A Cross-Lagged Panel Approach to Understanding Social Support and Chronic Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Symptoms in Veterans: Assessment Modality Matters

Although there is a strong and consistent association between social support and posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the directionality of this association has been debated, with some research indicating that social support protects against PTSD symptoms, whereas other research suggests that PTSD symptoms erode social support. The majority of studies in the literature have been cross-sectional, rendering directionality impossible to determine. Cross-lagged panel models overcome many previous limitations; however, findings from the few studies employing these designs have been mixed, possibly due to methodological differences including self-report versus clinician-administered assessment. The current study used a cross-lagged panel structural equation model to explore the relationship between social support and chronic PTSD symptoms over a 1-year period in a sample of 264 Iraq and Afghanistan veterans assessed several years after trauma exposure. Approximately a third of the sample met criteria for PTSD at the baseline assessment, with veterans’ trauma occurring an average of 6 years prior to baseline. Two separate models were run, with one using PTSD symptoms assessed via self-report and the other using clinician-assessed PTSD symptoms. Excellent model fit was found for both models. Results indicated that the relationship between social support and PTSD symptoms was affected by assessment modality. Whereas the self-report model indicated a bidirectional relationship between social support and PTSD symptoms over time, the clinician-assessed model indicated only that baseline PTSD symptoms predicted social support 1 year later. Results highlight that assessment modality is one factor that likely impacts disparate findings across previous studies. Theoretical and clinical implications of these findings are discussed, with suggestions for the growing body of literature utilizing these designs to dismantle this complex association.     

Judgments About Fact and Fiction by Children From Religious and Nonreligious Backgrounds

In two studies, 5‐ and 6‐year‐old children were questioned about the status of the protagonist embedded in three different types of stories. In realistic stories that only included ordinary events, all children, irrespective of family background and schooling, claimed that the protagonist was a real person. In religious stories that included ordinarily impossible events brought about by divine intervention, claims about the status of the protagonist varied sharply with exposure to religion. Children who went to church or were enrolled in a parochial school, or both, judged the protagonist in religious stories to be a real person, whereas secular children with no such exposure to religion judged the protagonist in religious stories to be fictional. Children's upbringing was also related to their judgment about the protagonist in fantastical stories that included ordinarily impossible events whether brought about by magic (Study 1) or without reference to magic (Study 2). Secular children were more likely than religious children to judge the protagonist in such fantastical stories to be fictional. The results suggest that exposure to religious ideas has a powerful impact on children's differentiation between reality and fiction, not just for religious stories but also for fantastical stories.     

Progress in Violence Risk Assessment and Communication: Hypothesis versus Evidence

We draw a distinction between hypothesis and evidence with respect to the assessment and communication of the risk of violent recidivism. We suggest that some authorities in the field have proposed quite valid and reasonable hypotheses with respect to several issues. Among these are the following: that accuracy will be improved by the adjustment or moderation of numerical scores based on clinical opinions about rare risk factors or other considerations pertaining to the applicability to the case at hand; that there is something fundamentally distinct about protective factors so that they are not merely the obverse of risk factors, such that optimal accuracy cannot be achieved without consideration of such protective factors; and that assessment of dynamic factors is required for optimal accuracy and furthermore interventions aimed at such dynamic factors can be expected to cause reductions in violence risk. We suggest here that, while these are generally reasonable hypotheses, they have been inappropriately presented to practitioners as empirically supported facts, and that practitioners’ assessment and communication about violence risk run beyond that supported by the available evidence as a result. We further suggest that this represents harm, especially in impeding scientific progress. Nothing here justifies stasis or simply surrendering to authoritarian custody with somatic treatment. Theoretically motivated and clearly articulated assessment and intervention should be provided for offenders, but in a manner that moves the field more firmly from hypotheses to evidence. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.