Visual influences on auditory pluck and bow judgments

In the McGurk effect, visual information specifying a speaker’s articulatory movements can influence auditory judgments of speech. In the present study, we attempted to find an analogue of the McGurk effect by using nonspeech stimuli—the discrepant audiovisual tokens of plucks and bows on a cello. The results of an initial experiment revealed that subjects’ auditory judgments were influenced significantly by the visual pluck and bow stimuli. However, a second experiment in which speech syllables were used demonstrated that the visual influence on consonants was significantly greater than the visual influence observed for pluck-bow stimuli. This result could be interpreted to suggest that the nonspeech visual influence was not a true McGurk effect. In a third experiment, visual stimuli consisting of the wordspluck andbow were found to have no influence over auditory pluck and bow judgments. This result could suggest that the nonspeech effects found in Experiment 1 were based on the audio and visual information’s having an ostensive lawful relation to the specified event. These results are discussed in terms of motor-theory, ecological, and FLMP approaches to speech perception.     

Leibniz's complete propositional logic

Conclusion I have shown (to my satisfaction) that Leibniz's final attempt at a generalized syllogistico-propositional calculus in the Generales Inquisitiones was pretty successful. The calculus includes the truth-table semantics for the propositional calculus. It contains an unorthodox view of conjunction. It offers a plethora of very important logical principles. These deserve to be called a set of fundamentals of logical form. Aside from some imprecisions and redundancies the system is a good systematization of propositional logic, its semantics, and a correct account of general syllogistics. For 1686 it was quite an accomplishment. It is a pity that Leibniz himself did not fully appreciate what he had achieved. It does seem to me that this was due in part, as the Kneales urge (Note 4), to his having kept the focus of his attention on traditional syllogistics. It is a great pity that he did not polish GI 195–200 for publication. The publication of GI 195, 198, and 200 would have most likely promoted further research.This paper was conceived in a Seminar on the Generales Inquisitiones offered by Professor Klaus Jacobi at the University of Freiburg during the 1987 winter semester. I am grateful to him for having allowed me to participate in that exciting seminar. I am grateful to all the seminar participants, especially to Professor Jacobi, Professor Klaus Erich Kaehler, Doctor Helmut Pape, and Herr Hans-Peter Engelhart for sustained and illuminating discussions of some passages of the GI. Jacobi was extremely kind in reading the second version of this paper with a highly refined comb. I am most grateful to him for having pointed out typos, stylistic infelicities, and conceptual obscurities. He also provided advice on the translation, and, most generously and cooperatively, offered suggestions for improving the exposition and the arguments.     

On the {↔, ∼} -reduct of the intuitionistic consequence operation

The intuitionistic consequence operation restricted to the language with (equivalence) and (negation) as the only connectives is axiomatized by means of a finite set of sequential rules of inference.To the memory of Professor Roman Suszko     

On two problems of Harvey Friedman

The paper considers certain properties of intermediate and moda propositional logics.The first part contains a proof of the theorem stating that each intermediate logic is closed under the Kreisel-Putnam rule xyz/(xy)(xz).The second part includes a proof of the theorem ensuring existence of a greatest structurally complete intermediate logic having the disjunction property. This theorem confirms H. Friedman's conjecture 41 (cf. [2], problem 41).In the third part the reader will find a criterion which allows us to obtain sets satisfying the conditions of Friedman's problem 42, on the basis of intermediate logics satisfying the conditions of problem 41.Finally, the fourth part contains a proof of a criterion which allows us to obtain modal logics endowed with Hallden's property on the basis of structurally complete intermediate logics having the disjunction property.Dedicated to Professor Roman SuszkoThe author would like to thank professors J. Perzanowski and A. Wroski for valuable suggestions.     

Perception,belief, and the structure of physical objects and consciousness

Conclusion We have now provided an overall simple theoretical account of the structure of perceptual experience proto-philosophically examined in Part I. The next task is to find the proper logical machinery to formulatte those accounts rigorously.This essay is an abridgment of a monograph written while the author enjoyed both a 1975–76 sabbatical leave from Indiana University and a concurrent grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities for doing research in metaphysics.