A case for a certainty norm of assertion

According to the widely endorsed Knowledge Account of Assertion, the epistemic requirements on assertion are captured by the Knowledge Norm of Assertion, which requires speakers only to assert what they know. This paper proposes that in addition to the Knowledge Norm there is also an Epistemic Propositional Certainty Norm of Assertion, which enjoins speakers only to assert p if they believe that p on the basis of evidence which makes p an epistemic propositional certainty. The paper explains how this propositional certainty norm accounts for a range of data related to the practice of assertion and defends the norm against general objections to certainty norms of assertion put forward by Duncan Pritchard, John Turri, and Timothy Williamson, by drawing on linguistic theories about epistemic modals and gradable predicate semantics. Together these considerations show that the prospects of a certainty account of assertion are much more promising than is usually assumed.

     

A dual-networks architecture of top-down control

Complex systems ensure resilience through multiple controllers acting at rapid and slower timescales. The need for efficient information flow through complex systems encourages small-world network structures. On the basis of these principles, a group of regions associated with top-down control was examined. Functional magnetic resonance imaging showed that each region had a specific combination of control signals; resting-state functional connectivity grouped the regions into distinct 'fronto-parietal' and 'cingulo-opercular' components. The fronto-parietal component seems to initiate and adjust control; the cingulo-opercular component provides stable 'set-maintenance' over entire task epochs. Graph analysis showed dense local connections within components and weaker 'long-range' connections between components, suggesting a small-world architecture. The control systems of the brain seem to embody the principles of complex systems, encouraging resilient performance.     

Ingroup bias in the minimal group paradigm shown by three‐person groups with high or low state self‐esteem

From social identity theory a negative relation between self‐esteem and ingroup bias can be deducted. Much research has been done to test this proposition and largely failed to confirm this relation. Unlike many existing studies, we conducted an experiment in which (a) self‐esteem is not conceived as a trait entity but much more situation‐specific, (b) the self‐esteem manipulation is not relative to the outgroup, and (c) the measure of intergroup differentiation is unrelated to the self‐esteem manipulation. We categorised our participants into two arbitrary minimal groups (Klee or Kandinsky fans) and afterwards formed homogeneous three‐person groups (all persons were either Klee or Kandinsky fans). We manipulated the state self‐esteem of these real groups by giving them positive or negative feedback concerning their performance in a problem‐solving task. Afterwards, all groups distributed money to ingroup and outgroup members via Tajfel distribution matrices. Low state self‐esteem groups were found to exhibit stronger ingroup bias than high state self‐esteem groups overall, although the variability of intergroup discrimination was larger in the low state self‐esteem groups, pointing to more heterogeneous reactions to low state self‐esteem. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A Woman's Choice? — On Women, Assisted Reproduction and Social Coercion

This paper critically discusses an argument that is sometimes pressed into service in the ethical debate about the use of assisted reproduction. The argument runs roughly as follows: we should prevent women from using assisted reproduction techniques, because women who want to use the technology have been socially coerced into desiring children--and indeed have thereby been harmed by the patriarchal society in which they live. I call this the argument from coercion. Having clarified this argument, I conclude that although it addresses important issues, it is highly problematic for the following reasons. First, if women are being coerced to desire to use AR, we should eradicate the coercive elements in pro-natalist ideology, not access to AR. Second, the argument seems to have the absurd implication that we should prevent all women, whether fertile or not, to try to have children. Third, it seems probable that women's welfare will be greater if we let well informed and decision-competent women decide for themselves whether they want to use AR.     

Testing unidimensionality in polytomous Rasch models

A fundamental assumption of most IRT models is that items measure the same unidimensional latent construct. For the polytomous Rasch model two ways of testing this assumption against specific multidimensional alternatives are discussed. One, a marginal approach assuming a multidimensional parametric latent variable distribution, and, two, a conditional approach with no distributional assumptions about the latent variable. The second approach generalizes the Martin-Löf test for the dichotomous Rasch model in two ways: to polytomous items and to a test against an alternative that may have more than two dimensions. A study on occupational health is used to motivate and illustrate the methods.The authors would like to thank Niels Keiding, Klaus Larsen and the anonymous reviewers for valuable comments to a previous version of this paper. This research was supported by a grant from the Danish Research Academy and by a general research grant from Quality Metric, Inc.     

What is it for a Life to go Well (or Badly)?: Some Critical Comments on Wayne Sumner’s Theory of Welfare

In an effort to construct a plausible theory of experience-based welfare, Wayne Sumner imposes two requirements on the relevant kind of experience: the information requirement and the autonomy requirement. I argue that both requirements are problematic. First, I argue (very briefly) that a well-know case like ‘the deceived businessman’ need not support the information requirement as Sumner believes. Second, I introduce a case designed to cast further doubt on the information requirement. Third, I attend to a shortcoming in Sumner’s theory of welfare, namely that it is unclear which of later and informed assessments are to be treated as authoritative when it comes to the evaluation of a person’s welfare. Finally, I suggest that, in combination with ‘welfarism’ (to which Sumner subscribes, and which has it that welfare is all that matters from a moral viewpoint), the information requirement entail morally troublesome conclusions: e.g. the conclusion that, from a moral point of view, we should, other things being equal, only to be concerned with the alternative that makes one person slightly better off in respect of welfare instead of also being morally concerned with the alternative that makes one person very happy.     

Odor production and utilization under conditions of nonreward and small reward

A series of five experiments was conducted to examine odor production and utilization under conditions of contrasting large and small reward. Using daily, eight-trial double-alternation sequences of reward (L)-nonreward (N) or small reward (S), i.e., LLNNLLNN and LLSSLLSS, appropriate patterning was shown only when an empty goalbox was initially encountered on N or S trials (Experiments 1–5). Manipulations designed to increase frustration, for example, preceding double-alternation training with a block of large-reward trials in Experiment 2, or increasing the L vs S ratio in Experiment 3, failed to yield patterning when small reward was presented at the start of the S-trial confinement period. Patterning was shown when small reward was presented at the end of the S-trial confinement (Experiments 4 and 5). Immediate vs delayed (30 sec) S or N trial goalbox removal failed to result in differences in patterning (Experiments 1 and 2). To distinguish odor production from odor use, subjects trained on an LLSSLLSS pattern preceded subjects trained on an LLNNLLNN pattern (Experiment 5). Because patterning failed to develop in the LLSSLLSS subjects and the first subject in the LLNNLLNN group, it was concluded that a discriminably different cue was not produced on S trials under the LLSSLLSS sequence when small reward was delivered at the beginning of the goalbox confinement period. Shifting small-reward delivery to the end of goalbox confinement resulted in the immediate display of patterning by the first LLNNLLNN subject, and the subsequent development of patterning by the LLSSLLSS subjects.