How I Attend—Not How Well Do I Attend: Rethinking Developmental Frameworks of Attention and Cognition in Autism Spectrum Disorder and Typical Development

Evidence from the study of attention among persons with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) and typically developing (TD) children suggests a rethinking of the notion that performance inherently reflects disability, ability, or capacity in favor of a more nuanced story that involves an emphasis on styles and biases that reflect real-world attending. We provide examples from behavioral and physiological research in which performance on attention tasks is not solely a function of abilities, or disabilities, per se but rather is also a function of the ways in which they are implemented. Thus, the study of attention both among persons with ASD and in typical development might best be recast in terms of the question of “how” rather than “how well.”     

Stability,breadth and guidance

Much recent work on explanation in the interventionist tradition emphasizes the explanatory value of stable causal generalizations—i.e., causal generalizations that remain true in a wide range of background circumstances. We argue that two separate explanatory virtues are lumped together under the heading of `stability’. We call these two virtues breadth and guidance respectively. In our view, these two virtues are importantly distinct, but this fact is neglected or at least under-appreciated in the literature on stability. We argue that an adequate theory of explanatory goodness should recognize breadth and guidance as distinct virtues, as breadth and guidance track different ideals of explanation, satisfy different cognitive and pragmatic ends, and play different theoretical roles in (for example) helping us understand the explanatory value of mechanisms. Thus keeping track of the distinction between these two forms of stability yields a more accurate and perspicuous picture of the role that stability considerations play in explanation.     

Meaning and Change in Psychotherapy

Starting from two accounts of psychological change in therapeutic settings, based respectively on the analysis of metaphors (Faccio et al. 2011, this issue) and on transformative moments in self narratives (Ribeiro and Gon?alves 2011, this issue), this paper examines core processes of psychological change. Drawing on sociocultural psychology, the paper first argues that core processes of change in such therapeutic settings take place at the level of the organization of a person's semiotic sets. Second, the paper suggests that such therapeutic frames are likely to provoke changes in other aspects of a person's life as these aim at transforming the persons thinking capacities, and as these have as objects situations external to them.     

Religion in Meaning Making and Boundary Work: Theoretical Explorations

Based on the articles brought together for this special issue, this article proposes a transversal analysis and theoretical elaboration of the question of the uses of religious elements for meaning making and boundary work. In order to do so, we will first propose a sociocultural psychological perspective to examine meaning making dynamics. Second, we will apply a boundary work perspective, as recently developed in the social sciences, on the organization of religious differences. The first considers religious elements as resources that can be used by people to orient themselves in time and the social space, to interpret and guide action, and to create new forms of life. The second approach proposes an analysis of uses of religious stuff in order to understand how boundaries between groups are created, transgressed or dissolved as well as to explore the link between religion and power. Our argument is that the articulation of these two approaches can itself offer a rich theoretical frame to apprehend religions in contemporary society.     

Knowing who dunnit: Infants identify the causal agent in an unseen causal interaction

Preverbal infants can represent the causal structure of events, including distinguishing the agentive and receptive roles and categorizing entities according to stable causal dispositions. This study investigated how infants combine these 2 kinds of causal inference. In Experiments 1 and 2, 9.5-month-olds used the position of a human hand or a novel puppet (causal agents), but not a toy train (an inert object), to predict the subsequent motion of a beanbag. Conversely, in Experiment 3, 10- and 7-month-olds used the motion of the beanbag to infer the position of a hand but not of a toy block. These data suggest that preverbal infants expect a causal agent as the source of motion of an inert object.     

Plasticity of memory for new learning in very old age: a story of major loss?

Longitudinal survivors of the Berlin Aging Study (N = 96, mean age = 84 years, range 75-101 years) were instructed and trained in a mnemonic skill to examine plasticity of episodic memory performance in very old age. Performance gains after mnemonic instruction were modest, and most individuals were unable to further enhance their performance during 4 sessions of mnemonic practice. Whereas the proportion of variance explained by measures from the broad fluid-ability domain (e.g., perceptual speed) increased with training, the proportion of variance explained by crystallized-ability domain (e.g., word knowledge) and sociobiographical variables decreased. Furthermore, prior 6-year longitudinal changes (loss) in perceptual speed predicted individual differences in plasticity. Results suggest that aging-induced biological factors are a prominent source of individual differences in cognitive plasticity in very old age.