Fluid and crystallized intelligence and primacy/recency components of short-term memory

Primacy and recency recall measures, obtained from both free and probed-recall tasks, were included in a battery of tests which also contained markers for fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, and cognitive speed factors. Our results confirmed previous findings that for subjects within the normal range of abilities, recency recall from probed-recall tasks is more closely linked to intelligence than is primacy recall. A new finding was also obtained: that primacy recall is correlated more with measures of cognitive speed than is recency recall. These results are discussed in terms of the concept of working memory and its relation to intelligence.     

Personality Characteristics and Self-esteem in Pet Owners and Non-owners

Previous research suggests that pet owners are psychologically different than non-owners in terms of self-esteem and other personality characteristics. In this study, 82 pet owners and 48 non-owners were tested on self-esteem, extraversion, neuroticism, and social self-esteem. Special emphasis was placed on highly attached pet owners compared with non-owners. Level of attachment was determined by scores from the CENSHARE pet attachment survey. No significant differences were found between the groups using analysis of variance and multivariate analysis of variance statistical procedures. It was concluded that pet owners and non-owners may not be different in terms of personality but may have become victims of stereotyping by both the general population and scientific researchers. Discussion was given to related significant findings and recommendations for further research.     

“Paramount reality” in Schutz and Gurwitsch

Conclusion Both Schutz and Gurwitsch describe reality as having a manifold character: Schutz speaks of multiple realities and Gurwitsch of orders of existence. Both hold that one realm of reality has a privileged status compared to the others: common everyday experience. However, in spite of this apparent convergence in their views, a closer reading of their various works reveal the important difference in what they understand under common everyday experience.For Schutz, it is the world of social action, characterized by him as paramount reality because of the constitutive processes of the experiences of time, space, sociality and meaning involved in action. For Gurwitsch, the realm of common everyday experience represents the counterpart and the origin of the constructed realm of science: therein lies its status of paramount reality. But what it really refers to is not ordinary experience, as most of his statements suggest, but pre-predicative experience, wherefrom the categories of the natural sciences, namely space and time, originate. Gurwitsch speaks of this pre-predicative experience, which he also calls primordial experience, as being essentially perceptual experience. However, he limits perceptual experience to sensory perception, leaving out the symbolic, social and action-related components of perception and becomes thus inconsistent with his adherence to the dismissal of the constancy hypothesis in his field theory of consciousness. The dismissal of the constancy hypothesis implies the recognition of the appresentational structures involving symbols, action and Others as inherent components of every perception. Schutz disagrees with Gurwitsch's reduction of the life-world Erlebnisse to sensory perception and this issue becomes the core of their debate on the phenomenon of paramount reality.     

Mentally retarded individuals outperform college graduates in judging the nonconservation of space and perimeter

Most adults of average and superior intelligence incorrectly assume that in a two dimensional figure two attributes, area, and perimeter, are locked in a fixed relationship such that if one remains unchanged so does the other. Consequently, when they correctly conserve one attribute during shape transformation, they incorrectly conserve the other. Mentally retarded individuals assume no such fixed relationship but depend exclusively on perceptual information. Although this dependence adversely effects their judgment of conservation, it allows them to correctly judge the changed state of the nonconserved attribute.     

Tower of Hanoi performance of retarded young adults and nonretarded children as a function of solution length and goal state

Three experiments were conducted with the Tower of Hanoi task to assess problem solving ability in 6-, 7-, 8-, and 10-year-old nonretarded children and mentally retarded young adults of varying maturational ages. In Experiment 1 we gradually reduced the number of moves required for solution until subjects could solve the 3-disk tower-ending problem. Although all groups experienced difficulty with the standard 7-move problem, all but the trainable retarded group readily solved the 6-move problem. The trainable group did not reach a comparable level of success until the 4-move problem. On the 7-move problem the retarded groups performed at the level of nonretarded groups that were maturationally $\text{1}\text{1}\text{2}$ to 3 years younger. An analysis of first moves indicated that subject groups differed in the strategies they used to solve the problems. In Experiment 2, practice effects were ruled out as a source of the superior performance on the 6- than on the 7-move problem. In Experiment 3, 7- and 10-year-old nonretarded children and mentally retarded young adults did not differ on 5-move problems in which configuration of the goal states was varied. A comparison of all 5-move problems judged to have the same depth of search requirements indicated that the tower-ending problems were significantly easier to solve than the partial-tower-ending problems, which in turn were easier than the flat-ending problems. A limited depth of search capacity sets boundaries on the use of sophisticated strategies and, to a large extent, accounts for the retarded groups' maturational lag.     

Behavioral control of visual fixation of the rhesus monkey.

A paradigm for the control of visual fixation of the macaque monkey in vision experiments was described. Using a Maxwellian view, the procedure permits the placement of discrete test-light stimuli in a specific area of the retina as the monkey fixates a primary target. This procedure holds foveal fixation as other behaviorally significant visual stimuli are presented to the visual field. By a methods-of-limits procedure, the sensitivity of the monkey eye was measured at different retinal locations under both photopic and scotopic visual adaptation.