Facial affect processing and depression susceptibility: cognitive biases and cognitive neuroscience

Facial affect processing is essential to social development and functioning and is particularly relevant to models of depression. Although cognitive and interpersonal theories have long described different pathways to depression, cognitive-interpersonal and evolutionary social risk models of depression focus on the interrelation of interpersonal experience, cognition, and social behavior. We therefore review the burgeoning depressive facial affect processing literature and examine its potential for integrating disciplines, theories, and research. In particular, we evaluate studies in which information processing or cognitive neuroscience paradigms were used to assess facial affect processing in depressed and depression-susceptible populations. Most studies have assessed and supported cognitive models. This research suggests that depressed and depression-vulnerable groups show abnormal facial affect interpretation, attention, and memory, although findings vary based on depression severity, comorbid anxiety, or length of time faces are viewed. Facial affect processing biases appear to correspond with distinct neural activity patterns and increased depressive emotion and thought. Biases typically emerge in depressed moods but are occasionally found in the absence of such moods. Indirect evidence suggests that childhood neglect might cultivate abnormal facial affect processing, which can impede social functioning in ways consistent with cognitive-interpersonal and interpersonal models. However, reviewed studies provide mixed support for the social risk model prediction that depressive states prompt cognitive hypervigilance to social threat information. We recommend prospective interdisciplinary research examining whether facial affect processing abnormalities promote-or are promoted by-depressogenic attachment experiences, negative thinking, and social dysfunction.     

Some thoughts on essence placeholders, interactionism, and heritability: reply to Haslam (2011) and Turkheimer (2011)

In the target article (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 2011), we provided a social-cognitive framework which identified genetic essentialist biases and their implications. In their commentaries, Haslam (2011) and Turkheimer (2011) indicated their general agreement with this framework but highlighted some important points for consideration. Haslam suggested that neuroessentialism is a comparable kind of essentialist bias and identified similarities with the genetic essentialism framework. In response, we acknowledge similarities but also identify qualitative and quantitative differences between genetic essentialism and other kinds of essentialist biases. Turkheimer challenged us to extend our discussion to address the question of how should people respond to genetic etiological information, critiqued the use of heritability coefficients, and identified a new construct (1 - rMZ), which may be termed a free-will coefficient. In response, we emphasize the need to transform interactionist explanations from being empty platitudes to becoming the default conceptual framework; we wholeheartedly accept his critical view of heritability coefficient estimates (but acknowledge a more limited utility for them); and we are intrigued by his conceptual interest in identifying free-will coefficients yet warn against falling into pitfalls similar to those that were stumbled into in the past.     

The Coronary Health Improvement Project (CHIP) for lowering weight and improving psychosocial health

This study extends previous research evaluating the association between the CHIP intervention, change in body weight, and change in psychological health. A randomized controlled health intervention study lasting 4 wk. was used with 348 participants from metropolitan Rockford, Illinois; ages ranged from 24 to 81 yr. Participants were assessed at baseline, 6 wk., and 6 mo. The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI) and three selected psychosocial measures from the SF-36 Health Survey were used. Significantly greater decreases in Body Mass Index (BMI) occurred after 6 wk. and 6 mo. follow-up for the intervention group compared with the control group, with greater decreases for participants in the overweight and obese categories. Significantly greater improvements were observed in BDI scores, role-emotional and social functioning, and mental health throughout follow-up for the intervention group. The greater the decrease in BMI through 6 wk., the better the chance of improved BDI score, role-emotional score, social functioning score, and mental health score, with odds ratios of 1.3 to 1.9. Similar results occurred through 6 mo., except the mental health variable became nonsignificant. These results indicate that the CHIP intervention significantly improved psychological health for at least six months afterwards, in part through its influence on lowering BMI.     

