Fantasy proneness,creative capacity,and styles of creativity

The Creativity Styles Questionnaire-Revised was used to measure graduate psychology students' (N=173) self-perceptions of creative capacity and styles of creativity (beliefs about and strategies for going about being creative). Participants also completed the Inventory of Childhood Memories and Imaginings, a self-report measure of Fantasy Proneness. The Self-perceived Creative Capacity and Fantasy Proneness scores were significantly correlated (r=.36, p<.001), and these scores were positively correlated with the styles subscale scores of Belief in Unconscious Processes. Use of Techniques, Use of Senses, and negatively correlated with Final Product Orientation. Also, the Fantasy Proneness scores were positively correlated with the Superstition scores and the Environmental Control and Behavioral Self-regulation scores.     

Against the New Evidentialists

Evidentialists and Pragmatists about reasons for belief have long been in dialectical stalemate. However, recent times have seen a new wave of Evidentialists who claim to provide arguments for their view which should be persuasive even to someone initially inclined toward Pragmatism. This paper reveals a central flaw in this New Evidentialist project: their arguments rely on overly demanding necessary conditions for a consideration to count as a genuine reason. In particular, their conditions rule out the possibility of pragmatic reasons for action. Since the existence of genuine pragmatic reasons for action is common ground between the Evidentialist and the Pragmatist, this problem for the New Evidentialist arguments is fatal. The upshot is that the deadlock between these two positions is restored: neither side can claim to be in possession of an argument that could convince the other. As it happens, I myself favor Pragmatism about reasons for belief, and although I don't claim to be able to convince a committed Evidentialist, I do make a prima facie case for Pragmatism by describing particular scenarios in which it seems to be true. I then go on to develop my own preferred version of the view: Robust Pragmatism, according to which a consideration never constitutes a reason for believing a proposition purely in virtue of being evidence for it.     

Phenomenal evidence and factive evidence defended: replies to McGrath,Pautz, and Neta

This paper defends and develops the capacity view against insightful critiques from Matt McGrath, Adam Pautz, and Ram Neta. In response to Matt McGrath, I show why capacities are essential and cannot simply be replaced with representational content. I argue moreover, that the asymmetry between the employment of perceptual capacities in the good and the bad case is sufficient to account for the epistemic force of perceptual states yielded by the employment of such capacities. In response to Adam Pautz, I show why a perceiver’s belief is better justified than the belief of someone who suffers a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination. I show, moreover, why the capacity view is compatible with standard Bayesian principles and how it accounts for degrees of justification. In response to Ram Neta, I discuss the relationship between evidence and rational confidence, as well as the notion of evidence in light of an externalism about perceptual content.     

The Perception of Honour-Related Violence in Female and Male University Students from Morocco,Cameroon and Italy

The study investigates the perception of honour-related violence against women in female and male university students from three countries - Morocco, Cameroon, Italy – all considered honour cultures but different in terms of various other sociocultural factors, such as family structure and gender roles. One hundred fourteen Moroccan (47 females, 67 males), 106 Cameroonian (41 females, 65 males) and 103 Italian (51 females, 52 males) students attending Turin University and currently living in Turin, answered a questionnaire to evaluate an act of honour-related violence by a father against his daughter. The results showed that the perception of this act was influenced by the participants’ nationality: Italians evaluated the incident as more serious and more as a crime than Moroccans, and the latter more than Cameroonians. Furthermore, Italians attributed less responsibility to the victim and more responsibility to the assailant than Moroccans and Cameroonians did; accordingly, they also proposed more severe punishment for the assailant than Moroccans and Cameroonians. The results also showed an interaction between nationality and gender: Cameroonian women attributed more responsibility to the victim and less to the assailant than Cameroonian men, and Italian men attributed less responsibility to the assailant than Italian women. These results are interpreted in terms of the importance attributed to family honour in the three countries and their differences in social organisation and gender roles.     

