冯友兰中国哲学“三史”中佛教研究的方法论转向

如何在中国哲学史的框架内理解和诠释中国佛教,胡适与冯友兰用现代学术的方法分别作了佛教“化中国”和佛教“中国化”两种解读。冯友兰历经一生写成的中国哲学“三史”中,对佛教研究在叙事方式上经历了由史论结合、以史为主到史论结合、以论为先而明其学脉,在理论分析上经历了从新实在论等西方哲学到运用马克思主义观点分析中国佛教哲学而得其宗旨。其一以贯之的主线是从揭示中国佛教的本位性到用马克思主义哲学考察中国佛教哲学,这不仅反映了冯先生学术研究的方法论转换,也深刻体现了他的世界观转向。     

Psychological characteristics of aggressive drivers with and without intermittent explosive disorder

We compared two groups of aggressive drivers, those who met criteria for Intermittent Explosive Disorder (IED) (n=10) and comparable aggressive drivers who did not meet IED criteria (n=20), to a group of non-aggressive driving controls (n=20) on measures of psychological distress, anger, hostility, and Type A behavior as well as measures of aggressive driving and driving anger and their driving records. There were few differences between the aggressive drivers with IED and those without IED. The IED positive aggressive drivers endorsed more assaultiveness and resentment as well as more impatience and showed trends to have more hostility and angry temperament. When all aggressive drivers were compared to controls, differences emerged on anxiety, hostility, and anger as well as on measure specific to aggressive driving (competitiveness) and driving anger (at slow drivers and traffic obstructions).     

Thought-shape fusion in anorexia nervosa: an experimental investigation

Cognitive biases and cognitive distortions have been implicated as important factors in the development and maintenance of many disorders. The concept of thought-shape fusion (TSF) in eating disorders was developed by Shafran, Teachman, Kerry, and Rachman (British Journal of Clinical Psychology 38 (1999) 167) as a variant of thought-action fusion, described by Shafran, Thordarson and Rachman (Journal of Anxiety Disorders 10 (1996) 379). TSF occurs when thinking about eating certain types of food increases a person's estimate of their shape and/or weight, elicits a perception of moral wrongdoing, and/or makes the person feel fat. Shafran et al. (1999) examined both the psychometric and experimental properties of TSF in an undergraduate sample. This paper reports an extension of this work to a clinical group (N=20) of patients with anorexia nervosa. After completing a set of relevant questionnaires, participants were asked to think about a food which they considered extremely fattening. They were then asked to write out the sentence, "I am eating--.", inserting the name of the fattening food in the blank. After being asked to rate their anxiety, guilt, feelings about their weight, morality, etc., participants were given the opportunity to neutralize their statement in any way they chose. The majority of the participants neutralized in ways consistent with the findings of Shafran et al. (1999). The results are discussed in terms of cognitive-behavioural formulations of eating disorders, and of the influence of cognitive biases and cognitive distortions on the processing of information relevant to food, weight and shape in anorexia nervosa.     

Infants' reasoning about opaque and transparent occluders in an individuation task

Two experiments document that conceptual knowledge influences 3-year-olds' extension of novel words. In Experiment 1, when objects were described as having conceptual properties typical of artifacts, children extended novel labels for these objects on the basis of shape alone. When the very same objects were described as having conceptual properties typical of animate kinds, children extended novel labels for these objects on the basis of both shape and texture. Moreover, providing a salient perceptual cue (Experiment 2) did not interfere with children's reliance on conceptual information in extending novel words: when an object with eyes was labeled with a novel word in the context of a story describing the object as an artifact, children extended the label on the basis of shape alone (i.e. as though the object were an artifact). These results, which challenge directly the position that 'dumb attentional mechanisms' can account for word learning, stand as evidence for the central role of conceptual information in mapping words to meaning.     

What do you think I think you think?: Strategic reasoning in matrix games

In reasoning about strategic interpersonal situations, such as in playing games, an individual's representation of the situation often includes not only information about the goals and rules of the game, but also a mental model of other minds. Often such mental models involve a hierarchy of reflexive reasoning commonly employed in social situations ("What do you think I think you think..."), and may be related to the developmental notion of 'theory of mind'. In two experiments, the authors formally investigate such interpersonal recursive reasoning in college-age adults within the context of matrix games. Participants are asked to predict the moves of another player (experimenter's confederate) in a two-choice, sequential-move game that may terminate at various stages with different payoffs for each player. Participants are also asked to decide optimally on their own moves based on the prediction made. Errors concerning the prediction, or translation of those predictions into decisions about one's action, were recorded. Results demonstrate the existence of a "default" mental model about the other player in the game context that is dynamically modified as new evidence is accumulated. Predictions about this other player's behavior are, in general, used consistently in decision-making, though the opponent tends to be modeled, by default, to behave in a myopic fashion not anticipating the participant's own action.     

Rich interpretation vs. deflationary accounts in cognitive development: the case of means-end skills in 7-month-old infants

Seven-month-old infants appear to learn means-end skills, such as pushing a button to retrieve a distant toy (Psychological Review 104 (1997) 686). The present studies tested whether such apparent means-end behaviors are genuine, or simply the repetition of trained behaviors under conditions of greatest arousal, as suggested by a dynamic systems reinterpretation. When infants were trained to repeat behaviors that did not serve as means to retrieving toys (pushing a button to light a set of distant lights), their button-pushing differed significantly from infants for whom button-pushing served as a means for retrieving toys. Further, infants demonstrated means-end skills with behaviors that they had not been trained to repeat. Implications for early means-end abilities and for debates surrounding the interpretation of infant behavior are discussed.     

Conceiving of entities as objects and as stuff

What is the difference between conceiving of an entity as an object of some kind and conceiving of it as an amount of solid stuff? We propose that the difference lies in how one thinks about the entity's structure. Object construals require thinking of the structure as being nonarbitrary, whereas substance construals require thinking of the structure as being arbitrary. We report six experiments that provide empirical support for this proposal. Regularity of structure, repetition of structure, and the existence of structure-dependent functions, all of which provide reasons to consider the structure of an entity to be nonarbitrary, were shown to bias participants towards object construals. We also discuss how the proposed account of what it means to construe an entity as an object or as some stuff can account for a range of findings in the literature on lexical development. These include the relation between cohesiveness and ontological category, shape and ontological category, and complexity of shape and ontological category. Finally, we discuss the nature of construals and the relation of object and substance construals to the physical, design, and intentional stances.     

Working and long-term memory deficits in schizophrenia: is there a common prefrontal mechanism?

This study tested the hypothesis that dorsolateral prefrontal cortex deficits contribute to both working memory and long-term memory disturbances in schizophrenia. It also examined whether such deficits were more severe for verbal than nonverbal stimuli. Functional magnetic resonance imaging was used to assess cortical activation during performance of verbal and nonverbal versions of a working memory task and both encoding and recognition tasks in 38 individuals with schizophrenia and 48 healthy controls. Performance of both working memory and long-term memory tasks revealed disturbed dorsolateral prefrontal cortex activation in schizophrenia, although medial temporal deficits were also present. Some evidence was found for more severe cognitive and functional deficits with verbal than nonverbal stimuli, although these results were mixed.