The problem of serial order in behavior: Lashley's legacy

In a prescient paper Karl Lashley (1951) rejected reflex chaining accounts of the sequencing of behavior and argued instead for a more cognitive account in which behavioral sequences are typically controlled with central plans. An important feature of such plans, according to Lashley, is that they are hierarchical. Lashley offered several sources of evidence for the hierarchical organization for behavioral plans, and others afterward provided more evidence for this hypothesis. We briefly review that evidence here and then shift from a focus on the structure of plans (Lashley's point of concentration) to the processes by which plans are formed in real time. Two principles emerge from the studies we review. One is that plans are not formed from scratch for each successive movement sequence but instead are formed by making whatever changes are needed to distinguish the movement sequence to be performed next from the movement sequence that has just been performed. This plan-modification view is supported by two phenomena discovered in our laboratory: the parameter remapping effect, and the handpath priming effect. The other principle we review is that even single movements appear to be controlled with hierarchically organized plans. At the top level are the starting and goal postures. At the lower level are the intermediate states comprising the transition from the starting posture to the goal posture. The latter principle is supported by another phenomenon discovered in our lab, the end-state comfort effect, and by a computational model of motor planning which accounts for a large number of motor phenomena. Interestingly, the computational model hearkens back to a classical method of generating cartoon animations that relies on the production of keyframes first and the production of interframes (intermediate frames) second.     

A proof for Rhiel's range estimator of the coefficient of variation for skewed distributions

In this research study is proof that the coefficient of variation (CV(high-low)) calculated from the highest and lowest values in a set of data is applicable to specific skewed distributions with varying means and standard deviations. Earlier Rhiel provided values for d(n), the standardized mean range, and a(n), an adjustment for bias in the range estimator of micro. These values are used in estimating the coefficient of variation from the range for skewed distributions. The d(n) and an values were specified for specific skewed distributions with a fixed mean and standard deviation. In this proof it is shown that the d(n) and an values are applicable for the specific skewed distributions when the mean and standard deviation can take on differing values. This will give the researcher confidence in using this statistic for skewed distributions regardless of the mean and standard deviation.     

The Gender Wage Gap: An Explanation of Men’s Elevated Wage Entitlement

Perceptions of wage entitlement differ between women and men such that men are more likely to feel worthy of higher pay. Based on a combination of status-related theories and evidence from two studies of 120 undergraduate men, we examined men’s reactions to gendered threats to their task abilities. When told that women typically outperform men, men responded with elevated projections of their own competence without reducing their self-pay. These effects were not related to endorsements of masculinity ideology. Instead, exaggerated competence was related to individual men’s heightened legitimate entitlement, and resistant high self-pay was linked to narcissistic entitlement. These patterns demonstrate that what appears to be a gender-based phenomenon is explained more accurately by men’s internalized status beliefs.     

Learned helplessness and the schedule-shift hypotheses

The critique of learned helplessness research and theory and the alternative schedule-shift discrimination hypothesis offered by McReynolds (Journal of Research and Personality, 1980,14, 139–157) are considered. Each point made by McReynolds is discussed and a variety of recent experimental evidence is reviewed. It is concluded that McReynolds' critique is without substance and that the schedule-shift discrimination explanation of the learned helplessness effect is contradicted by existing data.     

REFLECTIONS ON AFFIRMATIVE ACTION GOALS IN PSYCHOLOGY ADMISSIONS

Four goals of affirmative action in higher education are described as they relate to psychology admissions. Broadly conceived, these goals are compensating for past injustice, correcting present inequity, promoting intellectual diversity, and enhancing the presence of role models. It is argued that the four goats differ in their underlying assumptions about the purposes of affirmative action and that these differences can result in disparate admission decisions. Data from three experiments on decision making in graduate psychology admissions are presented to illustrate the analysis. In these studies, academic psychologists rated the admissibility of hypothetical graduate student applicants who varied on a number of characteristics (e g., ethnicity, social class, interest in minority research) pertinent to affirmative action. A consistent pattern of ethnic group differences in admissibility ratings was documented, illustrating that compensation for past injustice can be interpreted as a salient affirmative action goal in graduate admissions decisions. Implications of the analysis for clarifying admissions decisions guided by affirmative action goals are discussed.     