Authoritativeness and Responsibility in the Analytic Exploratory Process Discussion of Elisa’s Case

Following the clinical exploratory process of Francesca Colzani’s case, this discussion emphasizes how the authoritativeness of the analysts’ contribution has to do with her/his responsibility for a self-reflexive attitude. We do not speak of power as much as of the possibility for and openness to change, which is stimulated by both of the subjectivities that are brought into play. The paper underlines the dialogue between poetic meaning and analytic meaning suggesting an innovative bidirectionality: from poetic language to the analytic process, but also from the analytic process to poetic language.     

The Relational Model: International Relations and Dissemination in Italy: A Historical Account

In this paper we attempt to describe how the relational model spread in Italy primarily from the microcosm of the Institute that we founded—ISIPSÉ—and in which we tried to create a community within which we could study the contemporary theories and meet the psychoanalysts who gave life to the relational movement. We describe a process of creating a cultural space that allows us to dialogue directly with those who contributed to the evolution of contemporary psychoanalysis. Today in psychoanalytic literature the growing importance of the implicit refers primarily to the importance of the body in the analytic relationship. Therefore we believe that in the training of therapists attention for an embodied, physical transmission of psychoanalysis makes the transition from theory to clinical situation more consistent and smoother.     

Relationships,Environment, and the Brain: How Emerging Research is Changing What We Know about the Impact of Families on Human Development

Recent research is providing family therapists with new information about the complex interaction between an individual's biological makeup and his/her social and physical environment. Family and social relationships, particularly during sensitive periods early in life, can affect a child's biological foundation. Additionally, stress during the early years can have a lasting effect on an individual's physical and mental health and contribute to the onset of severe mental illness. Community programs have been developed to intervene early with families who have an at‐risk child to prevent or minimize the onset of mental illness including providing partnerships with at‐risk mothers of infants to shape attachment relationships. Programs are also developing individual and family interventions to prevent the onset of psychosis. Practicing family therapists can incorporate emerging neuroscience and early intervention research and leverage the growing base of community programs to enhance the effectiveness and sustainability of mental health outcomes for clients. Additionally, family therapy education programs should broaden student training to incorporate the growing body of information about how family relationships affect individual mental health development.     

Predictors of Sleep-Problem Trajectories Across Adolescence

Research on Child and Adolescent Psychopathology - Stress and sleep problems are significantly correlated in adolescents. Few longitudinal studies, however, have evaluated possible correlates and...     

The particularity and phenomenology of perceptual experience

I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views can easily satisfy the second but not the first desideratum. I argue that to satisfy both desiderata perceptual experience is best conceived of as fundamentally both relational and representational. I develop a view of perceptual experience that synthesizes the virtues of relationalism and representationalism, by arguing that perceptual content is constituted by potentially gappy de re modes of presentation.     

Believing for Practical Reasons

Some prominent evidentialists argue that practical considerations cannot be normative reasons for belief because they can't be motivating reasons for belief. Existing pragmatist responses turn out to depend on the assumption that it's possible to believe in the absence of evidence. The evidentialist may deny this, at which point the debate ends in an impasse. I propose a new strategy for the pragmatist. This involves conceding that belief in the absence of evidence is impossible. We then argue that evidence can play a role in bringing about belief without being a motivating reason for belief, thereby leaving room for practical considerations to serve as motivating reasons. I present two ways in which this can happen. First, agents can use evidence as a mere means by which to believe, with practical considerations serving as motivating reasons for belief, just as we use tools (e.g. a brake pedal) as mere means by which to do something (e.g. slow down) which we are motivated to do for practical reasons. Second, evidence can make it possible for one to choose whether or not to believe – a choice one can then make for practical reasons. These arguments push the debate between the evidentialist and the pragmatist into new territory. It is no longer enough for an evidentialist to insist that belief is impossible without evidence. Even if this is right, the outcome of the debate remains unsettled. It will hang on the ability of the evidentialist to respond to the new pragmatist strategy presented here.