The adaptive change model: an advance on the transtheoretical model of change

The author proposed a hypothetical model of change, the adaptive change model (ACM), to advance the current conceptualization and operationalization of the transtheoretical model of change (TTM; D. Grimley, J. Prochaska, W. Velicer, M. Blais, & C. DiClemente, 1994; J. Prochaska, 1979; J. Prochaska & C. DiClemente, 1984). He used exploratory factor analysis to identify items contributing to 2 sets of factors defining the Adaptive Change Questionnaire (T. Bowles, 2001). The factors were consistent for both clinical (n = 222) and nonclinical (n = 194) respondents. The first set of factors defined the process of change and included Openness to Opportunity, Visualization, Planning, Action, and Closure. The second set of factors described the factors that support change and included Social Support, Inner Drive, and Negative Emotions. Through analysis of gender effects, the author found that men scored significantly and slightly higher than did women on Openness to Opportunity, Visualization, and Inner Drive. There were no interactions involving gender and clinical status. Discriminant function analysis predicting clinical status on the basis of the 8 factors placed 80% of respondents in the correct category. The author discusses the relevance of the ACM in comparison with the characteristics of the TTM.     

On the neural correlates of object recognition awareness: relationship to computational activities and activities mediating perceptual awareness

Based on theoretical considerations of Aurell (1979) and Block (1995), we argue that object recognition awareness is distinct from purely sensory awareness and that the former is mediated by neuronal activities in areas that are separate and distinct from cortical sensory areas. We propose that two of the principal functions of neuronal activities in sensory cortex, which are to provide sensory awareness and to effect the computations that are necessary for object recognition, are dissociated. We provide examples of how this dissociation might be achieved and argue that the components of the neuronal activities which carry the computations do not directly enter the awareness of the subject. The results of these computations are sparse representations (i.e., vector or distributed codes) which are activated by the presentation of particular sensory objects and are essentially engrams for the recognition of objects. These final representations occur in the highest order areas of sensory cortex; in the visual analyzer, the areas include the anterior part of the inferior temporal cortex and the perirhinal cortex. We propose, based on lesion and connectional data, that the two areas in which activities provide recognition awareness are the temporopolar cortex and the medial orbitofrontal cortex. Activities in the temporopolar cortex provide the recognition awareness of objects learned in the remote past (consolidated object recognition), and those in the medial orbitofrontal cortex provide the recognition awareness of objects learned in the recent past. The activation of the sparse representation for a particular sensory object in turn activates neurons in one or both of these regions of cortex, and it is the activities of these neurons that provide the awareness of recognition of the object in question. The neural circuitry involved in the activation of these representations is discussed.     

A critique of science and R&D-based models of endogenous growth

Conclusion We have argued against the conventional treatment of science from two directions: firstly, we show that its assumptions about the mechanics of technology transfer are at odds with what occurs in practice. Secondly, the predictions of models based on conventional assumptions receive little support empirically, and are on some occasions contradicted by the data. We believe that the weaknesses we have discussed prompt a re-analysis of science as the workings of invisible colleges. Moreover, we note that there appears, at present, to be no empirical or sound theoretical reason to suppose that, for reasons of economic growth, governments need fund science. the author of The Economic Laws of Scientific Research, Macmillan/St Martin’s Press, 1996.     

Vice and Reason

Aristotle's account of vice presents a puzzle: (1) Viciouspeople must be guided by reason, since they act on decision(prohairesis), not on their non-rational desires. (2) And yet theycannot be guided by reason, since they are said to pay attention totheir non-rational part and not to live in accordance with reason. Wecan understand the conception of vice the reconciles these two claims,once we examine Aristotle's account of (a) the pursuit of the fine andof the expedient; (b) the connexion between vice and the pursuit ofpleasure; (c) the particular kind of regret to which the vicious personis subject.     

Love and Liturgy

For two millennia Christians have assembled on the “day of the sun” to celebrate the liturgy together. But why do it? Why structure one's life in such a way that participation in ritualized religious activity is a fixed point in the weekly rhythm of one's comings and goings? The project of this essay is to identify reasons to engage in such activity that emanate from the Christian ethical vision. Fundamental to this vision is a contrast between an ethic of proximity, which enjoins us to attend to the needs of those near and dear, and an ethic of outwardness, which enjoins us to both attend to and open ourselves up to the needs of those who belong to various out‐groups. The Christian ethical vision enjoins an ethic of outwardness. A close look at the liturgies of the Eastern Christian tradition reveals the ways in which they express this ethic.     

Relies to our critics

We respond to the central concerns raised by our commentators to our book, The Epistemological Spectrum. Casullo believes that our account of what we term “low-grade a priori” justification provides important clarification of a kind of philosophical reflection. However he objects to calling such reflection a priori. We explain what we think is at stake. Along the way, we comment on his idea of that there may be an epistemic payoff to making a distinction between assumptions and presumptions. In the book, we argued that an epistemically important form of nonaccidental reliability can be understood as a matter of processes being “transglobally reliable under modulational control.” Graham recommends another form of nonaccidental reliability, one rooted in evolutionary etiology. We explain why we think that the reliability of perceptual processes is best understood as turning of the kinds of modulational control that we highlight. We clarify how this approach represents a kind of reasonable epistemic patience—modulational control takes time, as it must turn on agents generating information about their own capacities and foibles. Lyons raises interesting questions regarding how (what we term) morphological content possessed by the agent can do the work that we set for it. We argue that it is necessary in order for agents to accommodate the background information that is relevant to many central problems of belief formation. We clarify how it can be expected to work.