Positive contrast following gradual and abrupt increases in reward magnitude using delay of reinforcement

In Experiment 1, rats were given a 1-pellet reward for 48 preshift trials. During a subsequent 20-trial postshift phase, one group was shifted to a 12-pellet reward on Trial 1, a second was shifted on Trial 11, and a third was given 1 more pellet each trial and then 12 pellets for the last 10 trials. The speeds of all three groups increased to a level above that of a control group given a 12-pellet food reward throughout training (positive contrast). In experiment 2, rats were shifted from 1 to 12 pellets either gradually or abruptly following either abbreviated training (9 trials) or extended training (20 trials). One group of control subjects received 12 pellets throughout training. The results revealed a positive contrast effect for gradually shifted subjects following extended training but not following abbreviated training. The abrupt shift procedure produced positive contrast following abbreviated training but only a marginal effect following extended training. These results indicate that, contingent upon the amount of preshift training, either gradual or abrupt reward increases may produce positive contrast.     

Effects of schedule and magnitude of reinforcement under conditions of thirst motivation

In contrast to a recent finding (Macdonald, G. E., & De Toledo, L. Learning and Motivation, 1974, 5, 288–298.) the results of three experiments investigating various partial reinforcement (PRF) manipulations under conditions of thirst motivation demonstrated strong similarity to analogous manipulations involving food reward. Specifically, for animals receiving water reinforcement, PRF was shown to generate greater resistance to extinction than continuous reinforcement (Expt 1 & 3), the schedule of reinforcement was shown to interact with level of acquisition (Expt 1 and 2), and the magnitude of the partial reinforcement extinction effect was shown to be a function of reward magnitude (Expt 3). These results provide strong evidence that mechanisms which operate in partial reinforcement situations are highly similar, regardless of the type of appetitive reinforcement.     

Sex-related effects on clinicians' attributions of parental responsibility for child psychopathology

An attempt was made to reproduce and extend previously reported data suggesting the operation of sex-related bias in clinicians' attributions of parental involvement in children's psychopathologies. More and less sex-role traditional male and female family-oriented practitioners were shown contrived profiles in which a boy or girl was described as masculine or feminine role-deficient, and apportioned maternal versus paternal blame, treatment focus, adjunctive therapy need, and likelihood of sabotage. As in the previous study, mothers were implicated slightly more than fathers and also were viewed as requiring relatively greater therapeutic attention by female than by male clinicians. However, several earlier findings were not replicated. Overall, the results offer only marginal support for the notion of sex-related practitioner bias.     

'Care': The case of paulette

School counsellors are often presented with information about pupils from a third party - a parent, another pupil, a member of the canteen staff a social worker, or a member of the teaching staff - with the expectation that the counsellor is in a position to take 'necessary' or 'appropriate' action. One particular case is used to illustrate some of the difficulties involved in acting upon third-party information.     

I Can't Relax! You're Driving me Quasi!

Robust Realists think that there are irreducible, non‐natural, and mind‐independent moral properties. Quasi‐Realists and Relaxed Realists think the same, but interpret these commitments differently. Robust Realists interpret them as metaphysical commitments, to be defended by metaphysical argument. Quasi‐Realists and Relaxed Realists say that they can only be interpreted as moral commitments. These theories thus pose a serious threat to Robust Realism, for they apparently undermine the very possibility of articulating the robust metaphysical commitments of this theory. I clarify and respond to this threat, showing that there is in fact space to develop and defend a robust moral ontology.