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91.
The dominant view about the nature of aesthetic value holds it to be response‐dependent. We believe that the dominance of this view owes largely to some combination of the following prevalent beliefs:
  • 1 The belief that challenges brought against response‐dependent accounts in other areas of philosophy are less challenging when applied to response‐dependent accounts of aesthetic value.
  • 2 The belief that aesthetic value is instrumental and that response‐dependence about aesthetic value alone accommodates this purported fact.
  • 3 The belief that response‐dependence about aesthetic value alone accommodates the widely acknowledged anthropocentricity of aesthetic value.
  • 4 The belief that response‐dependence about aesthetic value alone accommodates aesthetic normativity.
We argue that each of these beliefs is false, and that the dominance of response‐dependent accounts of aesthetic value is therefore largely without foundation.  相似文献   
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Developed from established psychoanalytic knowledge among different psychoanalytic cultures concerning unconscious interpsychic communication, analysts' use of their receptive mental experience—their analytic mind use, including the somatic, unconscious, and less accessible derivatives—represents a significant investigative road to patients' unconscious mental life, particularly with poorly symbolized mental states. The author expands upon this tradition, exploring what happens when patients unconsciously experience and identify with the analyst's psychic functioning. The technical implications of the analyst's “instrument” are described, including the analyst's ego regression, creation of inner space, taking mind as object, bearing uncertainty and intense affect, and self‐analysis. Brief case vignettes illustrate the structure and obstacles to this work.  相似文献   
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Couples who seek a stable and satisfying relationship must recover emotionally and reestablish their intimate connection after their conflicts are over. In a 3‐week diary study, 100 cohabiting couples reported on their daily moods, intimacy, relationship satisfaction, and conflicts. Results indicated that on days following a conflict, couple partners have worse mood, less satisfaction, and less self‐disclosure than on other days. Attachment security and intimacy partially moderated the ability of relationship partners to recover positive and reduce negative affect on days following conflict. Partners of anxiously attached individuals experienced more pronounced postconflict changes in mood and intimacy than partners of securely attached individuals. More intimacy in postconflict interactions was associated with a faster recovery from conflict.  相似文献   
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Abstract: The perceptual model of emotions maintains that emotions involve, or are at least analogous to, perceptions of value. On this account, emotions purport to tell us about the evaluative realm, in much the same way that sensory perceptions inform us about the sensible world. An important development of this position, prominent in recent work by Peter Goldie amongst others, concerns the essential role that virtuous habits of attention play in enabling us to gain perceptual and evaluative knowledge. I think that there are good reasons to be sceptical about this picture of virtue. In this essay I set out these reasons, and explain the consequences this scepticism has for our understanding of the relation between virtue, emotion, and attention. In particular, I argue that our primary capacity for recognizing value is in fact a non-emotional capacity.  相似文献   
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