Response slowing of older adults: effects of time-limit contingencies on single- and dual-task performances

Younger and older men (18-25 vs. 65-76 years of age) were given extended practice (44 hr) with a memory scanning procedure in which lists of visual and auditory items were presented singly (single-task condition) or together with a second visual or auditory list (dual-task condition). For both age groups, identification of test items was slower with the dual-task procedure, and experience with the tasks produced only small changes in response latencies. When time limits were placed on responding, latencies decreased substantially, and the difference between single and divided tasks was reduced. Although the older men were slower throughout the experiment, the time limit contingency reduced age differences in responses to both tasks. The task effect was larger for the older men, but this age difference also was reduced by the time limit procedures.     

Dissociations among memory measures in memory-impaired subjects: Evidence for a processing account of memory

Deficits in conceptual transfer on both implicit and explicit memory tests were obtained for memory-impaired temporal lobe epileptic (TLE) subjects in three studies. In Experiment 1, in which a generate-read paradigm was employed, memory-impaired TLEs failed to show normal generation effects on conceptually driven tests of semantic cued recall and general knowledge questions, although their data-driven memory as measured by word-fragment completion and graphemic cued recall tasks was normal. In Experiment 2, memory-impaired patients having left temporal lobe seizure foci were tested on these four tasks and compared with nonimpaired TLEs having right temporal foci. The left TLEs showed deficits on conceptually driven tasks and normal memory for data-driven tests. These findings were extended in Experiment 3, in which left TLE patients failed to show any benefit from blocked study, as compared with random study, on category production and semantic cued-recall tests, although right TLEs and normal controls showed blocking effects on both tasks. These findings may be accommodated by a processing framework of memory in which memory-impaired patients are characterized as having deficits in conceptual, but not in data-driven, processing capabilities.     

Maternal gestational stress alters adaptive and social behavior in adolescent rhesus monkey offspring

Data from rodent studies have indicated that stress experienced by pregnant mothers may result in behavioral and biological abnormalities in their offspring. However, few studies have examined the effects of prenatal stress on the offspring beyond the childhood period. In this study, 7 prenatally stressed (PNS) monkeys and 7 monkeys from undisturbed pregnancies were tested under mildly challenging conditions at 4 years of age. Following separation from cagemates and group formation, PNS monkeys showed more locomotion, abnormal and disturbance behavior than controls. Controls showed approximately six times more play than PNS animals. The PNS males showed the most clinging to others and the largest increase in contact with other animals over the period. Group differences were also found when the monkeys were observed as groups or alone in a playroom. Controls showed more explanatory behavior in the playroom, whereas PNS monkeys showed more inactivity. Control animals showed a decrease in distress vocalizations over time in the playroom, whereas PNS animals showed the opposite pattern. Control animals spent more time in proximity to and contact with cagemates than PNS animals. These results indicate that prenatal stress can have effects on adaptive and social behavior that persist into adolescence.     

CONTRIBUTIONS OF COGNITIVE THEORY TO NEW BEHAVIORAL TREATMENTS

Abstract— Although clinical, social, and cognitive psychologists alt use the concept of 'cognition,' they often use a in different ways to refer to different phenomena. We offer a heuristic framework for distinguishing among three general uses of the word cognition, and apply this framework to an evaluation of the experiential avoidance concept presented by Hayes and Gifford (this issue) While acknowledging the promise of such work, we raise concerns about its possible limitations. We recommend that clinical applications of the cognition concept be grounded in the theories and methods of contemporary cognitive and neural sciences In support of our recommendation, we present three examples from experiments from out own research.     

Self-perceptions of reactions to doing well or poorly: The roles of stability and level of self-esteem

We examined how individual differences in stability and level of self-esteem relate to self-perceptions of reactions to evaluative events. After exposure to either positive or negative mood-inducing stimuli, participants indicated the likelihood that they would react in reasonable, defensive/aggrandizing, and self-deprecating ways to doing well or poorly at something. Compared to stable high self-esteem individuals (stable high SEs), unstable high SEs reported a greater likelihood of reactions that appear to reflect fragile feelings of self-worth (e.g. more defensive/aggrandizing reactions). Fewer differences as a function of stability of self-esteem emerged among low SEs. Mood interacted with the self-esteem variables in the prediction of several reaction categories. These findings lend support for a multifaceted conceptualization of self-esteem and its role in psychological functioning.     

The effect of normative beliefs on anticipated emotions.

In 3 experiments, Ss were asked how they would or should make hypothetical decisions and how they would react emotionally to the options or outcomes. The choices were those in which departures from proposed normative models had previously been found: omission bias, status quo bias, and the person-causation effect. These effects were found in all judgments, including judgments of anticipated emotion. Arguments against the departures affected judgments of anticipated emotion as well as decisions, even though the arguments were entirely directed at the question of what should be done. In all but one study, effects of these arguments on anticipated emotion were as strong as their effects on decisions or normative beliefs. Thus, in many situations, people think that their emotional reactions will fall into line with their normative beliefs. In other situations, some people think that their emotional reactions have a life of their own. It is suggested that both normative beliefs and anticipated emotions affect decisions.