
1984年 | 11篇 |
1983年 | 16篇 |
1982年 | 12篇 |
1981年 | 7篇 |
1980年 | 16篇 |
1978年 | 10篇 |
1977年 | 6篇 |
1976年 | 8篇 |
1975年 | 7篇 |
1974年 | 10篇 |
1973年 | 9篇 |
1970年 | 8篇 |
1966年 | 6篇 |
排序方式: 共有10000条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
201.
Negotiation is not only used to settle differences of interest but also to settle differences of opinion. Discussants who are unable to resolve their difference about the objective worth of a policy or action proposal may be willing to abandon their attempts to convince the other and search instead for a compromise that would, for each of them, though only a second choice yet be preferable to a lasting conflict. Our questions are: First, when is it sensible to enter into negotiations and when would this be unwarranted or even fallacious? Second, what is the nature of a compromise? What does it mean to settle instead of resolve a difference of opinion, and what might be the dialectical consequences of mistaking a compromise for a substantial resolution? Our main aim is to contribute to the theory of argumentation within the context of negotiation and compromise formation and to show how arguing disputants can shift to negotiation in a dialectically virtuous way. 相似文献
202.
203.
This paper approaches legal argumentation from a rhetorical perspective. It discusses the nature of the audiences that are (and should be) targeted by judges in the legal process. Judicial opinions reach diverse groups of people with very different attitudes and expectations: other judges, lawyers, litigants, concerned citizens, etc. One important way in which these groups differ is that some of them are more likely to be persuaded by legalistic, precedent or statute-based arguments, while others expect judges to decide on grounds of justice or equity. So, judges face the challenge of determining whether they should select particular groups for special attention, or whether they have alternative rhetorical means to approach the problem of audience diversity. One strategy that is likely to be recommended by rhetorical scholars is that judges should not try to accommodate the various preferences of their actual readership, but that they should rather invoke an idealized audience or some version of Chaïm Perelman’s universal audience. However, the paper tries to show that the universal audience is of limited value for a discussion about how judges ought to proceed in the face of audience diversity. In particular, the idea of a universal audience does not help judges to make the choice between a legalistic or an equity-based approach to legal decision-making. By showing that this is so, the paper also raises doubts about the common thought that to invoke the universal audience in law is to appeal to natural law (as distinct from written, positive law). 相似文献
204.
José Ángel Gascón 《Argumentation》2018,32(2):155-173
Virtuous arguers are expected to manifest virtues such as intellectual humility and open-mindedness, but from such traits the quality of arguments does not immediately follow. However, it also seems implausible that a virtuous arguer can systematically put forward bad arguments. How could virtue argumentation theory combine both insights? The solution, I argue, lies in an analogy with virtue epistemology: considering both responsibilist and reliabilist virtues gives us a fuller picture of the virtuous arguer. 相似文献
205.
Oliver Laas 《Argumentation》2018,32(1):99-149
Arguments from analogy are pervasive in everyday reasoning, mathematics, philosophy, and science. Informal logic studies everyday argumentation in ordinary language. A branch of fuzzy logic, approximate reasoning, seeks to model facets of everyday reasoning with vague concepts in ill-defined situations. Ways of combining the results from these fields will be suggested by introducing a new argumentation scheme—a fuzzy analogical argument from classification—with the associated critical questions. This will be motivated by a case study of analogical reasoning in the virtual friendship debate within information ethics. The virtual friendship debate is a disagreement over whether virtual friendships are genuine friendships. It will be argued that the debate could move away from its current impasse, caused by unproductive metaphysical and logical assumptions, if extant arguments are reinterpreted as fuzzy analogical arguments from classification, and subjected to a new set of critical questions which would replace the quest for facts of essence about friendship with an emphasis on empirical data, persuasion, and definitional power. 相似文献
206.
Finnur Dellsén 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2018,49(3):451-459
Dellsén (2016) has recently argued for an understanding-based account of scientific progress, the noetic account, according to which science (or a particular scientific discipline) makes cognitive progress precisely when it increases our understanding of some aspect of the world. I contrast this account with Bird’s (2007, 2015); epistemic account, according to which such progress is made precisely when our knowledge of the world is increased or accumulated. In a recent paper, Park (2017) criticizes various aspects of my account and his arguments in favor of the noetic account as against Bird’s epistemic account. This paper responds to Park’s objections. An important upshot of the paper is that we should distinguish between episodes that constitute and promote scientific progress, and evaluate account of scientific progress in terms of how they classify different episodes with respect to these categories. 相似文献
207.
Theodor Leiber 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2018,49(3):491-493
208.
Katerina Clark 《Studies in East European Thought》2018,70(2-3):153-165
The essay concerns the highly controversial pamphlet of Rosa Luxemburg The Russian Revolution (1918/1922), in which Luxemburg criticizes Lenin’s post-revolutionary policies, in particular his dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, an elected body. The essay reviews the history of the text’s publication and the intense debate, which continues to this day, over whether or not Luxemburg changed her mind on its central critique. At stake in the argument is not only Luxemburg’s evaluation of Lenin’s actions but also the correct weighting to be given to the two components in the central Marxist–Leninist dialectic of revolution: spontaneity and consciousness. In elaborating this point the essay brings in examples from the writings of Lukács and Stalin, and also discusses the dialectic’s centrality in socialist realism. 相似文献
209.
Jeffrey Goodman 《Argumentation》2018,32(4):589-602
There is no concept more central to logic and critical thinking than the concept of an argument. I here address the definition of ‘argument’ in the logical sense of the term and defend the claim that many current proposals, once they are interpreted in a way that makes them sufficiently precise, are extensionally inadequate. Definitions found in some contemporary, prominent critical thinking textbooks will serve as a springboard. I claim that each may be interpreted in an absolutist way (i.e., as providing a definition of ‘argument’ simpliciter) or a relativistic way (as providing a definition of ‘argument-for-S’, where S is some agent or group of agents), yet all turn out to be objectionable no matter which route is taken. I finish with a proposal on which the definition of ‘argument’ is an absolutist one, yet one that avoids the problems discussed for the earlier proposals. 相似文献
210.
Michael Böhler 《Journal for General Philosophy of Science》2018,49(4):551-567
The present discussion contribution argues that O. Müller not only suppresses Goethe’s declared intentions with regard to the latter’s Theory of Colors and ignores his place in what in any case is a different scientific culture than his (Müller’s) own or Newton’s, namely a premodern culture of “narrative knowledge” in the sense specified by Lyotard. Moreover, Müller entangles himself in the paradox of wanting on the one hand to back up Goethe on the level of fact when the latter opposes the militant selfrighteousness of the Newtonian school, but doing so on the other hand by constructing an epic-heroic narrative of Newtonian militance, not to say eristic belligerence contradictory to Goethe’s own “tolerant enlightenment” in Lakatos’ sense. Thus, we are confronted with one of those cases where, as Paul de Man puts it, a multidimensional critical reading on the semiological as well as rhetorical levels shows “that the text does not practice what it preaches” (1979, 5). 相似文献