Comparative Religious Ethics Among the Ruins

This is a response to the recent essay by Elizabeth M. Bucar and Aaron Stalnaker on “Comparative Religious Ethics as a Field of Study.” I clarify my earlier positions on method and virtue in comparative religious ethics and try to respond to some of the issues that Bucar and Stalnaker raise in regard to my arguments specifically and the field more generally. I argue that while we need not measure the practical impact of scholarly work in comparative religious ethics purely in terms of political or social action, I nevertheless worry that defining the goals of comparative inquiry in terms of the production of bewilderment, intellectual vertigo, or skeptical questions can lead to impressionistic or therapeutic methodological norms. In a similar vein, I refine my earlier position on externalism that acknowledges the impossibility of a purely externalist approach but also notes the desirability of coming to understand others “in their own terms” prior to engaging in the process of transmutation. I also question Bucar and Stalnaker's pessimism about the potential of producing “rigorously convincing ethical theory from the lived experience of regular folk,” suggesting that perhaps we are working with different conceptions of the sociology of knowledge. Finally, I consider whether we are currently in the midst of an epistemological crisis and conclude with some reflections on the rationality of the craft of comparative religious ethics.     

Introduction

The contributors to this reflection on the field consider the legacy of Christian ethics in comparative religious ethics (CRE), particularly in regard to whether the latter has escaped the parochialism and hegemony of the former, whether the legacy is simply vicious or whether it can be virtuous, and the specific ways in which the former has influenced the discipline of CRE in regard to methods and themes. Beyond these methodological questions, the contributors also speak to the historical development of Christian ethics and CRE in the cultural and institutional contexts of late twentieth century America and provide reflections on the politics of CRE as it is now practiced and debated in the field and in the academy.     

The utility of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) facet and item scores in predicting violent recidivism

There is relatively limited research on psychopathy in non-Caucasian ethnic groups and even less on the utility of the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) that focuses on PCL-R facet and item scores in predicting violent recidivism. In this study, we assessed the utility of the PCL-R in prospectively predicting violent versus nonviolent recidivism during an 11-year follow-up window. A high-risk sample of 451 incarcerated Korean male offenders was assessed on the PCL-R at baseline. A total of 445 were reconvicted after release (353 violent and 92 nonviolent recidivists). Psychopathy facet scores were higher in violent compared to nonviolent recidivists. Facet 2 (affective) showed the strongest effect size (Cohen's d = 0.53; Percentage change in odds = 22.6%) in predicting violent recidivism. Analyses of the four items constituting the affective facet indicated that callous/lack of empathy (Percentage change in odds = 134.4%) and failure to accept responsibility (Percentage change in odds = 94.5%) were the strongest predictors of violent recidivism. Findings are to our knowledge the first to document the utility of the PCL-R in distinguishing violent from nonviolent recidivism and highlight the role of affective impairment (particularly lack of empathy) in violent recidivism.     

Introduction to John Wild’s “Marxist humanism and existential philosophy”

Continental Philosophy Review -