Welfare,Justice, and Pareto Efficiency

In economic analysis, it is usually assumed that each individuals well-being (mental welfare) depends on her or his own resources (material welfare). A typology is provided of the ways in which one persons well-being may depend on the material resources of other persons. When such dependencies are taken into account, standard Paretian analysis of welfare needs to be modified. Pareto efficiency on the level of material resources need not coincide with Pareto efficiency on the level of well-being. A change in economic conditions that is Pareto efficient in the standard sense, i.e., with respect to material resources, may nevertheless sacrifice one persons well-being to that of another. It is shown that under plausible assumptions, Pareto efficiency on the level of well-being may require the reduction of inequality on the level of material resources.     

Preservation of autobiographical memory in a case of pure progressive amnesia

G.D., a 79 year-old female, presents with a severe and slowly progressive amnesia although she remains entirely independent in daily life and is perfectly well spatially oriented. Her amnesia is relatively isolated and her deficit does not embrace other cognitive domains. G.D. underwent extensive neuropsychological evaluation including language, executive functions, perceptual, and memory tests. Based on clinical observation, the purpose of this study was to determine whether there was a dissociation between her autobiographical and semantic memory. Results point out a severely degraded semantic knowledge of famous public events and persons while autobiographical memory of personally experienced and relevant information remains intact. Results from this study and from previous studies seem to suggest that relative sparing of hippocampal structures may be related to the preservation of autobiographical memory.     

Global and Iterated Contraction and Revision: An Exploration of Uniform and Semi-Uniform Approaches

In order to clarify the problems of iterated (global) belief change it is useful to study simple cases, in particular consecutive contractions by sentences that are both logically and epistemically independent. Models in which the selection mechanism is kept constant are much more plausible in this case than what they are in general. One such model, namely uniform specified meet contraction, has the advantage of being closely connected with the AGM model. Its properties seem fairly adequate for the intended type of contraction. However, the revision operator based on it via the Levi identity collapses into an implausible operation that loses all old information when revising by new information. A weaker version, semi-uniform specified meet contraction, avoids the collapse but has the disadvantage of a remarkably weak logic. It is left as an open issue whether there is an intermediate class of contraction operators that yields a more satisfactory logic.     

Kepler’s optics without hypotheses

This paper argues that Kepler considered his work in optics as part of natural philosophy and that, consequently, he aimed at change within natural philosophy. Back-to-back with John Schuster’s claim that Descartes’ optics should be considered as a natural philosophical appropriation of innovative results in the tradition of practical and mixed mathematics the central claim of my paper is that Kepler’s theory of optical imagery, developed in his Paralipomena ad Vitellionem (1604), was the result of a move similar to Descartes’ by Kepler. My argument consists of three parts. First, Kepler borrowed a geometrical model and experiment of optical imagery from the mélange of mixed and practical mathematics provided in the works of the sixteenth-century mathematicians Ettore Ausonio and Giovanni Battista Della Porta. Second, Kepler criticized the Aristotelian theory of light and he developed his own alternative metaphysics. Third, Kepler used his natural philosophical assumptions about the nature of light to re-interpret the model of image formation taken from Della Porta’s work. Taken together, I portray Kepler’s theory of optical imagery as a natural philosophical appropriation of an innovative model of image formation developed in a sixteenth-century practical and mixed mathematical tradition which was not interested in questioning philosophical assumptions on the nature of light.     

HOW TO UNDERSTAND THE EXTENDED MIND

Given how epistemologists conceive of understanding, to what degree do we understand the hypothesis of extended mind? If the extended mind debate is a substantive dispute, then we have only superficial understanding of the extended mind hypothesis. And if we have deep understanding of the extended mind hypothesis, then the debate over this hypothesis is nothing but a verbal dispute.     

Is the superior verbal memory span of Mandarin speakers due to faster rehearsal?

It is well established that digit span in native Chinese speakers is atypically high. This is commonly attributed to a capacity for more rapid subvocal rehearsal for that group. We explored this hypothesis by testing a group of English-speaking native Mandarin speakers on digit span and word span in both Mandarin and English, together with a measure of speed of articulation for each. When compared to the performance of native English speakers, the Mandarin group proved to be superior on both digit and word spans while predictably having lower spans in English. This suggests that the Mandarin advantage is not limited to digits. Speed of rehearsal correlated with span performance across materials. However, this correlation was more pronounced for English speakers than for any of the Chinese measures. Further analysis suggested that speed of rehearsal did not provide an adequate account of differences between Mandarin and English spans or for the advantage of digits over words. Possible alternative explanations are discussed.     

Fallibility and Trust

I argue that while admission of one's own fallibility rationally requires one's readiness to stand corrected in the light of future evidence, it need have no consequences for one's present degrees of belief. In particular, I argue that one's fallibility in a given area gives one no reason to forego assigning credence 1 to propositions belonging to that area. I can thus be seen to take issue with David Christensen's recent claim that our fallibility has far‐reaching consequences for our account of rational belief and epistemic rationality. My arguments inter alia rely on the idea that in basing one's beliefs on one's evidence, one trusts both that one's evidence has the right pedigree and that one gets its probative force right, where such trust can rationally be invested without the need of any further evidence.     

Gingerbread Nuts and Pebbles: Frege and the Neo-Kantians – Two Recently Discovered Documents

We present and discuss two recently discovered pieces of correspondence by Frege: a postcard to Heinrich Rickert dated 1 July 1911 and a letter to Hinrich Knittermeyer dated 25 October 1912. The documents and their historical context shed new light on Frege's relation to the Neo-Kantians.     

Stimulating the creativity of elderly institutionalized women through works of art

The present article reports a controlled intervention study concerning the effects of a nondirected use of pictures of works of art as a way of stimulating creativity in elderly institutionalized women. Participants were randomly allocated either to the intervention (n = 20) or to the control (n = 20) group. After the intervention significant improvement in ratings between the groups was measured, with the intervention group more open and flexible and with a stronger deposition to a creative behavior than subjects in the control group. They also showed greater freedom and variation than the control group in drawing circles and making pictures. In puzzle tests the intervention group constructed increasingly imaginative, irregular, and open alternatives with colored patterns. The control group constructed closed and black forms. Importantly, the status of increased creativity continued to exist four months after the intervention. No changes were seen in the control group. This group showed a rational and precautious personality.