Abnormal behavior after intracerebral injection of polypeptides from wheat gliadin: Possible relevance to schizophrenia

Accumulating evidence suggests that: (1) gluten-like proteins in cereal grains may produce psychiatric symptoms in schizophrenics as well as in celiac patients; (2) the genotypes for these two disorders may have one or more but not all, genes in common. Gluten fed to treated schizophrenics on a cereal grain-free, milk-free diet exacerbates their symptoms; ingestion of polypeptides resulting from peptic-pancreatic digestion of wheat gliadin (from gluten) produces psychiatric and other symptoms in celiac patients. To test their effect on behavior of normal rats we bypassed the protective barrier systems by intracerebral injection of a potent subfraction of gliadin polypeptides which produces psychiatric symptoms in celiacs. Eighteen exploratory experiments in 4 rats demonstrated that intracerebral injection of these polypeptides may variably produce stereotyped movements, prolonged “chewing in air,” “catelepsy” and seizures, all after an unusually long latent period. The lowest dose producing “catalepsy” was 600 μg, and that for seizures was 500 μg. Since we used a mixture, one or more polypeptides in it may be considerably more potent. The accumulated evidence suggests the following working hypothesis: One or more of the polypeptides produced by peptic-pancreatic digestion of certain glutamine-proline rich food proteins(e.g., cereal grain glutens) are psychotoxic and may enter the brain of the schizophrenic or celiac because the small gut, and possibly other, barrier systems (enzymatic, immunologic, membranous, other) suffer defects of an unknown nature due to one or more abnormal genes common to both diseases; and that the differences in the two diseases are determined largely by the dissimilar components of the genotypes.     

Young children infer causal strength from probabilities and interventions

We examine the interaction of two cues that children use to make judgments about cause-effect relations: probabilities and interventions. Children were shown a "detector" that lit up and played music when a block was placed on its surface. We varied the probabilistic effectiveness of the block, as well as whether the experimenter or the child was performing the interventions. In Experiment 1, we found that children can use probabilistic evidence to make inferences about causal strength. However, when the results of their own interventions are in conflict with the overall frequencies, preschoolers favor the results of their own interventions. In Experiment 2, children used probabilistic evidence to infer a hidden causal mechanism. Though they again gave preference to their own interventions, they did not do so when their interventions were explicitly confounded by an alternative cause.     

A rational-emotive group intervention for preventing and coping with stress among safety officers

A stress management and prevention workshop for nonclinical industrial workers using rational-emotive principles with 18 months followup is reported. Twenty-two senior safety officers participated in an intervention program of five weekly meetings aimed at improving cognitive skills and assertiveness mainly by decreasing irrational thought processes. We hypothesized an increase in assertiveness, and a decrease in irrational beliefs, and emotional and cognitive stress symptoms (manifested in somatic complaints and cognitive weariness). Assertiveness improved and somatic complaints and irrationality decreased in the short term. Eighteen months later, cognitive weariness was also reduced. The other improvements were still evident, but not to the same extent as short-term effects. Although the workshop improved rationality, further practice would be needed in the behavioral aspect of stress prevention to achieve long-term improvements in assertiveness.Talma Kushnir, Ph.D., is a social and medical psychologist at the Occupational Health and Rehabilitation Institute, Raanana, Israel, and teaches psychology and health promotion at the Tel-Aviv University Medical School.Ruth Malkinson, Ph.D., fellow and RET trainer and supervisor of the Institute for RET, and teaches at the School of Social Work and Medical School at Tel-Aviv University, Israel. Both authors contributed equally to this studyThis study was supported by the Committee for Preventive Action and Research in Occupational Health, The Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Jerusalem, Israel.The authors thank Estie Weisberg for her administrative assistance in organizing the workshops.     

Domestic Stress and Well-Being of Employed Women: Interplay Between Demands and Decision Control at Home

Family researchers have suggested that shared decision control is important for coping with stressful demands at home, whereas occupational stress theorists view personal decision control as an essential coping resource. We studied the effects of home demands, personal decision control, and shared decision control at home on burnout and satisfaction with life, using Karasek’s job-demands-control model to gauge home stress and its outcomes. Participants were 133 mothers employed in secretarial and managerial jobs. We hypothesized that shared control would correlate more strongly with burnout and satisfaction with life than would personal control. In multiple regression analyses, demands had independent main effects on both outcomes. Shared control significantly predicted satisfaction with life, but not burnout, and personal control predicted neither. It is suggested that in families (as in teams), shared decision control may be a more potent coping resource than personal control.     

