Rationally developed fake-good and fake-bad scales for the Jesness Inventory

Develops two validity scales for the Jesness Inventory using a rational approach: a fake-good scale, Lie (L); and a fake-bad scale, Overt Symptomatology (OS). Effectiveness was assessed using 293 male delinquents classified as fake-good, fake-bad, or honest based on a matched-pair MMPI-A. L was moderately effective in detecting the fake-good set, and OS tentatively effective in detecting the fake-bad set. Both correlated well with their MMPI-A counterparts. Sensitivity, specificity, positive predictive power, negative predictive power, and overall effectiveness data were reported. The L scale and OS scale were related to race but differences were less than 1 raw score point. L was unrelated to age. OS was related to age, with younger children showing more willingness to admit to symptomatology. Age-based modified T-score norms were developed for the newly constructed scales using 1142 male and 360 female delinquents. ages 13–18.     

ELECTROCORTICAL DIFFERENTIATION OF EVALUATIVE AND NONEVALUATIVE CATEGORIZATIONS

Abstract— The evaluative categorizations that underlie affective and attitudinal judgments have often been equated with non-evaluative categorizations despite the central importance of evaluative processes for survival In the present experiment, a late positive potential (LPP) of the event-related brain potential elicited when participants evaluatively categorized food items as positive or nonpositive was compared with the LPP elicited when participants semantically (i e., nonevaluatively) categorized food items as vegetable or nonvegetable Results revealed that evaluative categorizations evoked an LPP that was relatively larger over the right than the left scalp regions compared with the LPP evoked by nonevaluative categorizations. This finding provides evidence regarding the differences in neural and cognitive processes involved in evaluative and nonevaluative categorizations.     

A short form of the Common Beliefs Survey III

Previous studies have shown that the Common Beliefs Survey III (CBS III) is an irrational beliefs inventory with satisfactory psychometric properties. We extended research on the CBS by examining this 54-item inventory for redundant material, and substantially abbreviated it without compormising its reliability or validity. This article describes the development of the new, 19-item short form (CBS19), convenient for clinical use, that preserves the psychometric properties of the original.     

Consider the source: One step in assessing premise acceptability

Premise acceptability is conceptually connected to presumption. To say that a premise is acceptable just when there is a presumption in its favor is to give a first approximation to this connection. A number of popular principles of presumption suggest that whether there is a presumption for a premise, belief, or claim depends on the sources which vouch for it. Sources consist of internal belief-generating mechanisms and external testimony. Alvin Plantinga's notion of warrant lays down four conditions upon a source for the belief which it generates to be warranted. We argue that there is a presumption for a premise, belief, or claim if and only if there is a presumption of warrant for that premise,belief or claim. This amounts to the thesis that there is a presumption for a belief from a challenger's point of view if and only if there is a presumption from that person's point of view that her cognitive faculties which have generated the belief have been functioning properly, in an appropriate cognitive environment, in accord with a segment of her design plan aimed at the truth, and that these faculties are reliable. In light of our argument for this thesis, we may legitimately claim that one way to determine that there is a presumption for a belief is to determine that there is a presumption of warrant for that belief, and thus that in determining whether there is a presumption for a belief or premise, we may consider the source.     

Ethical issues in a study of Internet use: uncertainty, responsibility, and the spirit of research relationships

In this article we explore ethical issues arising in a study of home Internet use by low-income families. We consider questions of our responsibility as educational researchers and discuss the ethical implications of some unanticipated consequences of our study. We illustrate ways in which the principles of research ethics for use of human subjects can be ambiguous and possibly inadequate for anticipating potential harm in educational research. In this exploratory research of personal communication technologies, participants experienced changes that were personal and relational. These unanticipated changes in their way of being complicated our research relationships, testing the boundaries of our committment to the principle of trustworthiness and forcing us to reevaluate our responsibilities.