Multiple bases for young and older adults' judgments of learning in multitrial learning

Prior work has suggested that participants use a memory-for-past-tests (MPT) heuristic for judgments of learning (JOLs) in a multitrial learning scenario. That is, when learning the same material in multiple sessions, previous memory performance can be used as a basis for later memory predictions. We explored this issue by evaluating the impact of healthy aging on the use of MPT across trials. Young adults and healthy older adults learned pairs of words, made JOLs, and received a memory test in three study-test trials on the same material. Results indicated that both young and older adults relied on MPT as a basis for JOLs and changes in MPT across trials were nominal. Further, only the most-recent past test influenced JOLs, whereas earlier tests were unrelated to later judgments. JOLs were also influenced by prior-trial JOLs and were related to subsequent memory performance on the same trial. We suggest that these data support both indirect- and direct-memory mechanisms as the bases for the MPT heuristic. Further, in a multitrial learning scenario, in which the same information was being learned, young and older adults used the same bases for their JOLs.     

Metacognitive errors contribute to the difficulty in remembering proper names

While prior research has shown that proper names are more challenging to learn and remember than other types of information (e.g., occupations), little research has explored the role of metacognitive factors in proper name learning. Thus in four experiments participants learned, made predictions, and were tested on their memory for common nouns (i.e., occupations) and proper nouns (i.e., names). Results showed that memory predictions were consistently overconfident for names, whereas the discrepancy between predictions and performance was smaller for occupations. With experience, participants were able to modify predictions and, critically, Experiment 4 showed that improvements in the accuracy of memory predictions led participants to allocate more study time to names and thus improved memory for names. Such data suggest that theories of proper name learning should make provisions for deficits in metacognitive awareness.     

Searching for interference effects in learning new face–name associations

In three experiments we attempted to increase interference using experimental manipulations in a face–name learning paradigm. All experiments included young and older adult participants because ageing is associated with increases in both susceptibility to interference and difficulty in learning face–name associations. None of the experiments produced interference for either age group: The inclusion of confusable (i.e., ambiguous) names and occupations, having to learn an additional piece of information in association with each face, and requiring participants to guess when uncertain all failed to negatively impact name learning. Interference does not appear to be the critical mechanism underlying the difficulty of learning proper names, and it cannot account for older adults' disproportionate decline in name-learning ability.     

General knowledge norms: Updated and expanded from the Nelson and Narens (1980) norms

The Nelson and Narens (Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior 19:338–368, 1980) general knowledge norms have been valuable to researchers in many fields. However, much has changed over the 32 years since the 1980 norms. For example, in 1980, most people knew the answer to the question “What is the name of the Lone Ranger’s Indian sidekick?” (answer: Tonto), whereas in 2012, few people know this answer. Thus, we updated the 1980 norms and expanded them by providing new measures. In particular, we report two new metacognitive measures (confidence judgments and peer judgments) and provide a detailed report of commission errors. Each of these measures will be valuable to researchers, and together they are likely to facilitate future research in a number of fields, such as research investigating memory illusions, metamemory processes, and error correction. The presence of substantial generational shifts from 1980 to 2012 necessitates the use of updated norms.     

The concreteness effect on judgments of learning: Evaluating the contributions of fluency and beliefs

Researchers have often determined how cues influence judgments of learning (JOLs; e.g., concrete words are assigned higher JOLs than are abstract words), and recently there has been an emphasis in understanding why cues influence JOLs (i.e., the mechanisms that underlie cue effects on JOLs). The analytic-processing (AP) theory posits that JOLs are constructed in accordance with participants’ beliefs of how a cue will influence memory. Even so, some evidence suggests that fluency is also important to cue effects on JOLs. In the present experiments, we investigated the contributions of participants’ beliefs and processing fluency to the concreteness effect on JOLs. To evaluate beliefs, participants estimated memory performance in a hypothetical experiment (Experiment 1), and studied concrete and abstract words and made a pre-study JOL for each (Experiments 2 and 3). Participants’ predictions demonstrated the belief that concrete words are more likely to be remembered than are abstract words, consistent with the AP theory. To evaluate fluency, response latencies were measured during lexical decision (Experiment 4), self-paced study (Experiment 5), and mental imagery (Experiment 7). Number of trials to acquisition was also evaluated (Experiment 6). Fluency did not differ between concrete and abstract words in Experiments 5 and 6, and it did not mediate the concreteness effect on JOLs in Experiments 4 and 7. Taken together, these results demonstrate that beliefs are a primary mechanism driving the concreteness effect on JOLs.     

Self-regulated learning of a natural category: Do people interleave or block exemplars during study?

Despite decades of research focused on the representation of concepts, little is known about the influence of self-regulatory processes when learning natural categories. Such work is vital, as many contexts require self-regulation when we form complex concepts. Previous research has demonstrated that interleaving, as compared to blocking, can improve classification. Thus, as an initial step to explore self-regulated learning of natural concepts, we evaluated whether people chose to block or interleave their practice. According to the search-for-differences hypothesis, people attempt to identify features of birds that distinguish one category (i.e., bird family) from another, and hence should interleave their study. According to the search-for-similarities hypothesis, people attempt to identify features that indicate inclusion into a single category, and hence are expected to block their study. To evaluate these hypotheses, we had participants learn exemplar birds (e.g., Song Sparrow) with their respective bird families (e.g., Sparrow) by selecting the order in which to study bird families. Across four experiments, different formats for selecting exemplars for study were used, so as to provide converging evidence for how participants regulated their learning. Participants overwhelmingly preferred to block their study, even though interleaving is normatively better for learning.     

Monitoring of learning at the category level when learning a natural concept: Will task experience improve its resolution?

Researchers have recently begun to investigate people's ability to monitor their learning of natural categories. For concept learning tasks, a learner seeks to accurately monitor learning at the category level — i.e., to accurately judge whether exemplars will be correctly classified into the appropriate category on an upcoming test. Our interest was in whether monitoring resolution at the category level would improve as participants gain task experience across multiple study-test blocks, as well as within each block. In four experiments, exemplar birds (e.g., American Goldfinch, Cassin's Finch) paired with each family name (e.g., Finch) were studied, and participants made a judgment of learning (JOL) for each exemplar. Of most interest, before and after studying the exemplars, participants made category learning judgments (CLJs), which involved predicting the likelihood of correctly classifying novel birds into each family. Tests included exemplars that had been studied or exemplars that had not been studied (novel). This procedure was repeated for either one or two additional blocks. The relative accuracy of CLJs did not improve across blocks even when explicit feedback was provided, whereas item-by-item JOL accuracy improved across blocks. Category level resolution did improve from pre-study to post-study on an initial block, but it did not consistently increase within later blocks. The stable accuracy of CLJs across blocks poses a theoretical and empirical challenge for identifying techniques to improve people's ability to judge their learning of natural categories.