情感在道德中的作用和感觉论原则在伦理学中的作用

情感问题,确切地说即情感和理性的相互关系问题,在伦理学史中一向占据着中心的地位。对马克思列宁主义伦理学来说,这个问题是方法论上的关键问题。马克思列宁主义伦理学按照自己的方法和对象的特点,运用和发展了辩证唯物主义认识论的成果,在这一成果中感觉论原则占着特殊的地位。在现代伦理学文献中,对这个原则研究、使用的情况是怎样     

心与世界

我的思考起始于W.塞拉斯(Wilfrid Sellars)对所予神话(the Myth of the Given)所作攻击中的一个中心要素.     

论真理的结构及其在哲学各主题之关联中的位置

我们持续不断地提出真之诉求,这一基本事实是我们哲学思考的出发点。真理包含了三个层面:实在论层面、实用主义层面和现象性层面,它们在根本上相互关联着,这使得真理概念具有了一个三元结构。这三个层面之间的关系引导我们进一步思考是、时间、空间、话语、意识、自由和幸福等哲学事态,并在其中发现同样的三元结构。借此,真理概念最终得到了完整论证,它在哲学上的位置也得到了明确呈现。     

Psychological characteristics of aggressive drivers with and without intermittent explosive disorder

We compared two groups of aggressive drivers, those who met criteria for Intermittent Explosive Disorder (IED) (n=10) and comparable aggressive drivers who did not meet IED criteria (n=20), to a group of non-aggressive driving controls (n=20) on measures of psychological distress, anger, hostility, and Type A behavior as well as measures of aggressive driving and driving anger and their driving records. There were few differences between the aggressive drivers with IED and those without IED. The IED positive aggressive drivers endorsed more assaultiveness and resentment as well as more impatience and showed trends to have more hostility and angry temperament. When all aggressive drivers were compared to controls, differences emerged on anxiety, hostility, and anger as well as on measure specific to aggressive driving (competitiveness) and driving anger (at slow drivers and traffic obstructions).     

Thought-shape fusion in anorexia nervosa: an experimental investigation

Cognitive biases and cognitive distortions have been implicated as important factors in the development and maintenance of many disorders. The concept of thought-shape fusion (TSF) in eating disorders was developed by Shafran, Teachman, Kerry, and Rachman (British Journal of Clinical Psychology 38 (1999) 167) as a variant of thought-action fusion, described by Shafran, Thordarson and Rachman (Journal of Anxiety Disorders 10 (1996) 379). TSF occurs when thinking about eating certain types of food increases a person's estimate of their shape and/or weight, elicits a perception of moral wrongdoing, and/or makes the person feel fat. Shafran et al. (1999) examined both the psychometric and experimental properties of TSF in an undergraduate sample. This paper reports an extension of this work to a clinical group (N=20) of patients with anorexia nervosa. After completing a set of relevant questionnaires, participants were asked to think about a food which they considered extremely fattening. They were then asked to write out the sentence, "I am eating--.", inserting the name of the fattening food in the blank. After being asked to rate their anxiety, guilt, feelings about their weight, morality, etc., participants were given the opportunity to neutralize their statement in any way they chose. The majority of the participants neutralized in ways consistent with the findings of Shafran et al. (1999). The results are discussed in terms of cognitive-behavioural formulations of eating disorders, and of the influence of cognitive biases and cognitive distortions on the processing of information relevant to food, weight and shape in anorexia nervosa.     

Infants' reasoning about opaque and transparent occluders in an individuation task

Two experiments document that conceptual knowledge influences 3-year-olds' extension of novel words. In Experiment 1, when objects were described as having conceptual properties typical of artifacts, children extended novel labels for these objects on the basis of shape alone. When the very same objects were described as having conceptual properties typical of animate kinds, children extended novel labels for these objects on the basis of both shape and texture. Moreover, providing a salient perceptual cue (Experiment 2) did not interfere with children's reliance on conceptual information in extending novel words: when an object with eyes was labeled with a novel word in the context of a story describing the object as an artifact, children extended the label on the basis of shape alone (i.e. as though the object were an artifact). These results, which challenge directly the position that 'dumb attentional mechanisms' can account for word learning, stand as evidence for the central role of conceptual information in mapping words to meaning.     

What do you think I think you think?: Strategic reasoning in matrix games

In reasoning about strategic interpersonal situations, such as in playing games, an individual's representation of the situation often includes not only information about the goals and rules of the game, but also a mental model of other minds. Often such mental models involve a hierarchy of reflexive reasoning commonly employed in social situations ("What do you think I think you think..."), and may be related to the developmental notion of 'theory of mind'. In two experiments, the authors formally investigate such interpersonal recursive reasoning in college-age adults within the context of matrix games. Participants are asked to predict the moves of another player (experimenter's confederate) in a two-choice, sequential-move game that may terminate at various stages with different payoffs for each player. Participants are also asked to decide optimally on their own moves based on the prediction made. Errors concerning the prediction, or translation of those predictions into decisions about one's action, were recorded. Results demonstrate the existence of a "default" mental model about the other player in the game context that is dynamically modified as new evidence is accumulated. Predictions about this other player's behavior are, in general, used consistently in decision-making, though the opponent tends to be modeled, by default, to behave in a myopic fashion not anticipating the participant's own action.     

Rich interpretation vs. deflationary accounts in cognitive development: the case of means-end skills in 7-month-old infants

Seven-month-old infants appear to learn means-end skills, such as pushing a button to retrieve a distant toy (Psychological Review 104 (1997) 686). The present studies tested whether such apparent means-end behaviors are genuine, or simply the repetition of trained behaviors under conditions of greatest arousal, as suggested by a dynamic systems reinterpretation. When infants were trained to repeat behaviors that did not serve as means to retrieving toys (pushing a button to light a set of distant lights), their button-pushing differed significantly from infants for whom button-pushing served as a means for retrieving toys. Further, infants demonstrated means-end skills with behaviors that they had not been trained to repeat. Implications for early means-end abilities and for debates surrounding the interpretation of infant behavior are discussed.     

Conceiving of entities as objects and as stuff

What is the difference between conceiving of an entity as an object of some kind and conceiving of it as an amount of solid stuff? We propose that the difference lies in how one thinks about the entity's structure. Object construals require thinking of the structure as being nonarbitrary, whereas substance construals require thinking of the structure as being arbitrary. We report six experiments that provide empirical support for this proposal. Regularity of structure, repetition of structure, and the existence of structure-dependent functions, all of which provide reasons to consider the structure of an entity to be nonarbitrary, were shown to bias participants towards object construals. We also discuss how the proposed account of what it means to construe an entity as an object or as some stuff can account for a range of findings in the literature on lexical development. These include the relation between cohesiveness and ontological category, shape and ontological category, and complexity of shape and ontological category. Finally, we discuss the nature of construals and the relation of object and substance construals to the physical, design, and intentional stances.