Mythical Thinking,Scientific Discourses and Research Dissemination

This article focuses on some principles for understanding. By taking Anna Mikulak’s article “Mismatches between ‘scientific’ and ‘non-scientific’ ways of knowing and their contributions to public understanding of science” (IPBS 2011) as a point of departure, the idea of demarcation criteria for scientific and non-scientific discourses is addressed. Yet this is juxtaposed with mythical thinking, which is supposed to be the most salient trait of non-scientific discourses. The author demonstrates how the most widespread demarcation criterion, the criterion of verification, is self-contradictory, not only when it comes to logic, but also in the achievement of isolating natural sciences from other forms of knowledge. According to Aristotle induction is a rhetorical device and as far as scientific statements are based on inductive inferences, they are relying on humanities, which rhetoric is a part of. Yet induction also has an empirical component by being based on sense-impressions, which is not a part of the rhetoric, but the psychology. Also the myths are understood in a rhetorical (Lévi-Strauss) and a psychological (Cassirer) perspective. Thus it is argued that both scientific and non-scientific discourses can be mythical.     

Further thoughts on memory: replies to Schechtman,Adams, and Goldberg

This is a response to three critical discussions of my book Memory: A Philosophical Study (Oxford University Press 2010): Marya Schechtman, “Memory and Identity”, Fred Adams, “Husker Du?”, and Sanford Goldberg “The Metasemantics of Memory”.     

Reliability of informant ratings and spouse similarity based on the Temperament and Character Inventory

A cohort of 136 Swedish spouse pairs rated themselves and each other with the Temperament and Character Inventory. The data allowed assessment of the reliability of ratings by knowledgeable informants compared to self-rating for this personality test. The reliability of the informant rating was in the expected range, with an average correlation of .58. Agreement was slightly higher for the Temperament dimensions than for the Character dimensions. Additionally, the design allowed evaluation of the similarity between husbands and wives across the seven dimensions measured by the TCI. Correlations between spouses in self-reports were very low for Temperament, with only Harm Avoidance having a statistically significant correlation (.22, p < .05). On the other hand, all three Character dimensions were significantly correlated. These results support the conceptualization of Temperament and Character as separate components of personality. The results are consistent with previous reports on the personality of spouse pairs.     

The role of frequency information and teleological reasoning in infants' and adults' action prediction

This study investigates the contribution of frequency learning and teleological reasoning to action prediction in 9-month-old infants and adults. Participants observed how an agent repeatedly walked to a goal while taking the longer of 2 possible paths, as the shorter and more efficient path was impassable. In the subsequent test phase, both paths were passable. In the 1st test trial, infants and adults anticipated the agent to take the longer path. Unlike adults, infants kept anticipating movements to the longer path even after observing that the agent now took the more efficient path, indicating that the frequency of previous observations dominates action prediction. These results provide evidence, contrary to existing claims in the developmental literature, that frequency learning underlies action prediction in infancy, whereas teleological reasoning might gain importance later on in life.     

Knowledge From Forgetting

This paper provides a novel argument for granting memory the status of a generative source of justification and knowledge. Memory can produce justified output beliefs and knowledge on the basis of unjustified input beliefs alone. The key to understanding how memory can generate justification and knowledge, memory generativism, is to bear in mind that memory frequently omits part of the stored information. The proposed argument depends on a broadly reliabilist approach to justification.     

Attitudes toward illegal immigration: a cross-national methodological comparison

This research is an examination of the generalizability of a Likert-type scale originally devised to measure attitudes toward illegal immigrants (IA) in the United States. The current authors administered this scale across 4 national samples using several methodological procedures. Undergraduate students (631) responded to the IA scale (R. Ommundsen & K. S. Larsen, 1997) at the University of Oslo, Oregon State University, the University of Copenhagen, and Vrije University of Amsterdam. The authors' main purpose was to evaluate the adequacy of the 20-item IA scale by examining possible problems with method and translation. A translation study carried out with the Danish, Norwegian, and Dutch samples (N = 299) showed that the various national versions were fairly accurate and contained largely the same meanings. The use of procrustes analysis of the IA scale yielded 3 factors in all 4 national samples. The coefficient of congruence of these 3 orthogonally rotated factor matrices, with the U.S. factor matrix as target, varied from .80 to .95, supporting the cross-national robustness of the scale. In the search for a more economical cumulative scale, a Mokken analysis yielded a 5-item scale that represented the aforementioned 3 factors and was stable across national samples.     

