Age-related variation in the influences of aging stereotypes on memory in adulthood

Adults 24-86 years of age read positive or negative information about aging and memory prior to a memory test. The impact of this information on recall performance varied with age. Performance in the youngest and oldest participants was minimally affected by stereotype activation. Adults in their 60s exhibited weak effects consistent with the operation of stereotype threat, whereas middle-age adults exhibited a contrast effect in memory performance, suggestive of stereotype lift. Beliefs about aging and memory were also affected by stereotypic information, and older adults' changed beliefs were more important in predicting performance than was exposure to stereotype-based information alone.     

Does anxiety affect children's reports of memory for a stressful event?

The study was conducted to explore the effects of anxiety on children's memory for a naturalistic, potentially stressful event. Eighty children of two age groups, 4-5 and 7-8 years, visited the dentist for either a teeth-cleaning check-up or an operative procedure. Anxiety was assessed by a behavioural rating scale, as well as through Likert-scale ratings by the hygienist, parent, and child. Memory for the event was elicited through free recall and specific central and peripheral questions. High anxiety had a debilitative effect on the reports of the older children, but not on young children's reports. However, experience with the dental event mediated the influence of age and anxiety on memory. Although all measures of anxiety were significantly associated with each other, only the behavioural rating scale yielded statistically reliable effects of anxiety on memory. The anxiety-memory relationship is believed to be more complex than previous research with children suggests.     

To deliberate or not to deliberate: Interactions between age,task characteristics,and cognitive activity on decision making

The effects of aging and deliberative activities on decision making were examined. In two separate tasks, young, middle‐aged, and older adults were presented with four alternatives and given instructions to choose the best one. Following study, participants were either given additional time to think about their decision or were prevented from doing so. Decision quality did not benefit from additional deliberative activity when the structure of the stimuli facilitated fluent online processing. In contrast, deliberation promoted performance when such processing was more difficult. In addition, those individuals who focused on attribute information relevant to the decision context performed better than those who did not. Age differences in performance were minimal, but older adults with lower levels of education or cognitive ability tended to perform worse than the rest of the sample under conditions where deliberative skills were required to promote performance. The results are inconsistent with recent proposals regarding the benefits of passive deliberation. In addition, the results support the general assertion that the age effects in decision making will be most evident in situations dependent upon deliberative skills. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The free will of corporations (and other collectives)

Moderate holists like French (Collective and corporate responsibility, 1984), Copp (J Soc Philos, 38(3):369–388, 2007), Hess (The Background of Social Reality – A Survey, 2013), Isaacs (Moral responsibility in collective contexts, 2011) and List and Pettit (Group agency: The possibility, design, and status of corporate agents, 2011) argue that certain collectives qualify as moral agents in their own right, often pointing to the corporation as an example of a collective likely to qualify. A common objection is that corporations cannot qualify as moral agents because they lack free will. The concern is that corporations (and other highly organized collectives like colleges, governments, and the military) are effectively puppets, dancing on strings controlled by external forces. The article begins by briefly presenting a novel account of corporate moral agency and then demonstrates that, on this account, qualifying corporations (and similar entities in other fields) do possess free will. Such entities possess and act from their own “actional springs”, in Haji’s (Midwest Stud Philos, 30(1):292–308, 2006) phrase, and from their own reasons-responsive mechanisms. When they do so, they act freely and are morally responsible for what they do.     

Forum: A New Culture of Learning

These brief essays by Mary Hess, Eugene Gallagher, and Katherine Turpin are solicited responses from three different contexts to the provocative book by Douglas Thomas and John Seely Brown, The New Culture of Learning (2011). Mary Hess writes from a seminary context, providing a critical summary of the authors' major concepts and their ramifications, positive and negative, for theological education and the church. Eugene Gallagher writes from a liberal arts setting, identifying characteristics of the face‐to‐face classroom that would go missing in a careless adoption of online learning environments. Finally, Katherine Turpin reports from the classroom, chronicling her experience in a course she redesigned for a graduate theological setting to employ some of the authors' pedagogical principles and strategies. Together, these responses offer critical appreciation and constructive critique of the work Thomas and Seely Brown have done – and point the conversation forward.     

Emotional Mimicry: Why and When We Mimic Emotions

The goal of this review was to provide a brief overview of recent developments in the domain of emotional mimicry research. We argue that emotional signals are intrinsically meaningful within a social relationship, which is crucial for understanding the functionality and boundary conditions of emotional mimicry. On the basis of a review of the literature on facial mimicry of emotion displays, we conclude that the classic matched motor hypothesis does not hold for emotional mimicry. We alternatively propose a contextual view of emotional mimicry, which states that emotional mimicry depends on the social context: we only mimic emotional signals that are interpreted to promote affiliation goals and not necessarily what we see. As a further consequence, we are less likely to mimic strangers and we do not mimic people we do not like nor emotions that signal antagonism.     

Category-Based versus Attribute-Based Processing in Different-Aged Adults

Adaptive social functioning requires flexibility in processing operations in response to the characteristics of specific situations. Three experiments were conducted in which the ability of different-aged adults to appropriately use category-based versus attribute-based information in making affective judgments was examined. Contrary to expectations, we found that performance was minimally related to age or to working memory efficiency. Adults of all ages made affective judgments based on category information when such information resulted in appropriate inferences, whereas attribute-based information was used when category-based inferences were inaccurate. We interpret these results to be consistent with the hypothesis that the processing of evaluative information occurs at a preconscious level with little drain on processing resources.     

Cancer as a defence against depressive pain

An association between object loss and the predisposition to develop physical illness is well established in the psychosomatic literature. This paper describes a psychotherapeutic consultation with a woman who developed breast cancer after the death of her father by cancer, and the loss of her mother by dementia. Her cancer was preceded by persecutory dreams which ‘predicted” the cancer, and which ceased when the cancer was diagnosed. It is argued that the cancer represented a somatic defence against intolerable guilt and despair, which constitute depressive anxiety as described by Klein and Riviere. Cancer is felt by such patients to be preferable to grief and madness. Possible unconscious meanings and functions of the dreams and the cancer are discussed, as well as the patient's inability to avail herself of psychotherapeutic help.     

From face to face: the contribution of facial mimicry to cognitive and emotional empathy

ABSTRACT

Despite advances in the conceptualisation of facial mimicry, its role in the processing of social information is a matter of debate. In the present study, we investigated the relationship between mimicry and cognitive and emotional empathy. To assess mimicry, facial electromyography was recorded for 70 participants while they completed the Multifaceted Empathy Test, which presents complex context-embedded emotional expressions. As predicted, inter-individual differences in emotional and cognitive empathy were associated with the level of facial mimicry. For positive emotions, the intensity of the mimicry response scaled with the level of state emotional empathy. Mimicry was stronger for the emotional empathy task compared to the cognitive empathy task. The specific empathy condition could be successfully detected from facial muscle activity at the level of single individuals using machine learning techniques. These results support the view that mimicry occurs depending on the social context as a tool to affiliate and it is involved in cognitive as well as emotional empathy.