Your heart makes my heart move: Cues of social connectedness cause shared emotions and physiological states among strangers

Two experiments tested the hypothesis that cues of social connectedness could lead even new interaction partners to experience shared emotional and physiological states. In Experiment 1, a confederate prepared for a stress-inducing task. Participants who had been led to feel socially connected to the confederate reported feeling greater stress than participants who had not. In Experiment 2, a confederate ran vigorously in place. Socially-connected participants had greater cardiovascular reactivity (heart rate and blood pressure) than controls. Each study held constant exposure to the confederate. The results suggest that the sharing of psychological and physiological states does not occur only between long-standing relationship partners, but can also result from even subtle experiences of social connectedness. These findings illustrate the dynamic and fluid ways in which important aspects of self can change in response to cues of social relatedness.     

Effects of spatial and selective attention on basic multisensory integration

When participants respond to auditory and visual stimuli, responses to audiovisual stimuli are substantially faster than to unimodal stimuli (redundant signals effect, RSE). In such tasks, the RSE is usually higher than probability summation predicts, suggestive of specific integration mechanisms underlying the RSE. We investigated the role of spatial and selective attention on the RSE in audiovisual redundant signals tasks. In Experiment 1, stimuli were presented either centrally (narrow attentional focus) or at 1 of 3 unpredictable locations (wide focus). The RSE was accurately described by a coactivation model assuming linear superposition of modality-specific activation. Effects of spatial attention were explained by a shift of the evidence criterion. In Experiment 2, stimuli were presented at 3 locations; participants had to respond either to all signals regardless of location (simple response task) or to central stimuli only (selective attention task). The RSE was consistent with task-specific coactivation models; accumulation of evidence, however, differed between the 2 tasks.     

Attachment and the management of empathic accuracy in relationship-threatening situations

The current studies tested how attachment orientations are related to empathic accuracy (i.e., the accuracy with which one infers a partner's private thoughts and feelings) during attachment-relevant discussions. In Study 1, married couples were videotaped discussing a severe or a less severe relationship issue that involved intimacy or jealousy. In Study 2, dating couples were videotaped trying to resolve a relationship conflict. Consistent with the revised empathic accuracy model, highly avoidant individuals were less empathically accurate in both studies. Relative to less anxious persons, highly anxious individuals were more empathically accurate when discussing intimacy issues that posed a potential threat to their relationship (in Study 1) and when they were rated as more distressed when discussing a relationship conflict (in Study 2). The findings are discussed in terms of how highly anxious and highly avoidant people differentially manage empathic accuracy to regulate negative affect and facilitate their interpersonal goals.     

Doxastic Voluntarism and the Function of Epistemic Evaluations

Control of our own beliefs is allegedly required for the truth of epistemic evaluations, such as “S ought to believe that p”, or “S ought to suspend judgment (and so refrain from any belief) whether p”. However, we cannot usually believe or refrain from believing at will. I agree with a number of recent authors in thinking that this apparent conflict is to be resolved by distinguishing reasons for believing that give evidence that p from reasons that make it desirable to believe that p whether or not p is true. I argue however that there is a different problem, one that becomes clearer in light of this solution to the first problem. Someone’s approval of our beliefs is at least often a non-evidential reason to believe, and as such cannot change our beliefs. Ought judgments aim to change the world. But ‘ought to believe’ judgments can’t do that by changing the belief, if they don’t give evidence. So I argue that we should instead regard epistemic ought judgments as aimed mainly at influencing assertions that express the belief and other actions based on the belief, in accord with recent philosophical claims that we have epistemic norms for assertion and action.     

Clinical Reflection and Ritual as Forms of Participation and Interaction: Reply to Bass and Stern

We agree with the commentaries that Relational psychoanalysis has stood firmly against dichotomizing clinical reflection, on one hand, and interactional processes, on the other. Still, we wonder whether the relational literature has skewed toward interaction at the expense of concentrated attention to patients’ internal worlds. Predispositions toward interaction may diminish reflective space and quiet inwardness, which are themselves forms of analytic relating. We raise the possibility that the Relational model’s inclusive breadth, valuable as it is, might sometimes impede and even devalue discussions of specific technical matters. We consider clinical conceptualizations of ritual, “relating,” and “being in contact.”