Unconditional respect for persons and the prediction of intergroup action tendencies

Unconditional respect for persons is an orientation that rests on the assumption that all people have intrinsic worth and deserve respect simply by their being human. This paper reports three cross‐sectional studies concerning unconditional respect in intergroup relations in three very different contexts. In all three studies, unconditional respect was positively related to positive action tendencies, and negatively related to negative action tendencies, toward other groups. Regression analyses showed that respect was a significant predictor of negative action tendencies even when attitude to the other group, social dominance orientation, empathy, and the quality and quantity of intergroup contact were statistically controlled. Moderation analyses showed that respect was particularly important under conditions of high threat. The implications of unconditional respect for intergroup relations are discussed. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Effects of explaining on children's preference for simpler hypotheses

Research suggests that the process of explaining influences causal reasoning by prompting learners to favor hypotheses that offer “good” explanations. One feature of a good explanation is its simplicity. Here, we investigate whether prompting children to generate explanations for observed effects increases the extent to which they favor causal hypotheses that offer simpler explanations, and whether this changes over the course of development. Children aged 4, 5, and 6 years observed several outcomes that could be explained by appeal to a common cause (the simple hypothesis) or two independent causes (the complex hypothesis). We varied whether children were prompted to explain each observation or, in a control condition, to report it. Children were then asked to make additional inferences for which the competing hypotheses generated different predictions. The results revealed developmental differences in the extent to which children favored simpler hypotheses as a basis for further inference in this task: 4-year-olds did not favor the simpler hypothesis in either condition; 5-year-olds favored the simpler hypothesis only when prompted to explain; and 6-year-olds favored the simpler hypothesis whether or not they explained.     

Can emotional content reduce the age gap in visual working memory? Evidence from two tasks

Ageing is associated with declines in several cognitive abilities including working memory (WM). The goal of the present study was to assess whether emotional information could reduce the age gap in the quantity and quality (precision) of representations in visual WM. Young and older adults completed a serial image recognition (SIR) task and a colour-image binding (CIB) task. Results of the SIR task showed worse performance for negative than neutral and positive images within the older group, hence enlarging the age gap in WM. In the CIB task, recall precision was lower in the old than young adults, showing an ageing decline in the quality of WM representations. Positive images tended to improve precision, but this boost was similar for both age groups. In sum, emotional content did not reduce the age gap in visual WM.     

Simplicity and probability in causal explanation

What makes some explanations better than others? This paper explores the roles of simplicity and probability in evaluating competing causal explanations. Four experiments investigate the hypothesis that simpler explanations are judged both better and more likely to be true. In all experiments, simplicity is quantified as the number of causes invoked in an explanation, with fewer causes corresponding to a simpler explanation. Experiment 1 confirms that all else being equal, both simpler and more probable explanations are preferred. Experiments 2 and 3 examine how explanations are evaluated when simplicity and probability compete. The data suggest that simpler explanations are assigned a higher prior probability, with the consequence that disproportionate probabilistic evidence is required before a complex explanation will be favored over a simpler alternative. Moreover, committing to a simple but unlikely explanation can lead to systematic overestimation of the prevalence of the cause invoked in the simple explanation. Finally, Experiment 4 finds that the preference for simpler explanations can be overcome when probability information unambiguously supports a complex explanation over a simpler alternative. Collectively, these findings suggest that simplicity is used as a basis for evaluating explanations and for assigning prior probabilities when unambiguous probability information is absent. More broadly, evaluating explanations may operate as a mechanism for generating estimates of subjective probability.     

Masked onset priming effect for high-frequency words: further support for the speech-planning account

Two experiments investigated whether priming due to a match in just the onset between a masked prime and target is found with high-frequency target words. Forster and Davis (1991, Exp. 5) reported that the masked onset priming effect was absent for high-frequency words and used the finding to argue that the effect has its locus in the grapheme-phoneme mapping process that operates serially within the nonlexical route. Experiment 1 used primes that were unrelated to targets and found a masked onset priming effect of equal size for high-frequency and low-frequency target words. Experiment 2 used form-related primes as used by Forster and Davis, and again found that the effect of onset mismatch was not dependent on target word frequency. These results are interpreted in terms of an alternative view that the masked onset priming effect has its origin in the process of preparing a speech response.