Political Ideologies and Support for Censorship: Is It a Question of Whose Ox Is Being Gored?

Two studies are described. one of 381 university students and the other a statewide survey of 295 adults, both of which examine the relationship between attitudinal support for censorship and political ideologies. The results of these studies are interpreted as challenging the view of Suedfeld, Steel, and Schmidt (1994) that support for censorship is a function of both the works in question and the political ideologies of the respondents. In both studies we find that support for censorship is somewhat consistent across messages and images of differing political content. and that support for censorship is generally greater among those with conservative political attitudes, regardless of the content of the works in question. A model of political attitudes (Maddox & Lilie. 1986) that conceptualizes American political idcologies as consisting of two relatively independent dimensions, rather than a single left-right dimension. is proposed as a more effective means of conceptualizing this issue.     

Autonomy in the medical profession in the United Kingdom – an historical perspective

This paper reviews the concept of professional autonomy from anhistorical perspective. It became formalised in the United Kingdom onlyafter a long struggle throughout most of the nineteenth century. In itspure form professional autonomy implies unlimited powers to undertakemedical investigations and to prescribe treatment, irrespective of cost.Doctors alone should determine the quality of care and the levels ofremuneration to which they should be entitled. In the second half of thetwentieth century a steady erosion of professional autonomy occurred inthe United Kingdom. The level of remuneration has been restricted formost doctors for nearly fifty years, whilst the costs of health carehave steadily reduced the doctor's ability to provide unrestricted carewithin the health care system. Reorganisation of the National HealthService in 1983 and 1991 has substantially eroded professional autonomy,to the point where research developments, clinical judgement and ethicalstandards are all now being placed at risk.     

A transgenerational theory

How does a family maintain and pass on its unique identity and culture? What mechanisms allow the passage of family tradition from one generation to the next? These are questions that a transgenerational theory must attempt to answer. Biological communication is one way of transmitting characteristics to succeeding generations but other forms of communication exist. Animals with complex nervous systems pass learned behaviour to their offspring and other members of their species. In the family environment Lamarckian transmission occurs in that acquired practices, behaviours and beliefs are passed on to succeeding generations. Transgenerational theory deals with the rules which govern the communication of acquired practices, behaviours and beliefs between generations. There is no rigorous scientific approach to the passage of family culture and tradition. This transgenerational theory is a minor step in the formulation of such an approach.     

Experiments in micro-history: Attributions about the recent vs. the remote subjective past

Demonstrated in two studies ( N = 64, N = 79) that information about a hypothetical stimulus person that appears to be 3 hold is judged more positively than information that appears to be 45 min old (p < .03, p < .007 respectively). In both instances, the information was received 1½ hago, but by unobtrusively manipulating the speeds of a clock by a factor of two, subjects were led to believe that they received the information either 45 min or 3 hago. The implications of thefindings for theories of attribution and social judgment are pointed out.     

A Radical Notion of EmbeddednessA Logically Necessary Precondition for Agency and Self-Awareness

The aim of this essay is to establish the logically necessary preconditions for the existence of self-awareness in an artificial or a natural agent. It examines the terms agent , situated , embodied , embedded , and representation as employed ubiquitously in cognitive science, attempting to clarify their meaning and the limits of their use. It discusses the minimal conditions for an agent's environment constituting a 'world' and rejects most, though not all, types of virtual world. It argues that to qualify as genuinely situated an agent should function in real time within the dynamic world we inhabit, or some close simulacrum of it. It shows that embodied agents will possess or evolve local coordinate systems, or points of view, locating, identifying, and interacting with objects relative to their current position in space-time, and it discusses various types of embodiment, arguing that most current situated and embodied systems are too limited to be candidates for even the most minimal claim to self-identity. It argues that a truly autonomous agent has to be active in its participation with the world, able to synthesize and order its internal representations from its own point of view, and that to do this effectively the agent will have to be embedded. To this end it proposes a six-point definition of embeddedness. Ultimately it argues for a philosophical-cum-cognitive-science model of the self that satisfies essential elements of both sets of definitions of the term.     

Managing the university third strand innovation process? Developing innovation support services in regionally engaged universities

Universities increasingly provide assistance to innovating firms, particularly in less successful regions lacking other support providers. Universities have to develop such support, just as consultancies learn to work with clients. In this paper, we use an innovation framework to explore how universities learn about developing such services, and the barriers they have to address to improve the development of such services.