Functional connectivity dynamics during film viewing reveal common networks for different emotional experiences

Recent theoretical and empirical work has highlighted the role of domain-general, large-scale brain networks in generating emotional experiences. These networks are hypothesized to process aspects of emotional experiences that are not unique to a specific emotional category (e.g., “sadness,” “happiness”), but rather that generalize across categories. In this article, we examined the dynamic interactions (i.e., changing cohesiveness) between specific domain-general networks across time while participants experienced various instances of sadness, fear, and anger. We used a novel method for probing the network connectivity dynamics between two salience networks and three amygdala-based networks. We hypothesized, and found, that the functional connectivity between these networks covaried with the intensity of different emotional experiences. Stronger connectivity between the dorsal salience network and the medial amygdala network was associated with more intense ratings of emotional experience across six different instances of the three emotion categories examined. Also, stronger connectivity between the dorsal salience network and the ventrolateral amygdala network was associated with more intense ratings of emotional experience across five out of the six different instances. Our findings demonstrate that a variety of emotional experiences are associated with dynamic interactions of domain-general neural systems.     

Pedagogical cues encourage toddlers' transmission of recently demonstrated functions to unfamiliar adults

Young children use pedagogical cues as a signal that others' actions are social or cultural conventions. Here we show that children selectively transmit (enact in a new social situation) causal functions demonstrated pedagogically, even when they have learned and can produce alternative functions as well. Two‐year‐olds saw two novel toys, each with two functions. One experimenter demonstrated one function using pedagogical cues (eye contact and child‐directed speech) and a second experimenter demonstrated the alternative function using intentional actions towards the object, but without pedagogical cues. Children imitated both functions at equal rates initially, indicating equal causal learning from both types of demonstration. However, they were significantly more likely to enact the pedagogical function for a new adult not present during the initial demonstrations. These results indicate that pedagogical cues influence children's transmission of information, perhaps playing a role in the dissemination of cultural conventions from a young age.     

The Self as a Moral Agent: Preschoolers Behave Morally but Believe in the Freedom to Do Otherwise

Recent work suggests a strong connection between intuitions regarding our own free will and our moral behavior. We investigate the origins of this link by asking whether preschool-aged children construe their own moral actions as freely chosen. We gave children the option to make three moral/social choices (avoiding harm to another, following a rule, and following peer behavior) and then asked them to retrospect as to whether they were free to have done otherwise. When given the choice to act (either morally or immorally), children avoided harm and abided by rules, but they endorsed their freedom to have done otherwise. When choice was restricted by adult instruction, children did not endorse their free choice and indicated feeling constrained by moral obligation in their explanatory responses. These results suggest that children believe that their moral actions afford free will, but this belief is dependent on their experience of choice.     

When Choices Are Not Personal: The Effect of Statistical and Social Cues on Children's Inferences About the Scope of Preferences

Individual choices are commonly taken to manifest personal preferences. The present study investigated whether social and statistical cues influence young children's inferences about the generalizability of preferences. Preschoolers were exposed to either 1 or 2 demonstrators’ selections of objects. The selected objects constituted 18%, 50%, or 100% of all available objects. We found that children took a single demonstrator's choices as indicative only of his or her personal preference. However, when 2 demonstrators made the same selection, then children inferred that it generalized to other agents of the same kind as the original demonstrator's, but not to agents of a different kind. Lastly, only when both demonstrators blatantly violated random selection (i.e., in the 18% condition) did children generalize the preference even to an agent of a different kind. Thus, from a young age, social and statistical cues inform children's naïve sociology.     

When it's not easy to do the right thing: Developmental changes in understanding cost drive evaluations of moral praiseworthiness

Recent work identified a shift in judgments of moral praiseworthiness that occurs late in development: adults recognize the virtue of moral actions that involve resolving an inner conflict between moral desires and selfish desires. Children, in contrast, praise agents who do the right thing in the absence of inner conflict. This finding stands in contrast with other work showing that children incorporate notions of cost and effort into their social reasoning. Using a modified version of Starmans and Bloom's (2016) vignettes, we show that understanding the virtue of costly moral action precedes understanding the virtue of resolving inner conflict. In two studies (N = 192 children, range = 4.00–9.95 years; and N = 193 adults), we contrasted a character who paid a personal cost (psychological in Study 1, physical in Study 2) to perform a moral action with another who acted morally without paying a cost. We found a developmental progression; 8- and 9-year-old children and adults recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are psychologically or physically costly. Six- and 7-year-old children only recognized the praiseworthiness of moral actions that are physically costly, but not actions that are psychologically costly. Moreover, neither adults nor children inferred that paying a cost to act morally required having a moral desire or resolving inner conflict. These results suggest that both adults and children conceptualize obligation as a direct motivational force on actions. They further suggest that costly choice—a hallmark of moral agency—is implicated in judgments of praiseworthiness early in development.