Teleo‐functional constraints on preschool children's reasoning about living things

These studies explore the degree to which preschool children employ teleological‐functional reasoning – reasoning based on the assumption of function and design – when making inferences about animal behavior. Using a triad induction method, Study 1 examined whether a sensitivity to biological function would lead children to overlook overall similarity and instead attend to relevant functional cues (in the presence of overall dissimilarity), as a basis for generalizing behavioral properties to unfamiliar animals. It found that, between 3 and 4 years of age, children, with increasing consistency, attend to functional features rather than overall similarity when drawing inferences about animal behavior. Children's ability to describe the relevance of functional adaptations to animal behavior also increased with age. Study 2 explored whether Study 1 findings might result from stimulus biases in favor of the function‐based choice. It found that children's attention shifted from functional features to overall similarity when generalizing labels rather than behaviors with the same triads. These results are discussed in relation to the development of biological knowledge.     

The 'body–container': A new perspective on the 'body–ego'

Psychoanalytic theory and practice tend to focus on metaphorical and symbolic mental representations in a way that often pushes aside the importance of a bodily 'presence' possessing qualities that can not and should not be subordinated to the representational structure. By introducing the 'body – container' model, this paper reintroduces the concrete physical body into the psychoanalytic discourse in a more direct way. This clinical – theoretical model links the 'body-ego' ( Freud, 1923 ) to the container idea ( Bion, 1962 ) aiming to creates a new integrative psyche-soma scheme. The 'body – container' experience is available as a subjective realization through a priori psycho-physical forms structured as an envelope and a central vertical axis. These forms are the outcome of our given bodily structure experienced under the 'magnetic' force of object relation. The mental envelope is already discussed in psychoanalytic theory ( Anzieu, 1989, 1990 ; Bick, 1968 ) and I wish to introduce the characteristics of the vertical axis which I call 'the frontal spine', emphasizing its constitutional reciprocity with the skin envelope. The proposed model offers new insights into the psycho-physical organization in primitive mental states and may contribute to the understanding of the complementary structural relation between embodied and represented in human experience. Two clinical examples illustrate the therapeutic work relevant to disturbances in the primal psycho-physical space organization at different developmental levels.     

Simple movement imitation: Are kinematic features sufficient to map perceptions into actions?

The aim of this study was to pinpoint the nature of the visual features used in the automatic mapping of perceived movements into similar executed movements, following the direct matching hypothesis. In Experiment 1 subjects imitated the lifting of one of two fingers, presented with different orientations. As predicted, stimuli which were further rotated away from the posture of the executing hand elicited slower reaction times. In Experiment 2, we verified that this orientation effect was not a purely perceptual effect by presenting the same stimuli but asking subjects to respond verbally. No orientation effect was found using a verbal response. In Experiment 3, we replaced the moving fingers by two arbitrary objects moving with the trajectories of the finger tips of Experiment 1. The same orientation effect as in Experiment 1 was observed. We conclude that in this experiment participants are using purely kinematic features to map perceived into executed movements.     

Contingent reliance on the affect heuristic as a function of regulatory focus

Results from four studies show that the reliance on affect as a heuristic of judgment and decision making is more pronounced under a promotion focus than under a prevention focus. Two different manifestations of this phenomenon were observed. Studies 1–3 show that different types of affective inputs are weighted more heavily under promotion than under prevention in person-impression formation, product evaluations, and social recommendations. Study 4 additionally shows that valuations performed under promotion are more scope-insensitive—a characteristic of affect-based valuations—than valuations performed under prevention. The greater reliance on affect as a heuristic under promotion seems to arise because promotion-focused individuals tend to find affective inputs more diagnostic, not because promotion increases the reliance on peripheral information per se.     

Congruency,consistency, and differentiation as predictors of job satisfaction within the nursing occupation

Holland's (Making vocational choices: A theory of careers, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973) congruency, consistency, and differentiation terms were used as independent variables to predict job satisfaction (JS) within the scope of a single occupation, rather than on the comparison between occupations. Based on the responses of 126 registered nurses on the specially designed List of Courses in Nursing (LCN) Inventory the congruence hypothesis was confirmed, while the consistency and differentiation hypotheses were only partially supported. The hypothesis on the additive relationship among congruence, consistency, and differentiation with JS was confirmed. The theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

Young children infer causal strength from probabilities and interventions

We examine the interaction of two cues that children use to make judgments about cause-effect relations: probabilities and interventions. Children were shown a "detector" that lit up and played music when a block was placed on its surface. We varied the probabilistic effectiveness of the block, as well as whether the experimenter or the child was performing the interventions. In Experiment 1, we found that children can use probabilistic evidence to make inferences about causal strength. However, when the results of their own interventions are in conflict with the overall frequencies, preschoolers favor the results of their own interventions. In Experiment 2, children used probabilistic evidence to infer a hidden causal mechanism. Though they again gave preference to their own interventions, they did not do so when their interventions were explicitly confounded by an alternative cause.