The Field of Consciousness and Extended Cognition

Extended cognition theorists claim that the definition of cognition can be extended to include not only the brain, but also the body and environment. In a series of works, Mark Rowlands has envisioned a new science of mind that explores the externalism of consciousness and cognition. This paper connects Rowlands’ work with the phenomenology of Aron Gurwitsch. It shows how Gurwitsch’s field of consciousness, in particular his conception of the marginal halo, can provide a distinct, organized way of thinking about extended cognition. A key question considered is from where do cognitive processes project and disclose meanings? By thinking of location as locus—a projecting pathway of points of intentional opportunity—organization in extended cognition becomes organization in a field of consciousness. The marginal halo in the field of consciousness is articulated as this locus of intentionality, what Rowlands (The new science of the mind: from extended mind to embodied phenomenology, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2010) calls “the noneliminable intentional core”. Problems of cognitive bloat and personal character are addressed in light of the findings. In addition to situating Gurwitsch’s work within the extended mind movement for the first time, this study highlights the importance of the marginal halo, largely neglected in previous Gurwitsch scholarship.     

Reduced Alternating Gaze During Social Interaction in Infancy is Associated with Elevated Symptoms of Autism in Toddlerhood

In typical development, infants often alternate their gaze between their interaction partners and interesting stimuli, increasing the probability of joint attention toward surrounding objects and creating opportunities for communication and learning. Children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) have been found to engage less in behaviors that can initiate joint attention compared to typically developing children, but the role of such atypicalities in the development of ASD during infancy is not fully understood. Here, using eye tracking technology in a live setting, we show that 10-month-olds at high familial risk for ASD engage less in alternating gaze during interaction with an adult compared to low risk infants. These differences could not be explained by low general social preference or slow visual disengagement, as the groups performed similarly in these respects. We also found that less alternating gaze at 10 months was associated with more social ASD symptoms and less showing and pointing at 18 months. These relations were similar in both the high risk and the low risk groups, and remained when controlling for general social preference and disengagement latencies. This study shows that atypicalities in alternating gaze in infants at high risk for ASD emerge already during the first 10 months of life - a finding with theoretical as well as potential practical implications.     

On Kant's Idea of Humanity as an End in Itself

Writers like Christine Korsgaard and Allen Wood understand Kant's idea of rational nature as an end in itself as a commitment to a substantive value. This makes it hard for them to explain the supposed equivalence between the universal law and humanity formulations of the categorical imperative, since the former does not appear to assert any substantive value. Nor is it easy for defenders of value‐based readings to explain Kant's claim that the law‐giving nature of practical reason makes all beings with practical reason regard the idea of a rational nature as an end in itself. This article seeks to replace these value‐based readings with a reading of the idea of rational nature as an end that fits better with the overall argument of the Groundwork.     

The Ethics of Accident-Algorithms for Self-Driving Cars: an Applied Trolley Problem?

Self-driving cars hold out the promise of being safer than manually driven cars. Yet they cannot be a 100 % safe. Collisions are sometimes unavoidable. So self-driving cars need to be programmed for how they should respond to scenarios where collisions are highly likely or unavoidable. The accident-scenarios self-driving cars might face have recently been likened to the key examples and dilemmas associated with the trolley problem. In this article, we critically examine this tempting analogy. We identify three important ways in which the ethics of accident-algorithms for self-driving cars and the philosophy of the trolley problem differ from each other. These concern: (i) the basic decision-making situation faced by those who decide how self-driving cars should be programmed to deal with accidents; (ii) moral and legal responsibility; and (iii) decision-making in the face of risks and uncertainty. In discussing these three areas of disanalogy, we isolate and identify a number of basic issues and complexities that arise within the ethics of the programming of self-driving cars.