A perceptual phenomenon and its neurophysiological correlate.

A square-wave grating from which the fundamental harmonic has been subtracted (missing fundamental grating) when viewed from a suitable distance appears similar to another grating of periodicity three times higher. The neurons of the visual cortex of the cat, in a given range of spatial frequencies characteristic of each cell, give similar responses to the two gratings.     

Attentional biases in geometric form perception

This paper reports the operation of robust attentional bias to the top and right during perception of small, single geometric forms. Same/different judgements of successively presented standard and comparison forms are faster when local differences are located at top and right rather than in other regions of the forms. The bias persists when form size is reduced to approximately one degree of visual angle, and it is unaffected by saccadic eye movements and by instructions to attend to other reliably differentiating regions of the forms. Results lend support in various degrees to two of the possible explanations of the bias: (1) a static, skewed distribution of attentional resources around eye fixation; and (2) biased, covert scanning that commences invariably at the top and right of stim ulus forms. Origins of the bias in terms of possible left-hemispheric capacity for constructing representations of visual stimuli from parts, as well as in terms of reading experience and prevailing optic flow during locomotion through space are considered. Recent investigations of conditions under which the bias can be maintained or reduced are mentioned.     

Perceptual Categorization: Connectionist Modelling and Decision Rules

Although it is currently popular to model human associative learning using connectionist networks, the mechanism by which their output activations are converted to probabilities of response has received relatively little attention. Several possible models of this decision process are considered here, including a simple ratio rule, a simple difference rule, their exponential versions, and a winner-take-all network. Two categorization experiments that attempt to dissociate these models are reported. Analogues of the experiments were presented to a single-layer, feed-forward, delta-rule network. Only the exponential ratio rule and the winner-take-all architecture, acting on the networks' output activations that corresponded to responses available on test, were capable of fully predicting the mean response results. In addition, unlike the exponential ratio rule, the winner-take-all model has the potential to predict latencies. Further studies will be required to determine whether latencies produced under more stringent conditions conform to the model's predictions.     

THE GOLEM LEGEND AND THE ENIGMA OF FACEBOOK

We are easily misguided as to the true nature of Facebook, and tend to treat it simply as a powerful technological instrument in the service of human intentions. We can, however, gain a better picture of it through recourse to the Jewish tradition of the golem, an image of human beings, created by them in a re-enactment of their own creation by God. It turns into a magic servant in modernity with an inherent dynamic running between its human and its subhuman characteristics. This dynamic is the main cause behind its becoming uncontrollable. In like manner, what is subhuman in Facebook serves its masters and functions under their total control, but also empowers Facebook's increasingly human operation, an algorithm-based capability which raises growing doubts about what counts as human. Facebook implies the crisis of humanity which coincides with the “death of God,” that is, the obsolescence of the idea of a divine creator.     

The epistemological objection to modal primitivism

Modal primitivists hold that some modal truths are primitively true. They thus seem to face a special epistemological problem: how can primitive modal truths be known? The epistemological objection has not been adequately developed in the literature. I undertake to develop the objection, and then to argue that the best formulation of the epistemological objection targets all realists about modality, rather than the primitivist alone. Furthermore, the moves available to reductionists in response to the objection are also available to primitivists. I conclude by suggesting that extant theories of the epistemology of modality are not sensitive to the question of primitivism versus reductionism.