Davidson on first‐person authority and externalism

Incompatibilism is the view that privileged knowledge of our own mental states cannot be reconciled with externalism regarding the content of mental states. Davidson has recently developed two arguments that are supposed to disprove incompatibilism and establish the consistency of privileged access and externalism. One argument criticizes incompatibilism for assuming that externalism conflicts with the mind‐body identity theory. Since mental states supervene on neurological events, Davidson argues, they are partly ‘in the head’ and are knowable just by reflection. Another argument rejects incompatibilism by repudiating the object perception model of introspection. Once extemalism is freed from the internalist idea that thoughts take objects which are inner epistemological intermediaries, Davidson maintains, it poses no threat to privileged self‐knowledge. It is argued that neither of these arguments is successful, since both disprove assumptions irrelevant to incompatibilism. Moreover, it is indicated how Davidson would have to go about defending his positive account of privileged self‐knowledge against the principal incompatibilist arguments.     

Bootstrap Contraction

We can often specify how we would contract by a certain sentence by saying that this contraction would coincide with some other contraction that we know how to perform. We can for instance clarify that our contraction by p&q would coincide with our contraction by p, or by q, or by {p, q}. In a framework where the set of potential outcomes is known, some contractions are “self-evident” in the sense that there is only one serious candidate that can be the outcome of such a contraction. Contraction by a specific contractee (sentence or set of sentences to be contracted) is bootstrapped if it is specified by saying that it coincides with some such self-evident contraction. For a wide range of (multiple) contraction operators, contractions by any contractee can be bootstrapped. This means that the selection mechanism (selection function, incision function, etc.) can be replaced by a function called a bootstrapping selector that assigns to each contractee some “self-evident” contractee that yields the same outcome. With bootstrapping we can eliminate traditional extralogical components in contraction (e.g., selection functions) and replace them by bootstrapping selectors that reflect more closely the ways in which we actually reason and argue about belief contraction.     

Essay Reviews

The impartial reader notices that Frege, in Die Verneinung, treats an opposing conception of negation, but without specifically naming its proponent. In this paper, it is proven for the first time that the view in question is that of his colleague in Jena, Bruno Bauch. Besides their different views, concerning above all the status of false thoughts, there are nonetheless broader points of agreement between the ideas of Bauch and Frege. These points of agreement cast light on both thinkers as representatives of a current of Neo-Kantianism, having its source in Lotze, in which Kantian and Platonic elements are fused to form a ‘transcendental Platonism’.     

Remembering without knowing

This paper challenges the standard conception of memory as a form of knowledge. Unlike knowledge, memory implies neither belief nor justification.     

Love as a Problem of Knowledge in Kierkegaard's Either/Or and Plato's Symposium

At the end of the essay “Silhouettes” in Either/Or, Kierkegaard writes, “only the person who has been bitten by snakes knows what one who has been bitten by snakes must suffer.” I interpret this as an allusion to Alcibiades' speech in Plato's Symposium. Kierkegaard invites the reader to compare Socrates with Don Giovanni, and Alcibiades with the seducer's women. Socrates' philosophical method, in this light, is a deceptive seduction: just as Don Giovanni's seduction leads his conquests to unhappy love—what Kierkegaard terms “reflective sorrow”—so the elenctic method leads Socrates' interlocutors to aporia, not to knowledge. I offer a critique of Socrates' ironic stance as a philosopher, which stance is reflected in the theory of love he presents in the Symposium, and suggest that philosophy should be modeled on the romantic love of persons—a love that can be reciprocated—not the love of an impersonal Form, a one-sided love.     

Gut or Game? The Influence of Moral Intuitions on Decisions in Video Games

Recent theorizing on the role of morality in media entertainment suggests morality serves as a guiding force in audience reactions to content. Using moral foundations theory as a base, research has found significant associations between moral salience and audience preferences for and responses to film and television varying in their presentations of morality. Our study extends this work by testing the same relationship in video games. Because a distinguishing factor between video games and traditional media is interactivity, our study focuses on how moral salience predicts decisions made in a video game. We find that increased moral salience led to a decreased probability of moral violations, while decreased moral salience led to an observed random (50%) distribution of violations. This finding was largely stable across different morality subcultures (German, United States) and age groups (adolescents and elderly), with deviations from this pattern explained by theory. We interpret this as evidence for a gut or game explanation of decision making in video games. When users encounter virtual scenarios that prime their moral sensitivities, they rely on their moral intuitions; otherwise, they make satisficing decisions not as an indication of moral corruption but merely as a continuation of the virtual experience.     

Blameworthiness as Deserved Guilt

It is often assumed that we are only blameworthy for that over which we have control. In recent years, however, several philosophers have argued that we can be blameworthy for occurrences that appear to be outside our control, such as attitudes, beliefs and omissions. This has prompted the question of why control should be a condition on blameworthiness. This paper aims at defending the control condition by developing a new conception of blameworthiness: To be blameworthy, I argue, is most fundamentally to deserve to feel guilty. Being blamed by someone else is not necessarily harmful to the wrongdoer. The blame might not be expressed, or the wrongdoer might not care. But to blame oneself necessarily involves suffering. This conception of blameworthiness explains why the control condition should obtain: We are morally blameworthy for A only if A was (directly or indirectly) under our control because (a) to be blameworthy is to deserve to feel guilty, (b) to feel guilty is to suffer, and (c) one deserves to suffer for A only if A was under one’s control.     

Volume completion in 4.5-month-old infants

In this study, we examined 4.5-month-old infants' visual completion of self-occluding three-dimensional objects. A previous study on this topic reported that 6-month-old, but not 4-month-old infants extrapolate a convex, symmetric prism from a limited view of its surfaces (Soska & Johnson, 2008). As of yet, studies on the development of amodal completion of three-dimensional, self-occluding objects are scarce. Given 4-month-old infants' abilities to derive three-dimensional shape from a variety of visual cues, three-dimensional amodal completion may well depend on the perceptual strength of three-dimensionality in the stimulus displays. The first experiments (1A and 1B) tested this hypothesis by means of a habituation paradigm and showed that 4.5-month-old infants are indeed able to amodally complete the back of a self-occluding object when sufficient three-dimensional cues are available. Further support for volume completion in 4.5-month-old infants was found in a second experiment, again using a habituation paradigm, that measured perceived connectedness between two visually separated, self-occluding, three-dimensional objects.