The moral obligations of trust

Moral obligation, Darwall argues, is irreducibly second personal. So too, McMyler argues, is the reason for belief supplied by testimony and which supports trust. In this paper, I follow Darwall in arguing that the testimony is not second personal ‘all the way down’. However, I go on to argue, this shows that trust is not fully second personal, which in turn shows that moral obligation is equally not second personal ‘all the way down’.     

On Alienation from the Built Environment

If “environment” means “that which environs us,” it isn’t clear why environmentalist thinkers so often identify it with nature and not with the built environment that a quick glance around would reveal is what we’re actually environed by. It’s a familiar claim that we’re “alienated from nature,” but I argue that what we’re really alienated from is the built environment itself. Typically talk of alienation from nature involves the claim that we fail to acknowledge nature’s otherness, but the built environment is just as other from us as the natural one. And just as we are said to fail to recognize the role of nature as the origin of everything with which we have to do in the world, so too we fail to recognize the role of socially organized human labor in the objects that surround us. Overcoming alienation would require acknowledging the builtness and the sociality of the world we inhabit.     

Social comparison mediates chimpanzees’ responses to loss,not frustration

Why do chimpanzees react when their partner gets a better deal than them? Do they note the inequity or do their responses reflect frustration in response to unattainable rewards? To tease apart inequity and contrast, we tested chimpanzees in a series of conditions that created loss through individual contrast, through inequity, or by both. Chimpanzees were tested in four social and two individual conditions in which they received food rewards in return for exchanging tokens with an experimenter. In conditions designed to create individual contrast, after completing an exchange, the chimpanzees were given a relatively less-preferred reward than the one they were previously shown. The chimpanzees’ willingness to accept the less-preferred rewards was independent of previously offered foods in both the social and individual conditions. In conditions that created frustration through inequity, subjects were given a less-preferred reward than the one received by their partner, but not in relation to the reward they were previously offered. In a social context, females were more likely to refuse to participate when they received a less-preferred reward than their partner (disadvantageous inequity), than when they received a more-preferred reward (advantageous inequity). Specifically, the females’ refusals were typified by refusals to exchange tokens rather than refusals to accept food rewards. Males showed no difference in their responses to inequity or individual contrast. These results support previous evidence that some chimpanzees’ responses to inequity are mediated more strongly by what others receive than by frustration effects.     

The structure of executive functioning in 11 to 14 year olds with and without special educational needs

The structure and development of executive functioning (EF) have been intensively studied in typically developing populations, with little attention given to those with Special Educational Needs (SEN). This study addresses this by comparing the EF structure of 132 adolescents (11–14 years-old) with SEN and 138 adolescents not requiring additional support (Non-SEN peers). Participants completed verbal and non-verbal assessments of key components of EF: inhibition, working memory and switching. Confirmatory Factor Analysis on each group tested one-, two- and three-factor models of EF. In both groups, there was statistical support for the fit of one- and two-factor models with no model being clearly better than the others; there was little support for three-factor models. Parsimony suggests that the one-factor model best represents the structure of EF. In light of our results, the implications for the nature of EF in early adolescence in both SEN and Non-SEN groups are discussed.     

Exploring the Evocation of Verbal Perspective Taking Using a Linguistic Relational Triangulation Questionnaire (RTQ-MST9)

The Psychological Record - The present article exhibits the use of a linguistic multiple-choice questionnaire format for evoking relational triangulation performances while examining whether...     

Misunderstood Stoicism: The negative Association Between Stoic Ideology and well-Being

Journal of Happiness Studies - Ancient philosophy proposed a wide range of possible approaches to life which may enhance well-being. Stoic philosophy has influenced various therapeutic traditions....     

The Efficient Assessment of Self-Esteem: Proposing the Brief Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale

Self-esteem is defined as sense of self-worth and self-respect, being crucial for understanding people’s well-being and success. It is one of the most studied constructs in the social sciences, with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES) being the most used measure. Across four studies (N = 1450), we tested the psychometric parameters of an abbreviated version of the RSES. Through Item Response Theory, the five best items were selected to form the unidimensional Brief Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (B-RSES), a reliable and valid measure of self-esteem, which is invariant across age groups and gender. In addition, both RSES and B-RSES correlated very similarly with the Big Five Personality Factors. Also, the B-RSES was strongly correlated with three other short measures of self-esteem, besides being more strongly associated with a range of variables such as conscientiousness and self-competence in comparison to the other three short scales. Together, the B-RSES is especially useful in research that requires rapid evaluation and the use of multiple variables.

     

Is depression the past tense of anxiety? An empirical study of the temporal distinction

It has long been recognised that depression and anxiety share a common core of negative affect, but research on similarities and differences between these two emotions is growing. The focus of the current study was on whether the timing of a triggering event can determine whether the dominant emotional reaction is depression or anxiety. It was hypothesised that aversive events in the past would elicit more depression than anxiety, whereas the same aversive events in the future would elicit more anxiety than depression. We created temporally varied versions of vignettes describing aversive events occurring at either time, and asked participants to rate the extent to which the events would elicit feelings of depression or anxiety. Results indicated that adverse past events elicited much higher ratings of anticipated depression and adverse future events elicited much higher ratings of anticipated anxiety. Implications for understanding these two emotions and depressive and anxiety disorders are discussed.