“It is not a something,but not a nothing either!”—McDowell on Wittgenstein

This paper corrects a mistake in John McDowell’s influential reading of Wittgenstein’s attack on the idea of private sensations. McDowell rightly identifies a primary target of Wittgenstein’s attack to be the Myth of the Given. But he also suggests that Wittgenstein, in the ferocity of his battles with this myth, sometimes goes into overkill, which manifests itself in seemingly behavioristic denials about sensations. But this criticism of Wittgenstein is a mistake. The mistake is made over two important but notoriously difficult sections in the so-called Private Language Argument, namely §304 and §293 of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein, maximally charitably read, commits no overkill in these two sections. This correction strengthens McDowell’s overall reading, but it is only a first step toward fully bringing out the deep but obscurely expressed insights in §304 and §293, the full treatment of which must await another occasion.     

Intentionality and partial belief

Suppose we wish to provide a naturalistic account of intentionality. Like several other philosophers, we focus on the intentionality of belief, hoping that we may later supplement our account to accommodate other intentional states like desires and fears. Now suppose that we also take partial beliefs or credences seriously. In cashing out our favoured theory of intentionality, we may for the sake of simplicity talk as if belief is merely binary or all-or-nothing. But we should be able to supplement or modify our account to accommodate credences. I shall argue, however, that it is difficult to do so with respect to certain causal or teleological theories of intentionality-in particular, those advanced by the likes of Stalnaker (Inquiry, 1984) and Millikan (J Philos 86:281–297, 1989). I shall first show that such theories are tailor-made to account for the intentionality of binary beliefs. Then I shall argue that it is hard to extend or supplement such theories to accommodate credences. Finally, I shall offer some natural ways of modifying the theories that involve an appeal to objective probabilities. But unfortunately, such modifications face problems.     

生命意义的缺失与追寻

生命意义(Meaning in life)指人们对自己生命中的目的、目标的认识和追求,主要包括意义存在(Presence of Meaning)和意义追求(Search for Meaning)两个维度。生命意义缺失(Absence of Meaning)指个体缺乏生活的目标、对自身存在价值和意义感的感知。意义缺失的体验一方面会带来焦虑、抑郁等消极影响,另一方面将激发起个体强烈的重构意义的动机,引导人们进行意义追求。未来研究应增加对生命意义的获取和提升、意义缺失的原因、含义与结构、意义追求的动机和效果的研究。     

Are Decisions Made by Group Representatives More Risk Averse? The Effect of Sense of Responsibility

We tested the hypothesis that a sense of responsibility drives group representatives' decisions to be more risk averse compared with decisions made by individuals. The hypothesis was supported when the monetary considerations (i.e., payoff inequality and the magnitude effect) were controlled for in the potential gain domain as well as in the potential loss domain. Evidence showed that this is because the group representatives were concerned about how they would view themselves (e.g., guilt and self‐blame) and also how they would be viewed by others (i.e., to avoid being blamed and looked down upon by others). This study provided new insights into understanding group representatives' decision making under risk. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Problem Clarity as a Moderator between Trait Affect and Self‐Perceived Creativity

Empirical studies on the relationship between affect and creativity often produce conflicting results. This inconsistency has led us to believe that the relationship between affect and creativity may be better understood by looking at potential moderators. Our study looked specifically at trait affect and self‐perceived creativity. Using the Affect Infusion Model (AIM) theory with problem clarity as the potential moderator, we hypothesized that when individuals are faced with problems that lack clarity, trait affect has greater sway over their self‐perceived creativity. Our results provided evidence that problem clarity moderated the relationship between positive trait affect and self‐perceived creativity; the positive relationship between positive trait affect and self‐perceived creativity is stronger when problem clarity is low and weaker when problem clarity is high. No moderating effect was found in the relationship between negative trait affect and self‐perceived creativity.     

家庭支持与朋友支持对不同自理能力老年人抑郁水平的影响

探讨社会支持中的家庭支持和朋友支持对不同自理能力老年人抑郁水平的影响作用。结果发现:(1)社会支持可有效缓解老年人抑郁症状;(2)对个体而言,家庭支持是较稳定的支持来源,受个体年龄和健康水平的影响较小,而朋友支持变动较大,随年龄增长和健康水平的下降,朋友支持逐渐减少;(3)社会支持对不可完全自理老年人抑郁水平的解释率高于对可完全自理老年人抑郁水平的解释率;(4)对于生活可完全自理的老人,朋友支持比家庭支持有更大的预测作用,而对于生活不能完全自理的老人,家庭支持的作用更大。     

A Meeting of the Conceptual and the Natural: Wittgenstein on Learning a Sensation‐Language

Since the rise of modern natural science there has been deep tension between the conceptual and the natural. Wittgenstein's discussion of how we learn a sensation‐language contains important resources that can help us relieve this tension. The key here, I propose, is to focus our attention on animal nature, conceived as partially re‐enchanted (in the sense recommended by John McDowell). To see how nature, so conceived, helps us relieve the tension in question, it is crucial to gain a firm and detailed appreciation of how the primitive‐instinctive, a central part of animal nature, actually serves the conceptual. I offer such an appreciation by closely examining §244 of the Philosophical Investigations and Peter Winch's discussion of it. The general aim is to bring out a certain kind of Wittgensteinian “naturalism” (not as a theory but as a general reminder), a “naturalism” that is fully alive to the rootedness of conceptuality in nature. A concomitant aim is to illustrate the truth of Wittgenstein's saying that in philosophy one often has to pay close attention to details.