The functional role of preschoolers' verbalizations in the generalization of self-instructional training

We examined the functional role of verbalizations in the generalization of self-instructional training with preschoolers. Children learned to overtly self-instruct during classroom work periods prior to covert training. Data were collected on children's acquisition of verbal regulation during training and on overt use of self-instructions in the classroom generalization setting. Results of a multiple baseline design across subjects indicated that treatment effects were evident in the training setting but did not generalize to the classroom until children were emitting overt self-instructions in the classroom itself. The production of self-verbalizations in the generalization setting was related to changes in correct responding, on-task behavior, and efficiency in completing academic work.     

Effectiveness of time-out: a comparison of psychiatric, correctional and day-treatment programs

The effectiveness of a time-out intervention for adolescent psychiatric patients, adjudicated (delinquent) youth, and behaviorally disordered youngsters was explored in this study. The research was conducted in three psychiatric hospitals for children and adolescents, a facility for adjudicated youth, and in a day-treatment program. Utilizing a comparative outcome model, 813 occurrences of time-out with 274 youth were investigated in order to assess levels of effectiveness. The results indicated that time-out had a significant impact, and the use of a child-care specialist as time-out monitor improves overall effectiveness. Important implications for practicing professionals and clinical researchers are noted.     

The epistemic efficacy of stupidity

I show that it follows from both externalist and internalist theories that stupid people may be in a better position to know than smart ones. This untoward consequence results from taking our epistemic goal to be accepting as many truths as possible and rejecting as many falsehoods as possible, combined with a recognition that the standard for acceptability cannot be set too high, else scepticism will prevail. After showing how causal, reliabilist, and coherentist theories devalue intelligence, I suggest that knowledge, as contemporary theories construe it, is not a particularly valuable cognitive achievement, and that we would do well to reopen epistemology to the study of cognitive excellences of all sorts.I am grateful to Warren Goldfarb for sharing his knowledge of wines with me, and to Kenneth Winkler for sharing his knowledge of birds.