Multiple and iterated contraction reduced to single-step single-sentence contraction

Multiple contraction (simultaneous contraction by several sentences) and iterated contraction are investigated in the framework of specified meet contraction (s.m.c.) that is extended for this purpose. Multiple contraction is axiomatized, and so is finitely multiple contraction (contraction by a finite set of sentences). Two ways to reduce finitely multiple contraction to contraction by single sentences are introduced. The reduced operations are axiomatically characterized and their properties are investigated. Furthermore, it is shown how iterated contraction can be reduced to single-step, single-sentence contraction. However, in this framework the outcome of iterated contraction depends unavoidably on the order in which the inputs are received. This order-dependence makes it impossible to treat two inputs on an equal footing. Therefore it is often preferable to perform changes involving several pieces of information as multiple rather than iterated change.     

Weighing Risks and Benefits

It is almost universally acknowledged that risks have to be weighed against benefits, but there are different ways to perform the weighing. In conventional risk analysis, collectivist risk-weighing is the standard. This means that an option is accepted if the sum of all individual benefits outweighs the sum of all individual risks. In practices originating in clinical medicine, such as ethical appraisals of clinical trials, individualist risk-weighing is the standard. This implies a much stricter criterion for risk acceptance, namely that the risk to which each individual is exposed should be outweighed by benefits for that same individual. The different choices of risk-weighing methods in different policy areas seem to have emerged from traditional thought patterns and social relations, rather than from explicit deliberations on possible justifications for the alternative ways to weigh risks against benefits. It is not obvious how the prevalent differences in risk-weighing practices can be reconstructed in terms of consistent underlying principles of preventive health or social priority-setting.     

Realism and Understanding

Realists claim that, amongst the statements weunderstand, there are some which are true, yetwhose truth potentially transcends the limits ofwhat we can recognize. Dummett and othershave argued that this realist thesis is incompatiblewith an account of understanding in termsof recognitional capacities. But careful analysis revealsthat this contention is mistaken. Thealleged incompatibility presupposes the truth of ametaphysical principle which cannot bevindicated on the basis of an account of understanding.Realists have independent reason toreject this metaphysical principle, as it leads to a collapseof more modest forms of realisminto more contentious ones. According to moderate realism,we neither know that there areactually recognition-transcendent truthsnor do we know taht there are none. Pending apositive case for the metaphysical principle, thisagnosticism is sufficient to warrant therealists' key thesis, viz. that there arepotentially recognition-transcendent truths. Thusrealism, in its more moderate guise, turns outto be the default position.     

A lexicon of attention: from cognitive science to phenomenology

This article tries to create a bridge of understanding between cognitive scientists and phenomenologists who work on attention. In light of a phenomenology of attention and current psychological and neuropsychological literature on attention, I translate and interpret into phenomenological terms 20 key cognitive science concepts as examined in the laboratory and used in leading journals. As a preface to the lexicon, I outline a phenomenology of attention, especially as a dynamic three-part structure, which I have freely amended from the work of phenomenologist and Gestalt philosopher Aron Gurwitsch (1901–1973). As a conclusion, I discuss the nature of subjectivity in attention and attention research, and whether attention might be the same as consciousness.     

Volume contents

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences -     

Coherence in Epistemology and Belief Revision*

A general theory of coherence is proposed, in which systemic and relational coherence are shown to be interdefinable. When this theory is applied to sets of sentences, it turns out that logical closure obscures the distinctions that are needed for a meaningful analysis of coherence. It is concluded that references to “all beliefs” in coherentist phrases such as “all beliefs support each other” have to be modified so that merely derived beliefs are excluded. Therefore, in order to avoid absurd conclusions, coherentists have to accept a weak version of epistemic priority, that sorts out merely derived beliefs. Furthermore, it is shown that in belief revision theory, coherence cannot be adequately represented by logical closure, but has to be represented separately. *Contribution to “Seven Bridges”     

Prospects for Epistemic Compatibilism

This paper argues that Sosa’s virtue perspectivism fails to combine satisfactorily internalist and externalist features in a single theory. Internalism and externalism are reconciled at the price of creating a Gettier problem at the level of “reflective” or second-order knowledge. The general lesson to be learned from the critique of virtue perspectivism is that internalism and externalism cannot be combined by bifurcating justification and knowledge into an object-level and a meta-level and assigning externalism and internalism to different levels.     

Perceived legitimacy of intergroup status differences: its prediction by relative ingroup prototypicality

Research demonstrates that the perceived legitimacy of intergroup status differences has profound effects on intergroup attitudes, emotions and behavior. However, there has only been little intergroup research that predicts the perception of legitimacy. We hypothesize that the perception of legitimate or illegitime status relations depends upon the perceived relative prototypicality of the ingroup for the inclusive category. Since the prototype of the inclusive category provides a normative comparison standard for subgroup evaluation, similarity to this standard (i.e. prototypicality) should be positively evaluated and used to justify high status. A first study in a natural intergroup context (N = 67) offered correlational data in support of the predicted relationship. The second study (N = 60), using Germans as ingroup with Poles as outgroup and Europe as inclusive category, demonstrated that the link between prototypicality and legitimacy is contingent upon the valence of the inclusive category. In order to elucidate the causal direction, the third study manipulated relative prototypicality in an artificial intergroup context (N = 94) and introduced status as a moderator variable. Overall, we found strong support for the hypothesis that legitimacy is related to prototypicality and that this relation is moderated by ingroup status and valence of the inclusive category. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When “different” means “worse”: In-group prototypicality in changing intergroup contexts

An experiment with 213 participants provided evidence for in-group projection—the generalization of distinctive in-group attributes to a superordinate category. The frame of reference for in-group (German) judgments was manipulated by presenting either Italians or the British as an out-group. Results showed that attributes on which Germans differed from each out-group were accentuated not only in in-group judgments but also when judging Europeans. By adapting features of the superordinate category to those of the in-group, the in-group's similarity to, and the out-group's deviation from, the prototype of the superordinate category were maintained, if not emphasized. Further, higher in-group prototypicality—compared to out-group prototypicality—for the superordinate category was related to negative out-group attitudes. In-group projection was reduced when a complex representation of the superordinate category was primed.     

Attitude change in face‐to‐face and computer‐mediated communication: private self‐awareness as mediator and moderator

Two types of social influence can be distinguished: norm‐based influence occurs when social identity is salient and interpersonal influence occurs when personal identity is salient. In two experiments the impact of trait and state private self‐awareness on interpersonal influence during face‐to‐face and computer‐mediated communication (CMC) was investigated. It is argued that interpersonal influence resulting from face‐to‐face communication is stronger than interpersonal influence resulting from CMC because CMC heightens state private self‐awareness. As a result, it leads to a focus on personal perceptions and thoughts which in turn reduces attitude change. Experiment 1 suggests that communication media may influence attitude change via private self‐awareness. Experiment 2 showed that trait private self‐awareness moderates the effect of communication media on interpersonal influence. Interpersonal influence was stronger in face‐to‐face communication than in CMC only for individuals higher in private self‐awareness. This finding indicates that the impact of situational variations of a concept can be limited to individuals who have a more elevated sense of private self‐awareness. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.