Neural correlates of establishing, maintaining, and switching brain states

Although the study of brain states is an old one in neuroscience, there has been growing interest in brain state specification owing to MRI studies tracing brain connectivity at rest. In this review, we summarize recent research on three relatively well-described brain states: the resting, alert, and meditation states. We explore the neural correlates of maintaining a state or switching between states, and argue that the anterior cingulate cortex and striatum play a critical role in state maintenance, whereas the insula has a major role in switching between states. Brain state may serve as a predictor of performance in a variety of perceptual, memory, and problem solving tasks. Thus, understanding brain states is critical for understanding human performance.     

Switching in the cocktail party: exploring intentional control of auditory selective attention

Using a novel variant of dichotic selective listening, we examined the control of auditory selective attention. In our task, subjects had to respond selectively to one of two simultaneously presented auditory stimuli (number words), always spoken by a female and a male speaker, by performing a numerical size categorization. The gender of the task-relevant speaker could change, as indicated by a visual cue prior to auditory stimulus onset. Three experiments show clear performance costs with instructed attention switches. Experiment 2 varied the cuing interval to examine advance preparation for an attention switch. Experiment 3 additionally isolated auditory switch costs from visual cue priming by using two cues for each gender, so that gender repetition could be indicated by a changed cue. Experiment 2 showed that switch costs decreased with prolonged cuing intervals, but Experiment 3 revealed that preparation did not affect auditory switch costs but only visual cue priming. Moreover, incongruent numerical categories in competing auditory stimuli produced interference and substantially increased error rates, suggesting continued processing of task-relevant information that often leads to responding to the incorrect auditory source. Together, the data show clear limitations in advance preparation of auditory attention switches and suggest a considerable degree of inertia in intentional control of auditory selection criteria.     

“It is not a something,but not a nothing either!”—McDowell on Wittgenstein

This paper corrects a mistake in John McDowell’s influential reading of Wittgenstein’s attack on the idea of private sensations. McDowell rightly identifies a primary target of Wittgenstein’s attack to be the Myth of the Given. But he also suggests that Wittgenstein, in the ferocity of his battles with this myth, sometimes goes into overkill, which manifests itself in seemingly behavioristic denials about sensations. But this criticism of Wittgenstein is a mistake. The mistake is made over two important but notoriously difficult sections in the so-called Private Language Argument, namely §304 and §293 of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein, maximally charitably read, commits no overkill in these two sections. This correction strengthens McDowell’s overall reading, but it is only a first step toward fully bringing out the deep but obscurely expressed insights in §304 and §293, the full treatment of which must await another occasion.     

Intentionality and partial belief

Suppose we wish to provide a naturalistic account of intentionality. Like several other philosophers, we focus on the intentionality of belief, hoping that we may later supplement our account to accommodate other intentional states like desires and fears. Now suppose that we also take partial beliefs or credences seriously. In cashing out our favoured theory of intentionality, we may for the sake of simplicity talk as if belief is merely binary or all-or-nothing. But we should be able to supplement or modify our account to accommodate credences. I shall argue, however, that it is difficult to do so with respect to certain causal or teleological theories of intentionality-in particular, those advanced by the likes of Stalnaker (Inquiry, 1984) and Millikan (J Philos 86:281–297, 1989). I shall first show that such theories are tailor-made to account for the intentionality of binary beliefs. Then I shall argue that it is hard to extend or supplement such theories to accommodate credences. Finally, I shall offer some natural ways of modifying the theories that involve an appeal to objective probabilities. But unfortunately, such modifications face problems.     

A Gricean approach to the use of consensus and distinctiveness in causal attributions of verbally described interpersonal events

Various causal attribution theories, starting with the covariation model, argue that people use consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information to causally explain events and behaviors. Yet, the visual presentation of the covariation model in the form of a cube is based on the assumptions that these dimensions generally affect attributions independently, symmetrically, and equally. A Gricean analysis suggests that these assumptions may not generally hold in the case of causal judgments for verbally communicated interpersonal events. We had participants judge the causal role of an actor and a patient in interpersonal events that were described through actor‐verb‐patient sentences under high versus low consensus and distinctiveness (Studies 1, 2, and 3) or without such information (Studies 2 and 3). As predicted by Gricean logic, consensus and distinctiveness effects on causality ratings depended on the target whose causal role participants assessed, on the information about the alternative dimension, and, most consistently, on consensus and distinctiveness being high versus low. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Dissociable effects of auditory attention switching and stimulus–response compatibility

