On Making and Keeping Promises

Do the conditions under which promises are made determine whether they ought to be kept? Philosophers have placed a number of conditions on promising which, they hold, must be met in order to make promise-keeping obligatory. In so doing, they have distinguished valid promises from invalid promises and justified promises from promises that are not justified. Considering such conditions, one by one, we argue that they are mistaken. In the first place, the conditions they lay down are not necessary for either valid or justified promise-making. In the second place, promises need not meet such conditions in order to create moral obligations. In general, such analyses of promising fail because they suffer from a confusion between promise-making and promise-keeping. Philosophers have wrongly supposed that obligations to keep promises are dependent upon, or derivable from, the quality of the promises themselves, at the time they are made, instead of focusing on conditions that must be satisfied at the time when promises are supposed to be kept. It is not the quality of a promise that determines an obligation to keep it but the rightness or wrongness of performing the promised act.     

Reinforcement and the organisation of behaviour in golden hamsters: Differential overshadowing of a CS by different responses

Are different responses differentially associable with their consequences? An overshadowing design was used to try to answer this question for three responses previously studied in golden hamsters. In Experiment I, scrabbling was rapidly suppressed by electric shock punishment, and it overshadowed a tone which occurred between scrabbling and shock. In Experiment II, no evidence of response-shock association was obtained when open rearing was the punished response, and open rearing did not overshadow the tone. Punishment had some effect on face washing, but there was no statistically significant overshadowing with this response. These results are consistent with the idea that differences in punishment suppression among these three responses have an associative basis. They also demonstrate the usefulness of a novel paradigm for studying “preparedness” of response-reinforcer associations.     

陈莲笙道长生平

陈莲笙道长生于1917年10月25日,上海市人.历任中国道教协会副会长,中国道教协会顾问,上海市道教协会会长.上海市道教协会名誉会长,上海城隍庙住持,上海道学院院长,<上海道教>杂志主编,上海市宗教学会理事,上海市政协第七届委员,上海市政协第八、九届常委等职.     

Mental representation of logical connectives

Logical connectives, such as “AND”, “OR”, “IF . . . THEN”, and “IF AND ONLY IF” are ubiquitous in both language and cognition; however, reasoning with logical connectives is error-prone. We argue that some of these errors may stem from people's tendency to minimize the number of possibilities compatible with logical connectives and to construct a “minimalist” one-possibility representation. As a result, connectives denoting a single possibility (e.g., conjunctions) are likely to be represented correctly, whereas connectives denoting multiple possibilities (e.g., disjunctions or conditionals) are likely to be erroneously represented as conjunctions. These predictions were tested and confirmed in three experiments using different paradigms. In Experiment 1, participants were presented with a multiple-choice task and asked to select all and only those possibilities that would indicate that compound verbal propositions were true versus false. In Experiment 2, a somewhat similar task was used, except that participants were asked later to perform a cued recall of verbal propositions. Finally, Experiment 3 used an old/new recognition paradigm to examine participants' ability to accurately recognize different logical connectives. The results of the three experiments are discussed in relation to theories of representation of possibilities and theories of reasoning.