Alcohol dependence,beliefs and the priming effect

Twenty hospitalized alcoholics served as their own controls in a study which sought to compare psychophysiological and cognitive factors as mediating influences on the priming effect of alcohol. Ten subjects were independently assessed by a psychiatrist as being severely dependent on alcohol and ten as mildly or moderately alcohol dependent. Physiological, behavioural and subjective indices of the motivation to drink alcohol were employed 15 and 60 min after subjects had consumed beverages on four separate occasions corresponding to four priming conditions. These priming drinks contained either 60 ml vodka in heavy dilution or just tonic water, and in each of these conditions subjects were either led to believe that the beverages contained alcohol or they had no alcohol. The severely-dependent group displayed a degree of concordance between the indices of motivation to drink, and the levels of these tended to be significantly higher than in the less-dependent subjects. The results suggest that severely alcohol-dependent subjects were more disposed to drink 60 min after consuming alcoholic drinks than after soft drinks, regardless of whether they believed that the priming drinks had contained alcohol. Cognitive factors assumed greater importance for the drinking behaviour of less-dependent subjects, although there was evidence of discordance across behavioural, physiological and subjective measures for this group.     

Structural models for the mediation of salience effects on attribution

Previous research has demonstrated that salient information is overrepresented in causal attributions. Two experiments were conducted to investigate potential mediators for this effect and to make a case for the use of structural models in explanations of process. Two mediators were considered: enhanced visual recall of salient stimuli and exaggerated schema-relevant recall of salient stimuli. Although analyses of variance supported the visual recall model, structural analyses demonstrated its implausibility. Analyses of variance and structural models revealed that schema-relevant recall, that is, information seen as representative of causal influence, is a plausible mediator; this was particularly true of relevant visual information. Results suggest that salience effects (S. E. Taylor & S. T. Fiske in L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 11). New York: Academic Press, 1978) are due to: (a) the attentional advantage of inherently salient visual events and (b) the influence of stored visual and nonvisual schema-relevant information on causal judgments.     

Imaging,empathy, and causal attribution

Three studies were conducted to test whether imagery accounts for the effects of empathy on attributions, that is, whether attributers construct and scan a mental image of social scenarios the same way that actual participants scan a real environment. According to this interpretation, attributers “see” the world as the participant does and make vicarious attributions. An alternative interpretation holds that subjects base vicarious attributions on recreating the motivations and affect of the actor, so that imaging is irrelevant to empathy and attributions. In the first study, subjects who imagined a story from the perspective of a particular character later showed differential recall of story details as a function of role, but not differential attributions. In Experiment 2, role-taking subjects showed clear effects of imaged perspective on recall for story details, but no effects on attributions of causality for an accident. Further, recall and attribution were uncorrelated. In the last study, empathy and imagery role-taking instructions produced independent effects: imagers showed pronounced perspective-relevant recall and empathizers did not. Neither showed unambiguous vicarious attributions. Recall and attribution were again uncorrelated. These studies suggest that the imagery explanation of empathy effects is untenable, and imply that the recall of perspective-relevant details is unlikely to mediate attributions of causality in imaginary scenarios.     

Fact and fantasy: the roles of accuracy and variability in confusing imaginations with perceptual experiences

In Experiment 1, pictures were presented to subjects two, five, or eight times, and subjects were asked to imagine each pciture two, five, or eight times. Subsequently, subjects estimated the number of times each picture had been presented. Their estimates of the frequency of these external events were influenced by imagination trials; this effect was greater for good imagers than for poor imagers. Experiment 2 involved a similar design in which subjects were asked either to imagine the same referent for a word or to imagine a different referent for a word on successive imagination trials. Consistency (same referent) did not increase the influence of imaginations on immediate judgments of external frequency. Thus, the results of Experiment 1 were attributed to the greater accuracy (as opposed to greater consistency) of good imagers' internal generations of the stimuli. Furthermore, variation (imagining different referents), like greater accuracy, increased the effects of imagination trials on immediate but not on delayed judgments of frequency. Possible mechanisms underlying these effects are discussed. In general, the two studies show that qualitative characteristics of completely covert generations influence their impact on estimates of the frequency of external events.     

The effects of alcohol and extreme provocation on the use of a highly noxious electric shock

Intoxicated and nonintoxicated subjects were given the opportunity to administer a potentially injurious level of shock to an opponent who behaved in either a provocative or an extremely provocative manner. The provocative opponent attempted to administer high-intensity shocks to the subject. The extremely provocative opponent attempted to administer high-intensity shocks and the potentially injurious level of shock. The intoxicated subjects in the extreme provocation condition evidenced the greatest increase in the use of the potentially injurious shock. It was concluded that aggression is a function of the interaction of alcohol consumption and level of provocation.     

The effects of smoking and urinary pH on a detection task

Performance was measured in a detection task over a period of 50 min. Subjects were either non-smokers or smoked more than 15 cigarettes per day. No smoking was allowed during the task, but smokers were all asked to smoke a cigarette immediately before doing it. One hour previously, subjects had been given a double-blind dose of a substance which would shift the pH of their urine either upwards or downwards, by small amounts sufficient to affect the rate of renal excretion of nicotine in the smokers. The pH manipulation had no effect on the performance of the non-smokers, who improved steadily throughout the task. After some 40 min of performance, the deprived smokers showed less improvement than the non-smokers, and the smokers whose urine had been made acid improved less than those whose had been made alkaline. The results are interpreted as evidence for a phasic effect on performance of small degrees of nicotine deprivation, which has consequences for theories of nicotine dependence.     

Predicting Perceptions of Victimization

Male and female subjects rated female victims of misfortune after observing videotapes of the victims detailing their injuries to doctors. Contrary to predictions of just wortd theory, subjects derogated culpable victims more than innocent victims. When observers identified with the victim, through political ties, derogation was reduced. It was concluded that responses to victims are described by a balance theory framework in which the observer's relationships to the victim and the victimizing agent determine whether (s)he will react to victims with sympathy or derogation. It was further concluded that these relationships can be predicted from an understanding of the social and political context shared by the perceiver and the victim.