WORD RECOGNITION SKILLS OF LEARNING DISABLED CHILDREN AND AVERAGE STUDENTS’

Abstract

The ability of learning disabled and average students’ to recognize and identify words was investigated. Two informal reading measures, the Sundbye Minimal Contrast Phonics Test and an oral reading sample, were administered to three groups. The groups were composed of learning disabled students evidencing reading problems (LD), average students matched with the learning disabled group on reading level and IQ (YN), and average students matched with the learning disabled group on chronological age and IQ (ON). The LD group and average readers did not differ on identification of symbol‐sound associations, word recognition proficiency, the ability to detect and correct word recognition errors, and the ability to use information within the text to recognize words. However, the LD and ON group differed on mean number of word recognition errors. Educational implications of the findings were discussed and a profile of the word recognition skills of learning disabled children was presented.     

There’s a Place: How Parents Help Their Children Create a Capacity for Playfulness and can it be Sustained across the Lifespan

ABSTRACT

This article traces the ways that playfulness shifts and grows with the child and with the parent-child dyad. It also speaks to the paradoxical manner in which feeling essential as a parent is both necessary at the beginning of the child’s life yet must evolve into relevance as the child’s autonomy warrants. Interestingly, grace and playfulness are both a content and a process in parenting. The playful parent’s wisdom produces a sense of grace over time just as it produces a way of being that the child can internalize so that they too can eventually parent with grace and fun should they so desire.     

Aspiration/reservation-based decision support—a step beyond goal programming

Real-life decision problems are usually so complex that they cannot be modelled with a single objective function, thus creating a need for clear and efficient techniques for handling multiple criteria to support the decision process. A widely used technique and one commonly taught in general OR/MS courses is goal programming, which is clear and appealing. On the other hand, goal programming is strongly criticized by multiple-criteria optimization specialists for its non-compliance with the efficiency (Pareto-optimality) principle. In this paper we show how the implementation techniques of goal programming can be used to model the reference point method and its extension, aspiration/reservation-based decision support. Thereby we show a congruence between these approaches and suggest how the GP model with relaxation of some traditional assumptions can be extended to an efficient decision support technique meeting the efficiency principle and other standards of multiobjective optimization theory.     

Toward a Science of Other Minds: Escaping the Argument by Analogy

Since Darwin, the idea of psychological continuity between humans and other animals has dominated theory and research in investigating the minds of other species. Indeed, the field of comparative psychology was founded on two assumptions. First, it was assumed that introspection could provide humans with reliable knowledge about the causal connection between specific mental states and specific behaviors. Second, it was assumed that in those cases in which other species exhibited behaviors similar to our own, similar psychological causes were at work. In this paper, we show how this argument by analogy is flawed with respect to the case of second‐order mental states. As a test case, we focus on the question of how other species conceive of visual attention, and in particular whether chimpanzees interpret seeing as a mentalistic event involving internal states of perception, attention, and belief. We conclude that chimpanzees do not reason about seeing in this manner, and indeed, there is considerable reason to suppose that they do not harbor representations of mental states in general. We propose a reinterpretation model in which the majority of the rich social behaviors that humans and other primates share in common emerged long before the human lineage evolved the psychological means of interpreting those behaviors in mentalistic terms. Although humans, chimpanzees, and most other species may be said to possess mental states, humans alone may have evolved a cognitive specialization for reasoning about such states.