Negative priming and multiple repetition: A reply to Grison and Strayer (2001)

Strayer and colleagues (Grison & Strayer, 2001; Malley & Strayer, 1995; Strayer & Grison, 1999) have reported experiments in which negative priming by ignored stimuli occurred only for stimuli that were repeatedly sampled from small sets. These results were argued to be inconsistent with episodic/mismatch accounts of negative priming. We show here that a dependence of negative priming on multiple repetition is wholly consistent with such theories. Furthermore, we argue that the inhibitory theory proposed by Strayer and colleagues cannot account for major findings regarding negative priming and that anomalies in the data reported by Grison and Strayer are more parsimoniously explained by episodic/mismatch accounts.     

A Test of Evolutionary and Sociocultural Explanations of Reactions to Sexual Harassment

Although the field of evolutionary psychology has been perceived to generate predictions that are untestable, one potentially falsifiable prediction of the evolutionary approach is that women should be less upset by unwanted sexual advances from high than from low status men. Three experiments tested this hypothesis within a workplace and an academic setting. Across the first two experiments, women and men were actually more upset by perceived sexual harassment from higher than lower status members of the other sex. Results of Study 3 suggested that women only showed this difference when there was a power relationship involved. These results conflict with the evolutionary prediction and support a sociocultural explanation of reactions to sexual harassment; that is, that they are influenced by power differentials.     

Justifying Deception in Social Science Research

The use of deceptive techniques is common in social science research. It is argued that the use of such techniques is incompatible with the standard of informed consent, which is widely employed in the ethical evaluation of research involving human subjects. A number of proposals to justify the use of deceptions in social science research are examined, in the face of its apparent incompatibility with the standard of informed consent, and found to be inadequate. An alternative method of justification is outlined, which enables some deceived participants in social science research to rationally and autonomously choose to participate in that research. The alternative method of justification appeals to the idea of indirect consent , which is introduced. It is argued that research subjects who receive reliable testimony regarding research procedures can sometimes be placed in a position to rationally and autonomously consent indirectly to participation in experiments and studies, even if these involve significant deceptions.