Aristotle's Cognitive Science: Belief,Affect and Rationality

I offer a novel interpretation of Aristotle's psychology and notion of rationality, which draws the line between animal and specifically human cognition. Aristotle distinguishes belief (doxa), a form of rational cognition, from imagining (phantasia), which is shared with non‐rational animals. We are, he says, “immediately affected” by beliefs, but respond to imagining “as if we were looking at a picture.” Aristotle's argument has been misunderstood; my interpretation explains and motivates it. Rationality includes a filter that interrupts the pathways between cognition and behavior. This prevents the subject from responding to certain representations. Stress and damage compromise the filter, making the subject respond indiscriminately, as non‐rational animals do. Beliefs are representations that have made it past the filter, which is why they can “affect [us] immediately.” Aristotle's claims express ceteris paribus generalizations, subject to exceptions. No list of provisos could turn them into non‐vacuous universal claims, but this does not rob them of their explanatory power. Aristotle's cognitive science resolves a tension we grapple with today: it accounts for the specialness of human action and thinking within a strictly naturalistic framework. The theory is striking in its insight and explanatory power, instructive in its methodological shortcomings.     

Beliefs and environmental behavior: The moderating effect of emotional intelligence

Recent decades have seen a proliferation of studies aiming to explain how pro‐environmental behavior is shaped by attitudes, values and beliefs. In this study, we have included an aspect in our analysis that has been rarely touched upon until now, that is, the intelligent use of emotions as a possible component of pro‐environmental behavior. We applied the Trait Meta Mood Scale‐24 (TMMS‐24) and the New Environmental Paradigm scale to a sample of 184 male and female undergraduate students. We also carried out correlation and hierarchical regression analyses of blocks. The results show the interaction effects of the system of environmental beliefs and the dimensions of emotional intelligence on glass recycling attitudes, intentions and behavior. The results are discussed from the perspective of research on how the management of emotions guides thought and behavior.     

“It is not a something,but not a nothing either!”—McDowell on Wittgenstein

This paper corrects a mistake in John McDowell’s influential reading of Wittgenstein’s attack on the idea of private sensations. McDowell rightly identifies a primary target of Wittgenstein’s attack to be the Myth of the Given. But he also suggests that Wittgenstein, in the ferocity of his battles with this myth, sometimes goes into overkill, which manifests itself in seemingly behavioristic denials about sensations. But this criticism of Wittgenstein is a mistake. The mistake is made over two important but notoriously difficult sections in the so-called Private Language Argument, namely §304 and §293 of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein, maximally charitably read, commits no overkill in these two sections. This correction strengthens McDowell’s overall reading, but it is only a first step toward fully bringing out the deep but obscurely expressed insights in §304 and §293, the full treatment of which must await another occasion.     

Intentionality and partial belief

Suppose we wish to provide a naturalistic account of intentionality. Like several other philosophers, we focus on the intentionality of belief, hoping that we may later supplement our account to accommodate other intentional states like desires and fears. Now suppose that we also take partial beliefs or credences seriously. In cashing out our favoured theory of intentionality, we may for the sake of simplicity talk as if belief is merely binary or all-or-nothing. But we should be able to supplement or modify our account to accommodate credences. I shall argue, however, that it is difficult to do so with respect to certain causal or teleological theories of intentionality-in particular, those advanced by the likes of Stalnaker (Inquiry, 1984) and Millikan (J Philos 86:281–297, 1989). I shall first show that such theories are tailor-made to account for the intentionality of binary beliefs. Then I shall argue that it is hard to extend or supplement such theories to accommodate credences. Finally, I shall offer some natural ways of modifying the theories that involve an appeal to objective probabilities. But unfortunately, such modifications face problems.     

Fathers’ Challenging Parenting Behavior Prevents Social Anxiety Development in Their 4-Year-Old Children: A Longitudinal Observational Study

Recent models on parenting propose different roles for fathers and mothers in the development of child anxiety. Specifically, it is suggested that fathers’ challenging parenting behavior, in which the child is playfully encouraged to push her limits, buffers against child anxiety. In this longitudinal study, we explored whether the effect of challenging parenting on children’s social anxiety differed between fathers and mothers. Fathers and mothers from 94 families were separately observed with their two children (44 % girls), aged 2 and 4 years at Time 1, in three structured situations involving one puzzle task and two games. Overinvolved and challenging parenting behavior were coded. Child social anxiety was measured by observing the child’s response to a stranger at Time 1, and half a year later at Time 2, and by parental ratings. In line with predictions, father’s challenging parenting behavior predicted less subsequent observed social anxiety of the 4-year-old child. Mothers’ challenging behavior, however, predicted more observed social anxiety of the 4-year-old. Parents’ overinvolvement at Time 1 did not predict change in observed social anxiety of the 4-year-old child. For the 2-year-old child, maternal and paternal parenting behavior did not predict subsequent social anxiety, but early social anxiety marginally did. Parent-rated social anxiety was predicted by previous parental ratings of social anxiety, and not by parenting behavior. Challenging parenting behavior appears to have favorable effects on observed 4-year-old’s social anxiety when displayed by the father. Challenging parenting behavior emerges as an important focus for future research and interventions.     

When in Rome… Identification and acculturation strategies among minority members moderate the dehumanisation of the majority outgroup

The study of humanness as a dimension of social judgment has received extensive attention over the past decade. Although the common reported finding is that people attribute more human characteristics to their ingroup than to the outgroup, similar tendencies are expected to be tempered for minority groups when judging the host society. In Study 1, carried out with Gypsy minority members, we tested the hypothesis that those group members who adopt an assimilative strategy identifying more with the host compared with the heritage culture will display the lowest levels of dehumanisation. In Studies 2 and 3, conducted with immigrants in Italy and in Portugal, respectively, the hypothesis was extended from an identification conceptualisation to an acculturation one. Despite significant variability in intergroup settings and measures, results confirmed our hypothesis that immigrants who choose to assimilate with the host culture dehumanise the outgroup less compared with those who adopt any of the other acculturation strategies. Implications for the ethnocentric nature of dehumanisation biases and for intergroup relations in general are discussed. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.