Undermind

David Albert and Barry Loewer have proposed a new interpretation of quantum mechanics which they call the Many Minds interpretation, according to which there are infinitely many minds associated with a given (physical) state of a brain. This interpretation is related to the family of many worlds interpretations insofar as it assumes strictly unitary (Schrödinger) time-evolution of quantum-mechanical systems (no reduction of the wave-packet). The Many Minds interpretation itself is principally motivated by an argument which purports to show that the assumption of unitary evolution, along with some common sense assumptions about mental states (specifically, beliefs) leads to a certain nonphysicalism, in which there is a many-to-one correspondence between minds and brains. In this paper, I critically examine this motivating argument, and show that it depends on a mistaken assumption regarding the correspondence between projection operators and yes/no questions.Thanks to David Albert, Arthur Fine, Martin Jones, and the two anonymous referees for their comments on an earlier version of this paper, and thanks to Jeremy Butterfield, Rob Clifton, Meir Hemmo and David Malament for comments on a revised version. Special thanks to Arthur for several helpful discussions.     

Bimanual interference associated with the selection of target locations

Four experiments were conducted to identify the locus of interference observed during the preparation of bimanual reaching movements. Target locations were specified by color, and the right-hand and left-hand targets could be either the same or a different color. Movements of different amplitudes (Experiment 1) or different directions (Experiment 2) to targets of the same color were initiated more quickly than symmetric movements to targets of different colors. These results indicate that costs observed during bimanual movements arise during target selection rather than during motor programming. Experiments 3 and 4 further examined the interference associated with target selection. Reaction time costs were found with unimanual movements when the target was presented among distractors associated with responses for the other hand. Interference observed during bimanual reaching appears to reflect difficulty in segregating the response rules assigned to each hand.     

Zipf’s word frequency law in natural language: A critical review and future directions

The frequency distribution of words has been a key object of study in statistical linguistics for the past 70 years. This distribution approximately follows a simple mathematical form known as Zipf’s law. This article first shows that human language has a highly complex, reliable structure in the frequency distribution over and above this classic law, although prior data visualization methods have obscured this fact. A number of empirical phenomena related to word frequencies are then reviewed. These facts are chosen to be informative about the mechanisms giving rise to Zipf’s law and are then used to evaluate many of the theoretical explanations of Zipf’s law in language. No prior account straightforwardly explains all the basic facts or is supported with independent evaluation of its underlying assumptions. To make progress at understanding why language obeys Zipf’s law, studies must seek evidence beyond the law itself, testing assumptions and evaluating novel predictions with new, independent data.     

Waiting for feedback helps if you want to know the answer: the role of curiosity in the delay-of-feedback benefit

When participants answer a test question and then receive feedback of the correct answer, studies have shown that the feedback is more effective when it is delayed by several seconds rather than provided immediately (e.g., Brackbill & Kappy, Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 55, 14–18, 1962; Schroth, Contemporary Educational Psychology, 17, 78–82, 1992). Despite several demonstrations of this delay-of-feedback benefit, a theoretical explanation for this finding has not yet been developed. The present study tested the hypothesis that brief delays of feedback are beneficial because they encourage anticipation of the upcoming feedback. In Experiment 1, participants answered obscure trivia questions, and before receiving the answer, they rated their curiosity to know the answer. The answer was then provided either immediately or after a 4-s delay. A later final test over the same questions revealed a significant delay-of-feedback benefit, but only for items that had been rated high in curiosity. Experiment 2 replicated this same effect and showed that the delay-of-feedback benefit only occurs when feedback is provided after a variable, unpredictable time duration (either 2, 4, or 8 s) rather than after a constant duration (always 4 s). These findings demonstrate that the delay-of-feedback effect appears to be greatest under conditions in which participants are curious to know the answer and when the answer is provided after an unpredictable time interval.