The Obligation to Know: Information and the Burdens of Citizenship

Contemporary persons are daily confronted with enormous quantities of information, some of which reveal causal connections between their actions and harm that is visited upon distant others. Given their limited cognitive and information processing capacities, persons cannot reasonably be expected to respond to every cry for help or call to action, but neither can they defensibly refuse to hear and reflect upon any of them. Persons have a limited obligation to know, I argue, which requires that they inform themselves and others about their role in harmful social practices, with a view toward challenging the norms that sustain such practices. In this paper, I explore this obligation to know, and the related idea of excusable ignorance, offering accounts of the epistemic burden that it entails for persons in their capacities as citizens and in the context of global climate change and of reproach as a potentially effective tool for rectifying rather than excusing ignorance.     

The effect of biased lineup instructions on eyewitness identification confidence

Although it is well‐known that biased lineup instructions (i.e., those that do not inform witnesses the perpetrator may not be in the lineup) inflate false identifications, their effects on witness confidence are less well understood due to methodological limitations of past studies. We report two studies that use novel methodologies to obviate these limitations. Study 1 (N = 177) demonstrated that biased lineup instructions increased witnesses' average estimates of the likelihood that a lineup member is guilty. Study 2 (N = 137) introduces a novel debiasing paradigm that allows a parsing of choosers into those who made an identification only because of the biased instructions (induced choosers), and those who would have chosen despite the instructions (inherent choosers). Biased lineup instructions inflated confidence only among induced choosers, but not among inherent choosers. Contrary to legal reasoning, witness confidence is an insufficient metric to determine the suggestiveness of biased instructions.     

Childhood Irritability: Predictive Validity and Mediators of Adolescent Psychopathology

Despite its transdiagnostic significance, there is modest evidence with respect to the predictive validity of childhood irritability, especially across developmental periods; similarly, little is known about explanatory factors underlying these predictions. This study had two goals: (1) to test the predictive validity of childhood irritability with respect to adolescent internalizing and externalizing problems, controlling for baseline ADHD and related psychopathology and (2) to test theoretically-derived family (i.e., parenting behavior, parenting stress) and social (i.e., peer status, social skills) constructs as explanatory factors of adolescent psychopathology. Two hundred thirty ethnically diverse (51.5% White) 5–10-year-old youth (32% female) with (n?=?121) and without (n?=?110) ADHD completed three separate laboratory-based assessments across six to seven years. Temporally-ordered predictors, putative mediators, and psychopathology outcomes were assessed using multiple informants (i.e., parent, teacher, youth) and methods (i.e., structured interviews, normed rating scales). Controlling for demographic factors, clinical correlates, and baseline psychopathology, childhood irritability uniquely predicted adolescent externalizing problems, but not internalizing problems. Next, analyses revealed that low social skills partially explained predictions of adolescent internalizing problems. However, family or social factors did not underlie predictions of adolescent externalizing problems. These preliminary findings support the predictive validity of childhood irritability with respect to early adolescent externalizing problems and implicate low social skills as a potentially unique mediator of internalizing outcomes. Intervention-induced improvements in social skills may minimize emergent psychopathology initiated by significant childhood irritability.

     

Edwards on the Will

Jonathan Edwards' The Freedom of the Will advances an ethical argument concerning the nature of the freedom that a person must have to be considered morally culpable. The view he opposes, that free decisions must be uncaused, is shown to be now common in Western culture, and the results he predicted of that are displayed. His own view, whereby a free decision is one constrained only by moral causes, is shown to be theologically grounded and consistent with ethical responsibility. Mention is made of the virtue ethic he relied upon, and of the predestinarian nature of the account.