Using a task-switching variant of dichotic listening, we examined the ability to intentionally switch auditory attention between two speakers. We specifically focused on possible interactions with stimulus–response compatibility. In each trial, two words, one spoken by a male and another by a female, were presented dichotically via headphones. In one experimental group, two animal names were presented, and the relevant animal had to be judged as smaller or larger than a sheep by pressing a left or right response key. In another group, two number words were presented and had to be judged as smaller or larger than 5. In each trial, a visual cue indicated the gender of the relevant speaker. Performance was worse when the gender of the relevant speaker switched from trial to trial. These switch costs were larger for animal names than for number words, suggesting stronger interference with slower access to semantic categories. Responses were slower if the side of the target stimulus (as defined by the relevant gender) was spatially incompatible with the required response (as defined by the size judgment). This stimulus–response compatibility effect did not differ across stimulus material and did not interact with attentional switch costs. These results indicate that auditory switch costs and stimulus–response compatibility effects are dissociable, referring to target selection and response selection, respectively.     

The phenomenological-existential comprehension of chronic pain: going beyond the standing healthcare models

A distinguishing characteristic of the biomedical model is its compartmentalized view of man. This way of seeing human beings has its origin in Greek thought; it was stated by Descartes and to this day it still considers humans as beings composed of distinct entities combined into a certain form. Because of this observation, one began to believe that the focus of a health treatment could be exclusively on the affected area of the body, without the need to pay attention to patient’s subjectivity. By seeing pain as a merely sensory response, this model was not capable of encompassing chronic pain, since the latter is a complex process that can occur independently of tissue damage. As of the second half of the twentieth century, when it became impossible to deny the relationship between psyche and soma, the current understanding of chronic pain emerges: that of chronic pain as an individual experience, the result of a sum of physical, psychological, and social factors that, for this reason, cannot be approached separately from the individual who expresses pain. This understanding has allowed a significant improvement in perspective, emphasizing the characteristic of pain as an individual experience. However, the understanding of chronic pain as a sum of factors corresponds to the current way of seeing the process of falling ill, for its conception holds a Cartesian duality and the positivist premise of a single reality. For phenomenology, on the other hand, the individual in his/her unity is more than a simple sum of parts. Phenomenology sees a human being as an intending entity, in which body, mind, and the world are intertwined and constitute each other mutually, thus establishing the human being’s integral functioning. Therefore, a real understanding of the chronic pain process would only be possible from a phenomenological point of view at the experience lived by the individual who expresses and communicates pain.     

生命意义的缺失与追寻

生命意义(Meaning in life)指人们对自己生命中的目的、目标的认识和追求,主要包括意义存在(Presence of Meaning)和意义追求(Search for Meaning)两个维度。生命意义缺失(Absence of Meaning)指个体缺乏生活的目标、对自身存在价值和意义感的感知。意义缺失的体验一方面会带来焦虑、抑郁等消极影响,另一方面将激发起个体强烈的重构意义的动机,引导人们进行意义追求。未来研究应增加对生命意义的获取和提升、意义缺失的原因、含义与结构、意义追求的动机和效果的研究。     

Educational Science Students’ Implicit Theories of Creativity

This article presents the results of research into the implicit theories of creativity of Educational Science students preparing for the role of educational counsellors. Educational Science students will soon be working in educational institutions where they are expected to support creativity. Prospective (pre)school counsellors were asked about how they perceive and how they experience creativity in their own schooling by means of a questionnaire and focus group interview. Participants’ answers were analyzed using quantitative and qualitative content analyses. The data obtained from the questionnaire showed that the students mainly defined creativity as the characteristic of a person or process. They saw the major possibility for developing creativity during university studies in stimulating teaching activities and a supportive educational climate. The data from the focus group expanded the students’ definition of creativity through the domain of the expression and the valuation of creativity. In the discussion about the development of creativity during university studies, the role of the study program and the students’ individual characteristics were highlighted. The aspects of Educational Science education that need to be changed to increase the quality of the preparation of future educational counsellors are also considered.