Does Defensiveness Account for the Relationship Between Religiosity and Psychosocial Adjustment?

Religiosity has been related to positive psychosocial adjustment across a large number of studies. Some researchers question, however, whether this relationship is an accurate finding, observing that there are many potential confounds that have not been controlled for, such as defensiveness. This study examined whether defensiveness accounted for the relationship between religiosity and psychosocial adjustment. Two samples of religious individuals were assessed on religiosity (Duke University Religion Index), defensiveness (measured using the denial of distress and repressive defensiveness subscales from the Weinberger Adjustment Inventory [WAI]), and psychosocial adjustment (Depression subscale from the WAI, the Perceived Stress Scale, and the Sarason Social Support Scale). In both studies it was found that religiosity was related to positive psychosocial adjustment as well as higher levels of defensiveness. Defensiveness, however, did not account for the relationships between religiosity and psychosocial adjustment. These findings add to the research literature by eliminating a potential confound of the relationship between religiosity and psychosocial adjustment.     

$${\in_K}$$: a Non-Fregean Logic of Explicit Knowledge

We present a new logic-based approach to the reasoning about knowledge which is independent of possible worlds semantics. \({\in_K}\) (Epsilon-K) is a non-Fregean logic whose models consist of propositional universes with subsets for true, false and known propositions. Knowledge is, in general, not closed under rules of inference; the only valid epistemic principles are the knowledge axiom K _i φ → φ and some minimal conditions concerning common knowledge in a group. Knowledge is explicit and all forms of the logical omniscience problem are avoided. Various stronger epistemic properties such as positive and/or negative introspection, the K-axiom, closure under logical connectives, etc. can be restored by imposing additional semantic constraints. This yields corresponding sublogics for which we present sound and complete axiomatizations. As a useful tool for general model constructions we study abstract versions of some 3-valued logics in which we interpret truth as knowledge. We establish a connection between \({\in_K}\) and the well-known syntactic approach to explicit knowledge proving a result concerning equi-expressiveness. Furthermore, we discuss some self-referential epistemic statements, such as the knower paradox, as relaxations of variants of the liar paradox and show how these epistemic “paradoxes” can be solved in \({\in_K}\). Every specific \({\in_K}\)-logic is defined as a certain extension of some underlying classical abstract logic.     

Translating Research for Professional Development and Effective Clinical Practice With Older Adults

This paper offers a commentary on the articles in the special series on cognitive behavior therapy with older adults (Carmin, 2012-this issue), noting the commonalities found across discussions of diagnostic interviewing and cognitive-behavioral assessment and treatment for late-life insomnia, depression and suicide risk, PTSD, and OCD. These case studies demonstrate best practices in the application of cognitive-behavioral strategies for assessment and intervention with a diverse range of older adults. Clinicians can improve the effectiveness of their work with aging clients by expanding their skills in assessment and managing interprofessional relationships in integrated health-care settings. Reflected by the papers in this series, ongoing professional development and research attention are both essential as clinicians from the mental health disciplines increase provision of CBT with older adults. Treatments for specific disorders and problems will also benefit from the growing literature on successful aging, and the application of positive psychology in our future collaborations with older adults and their care partners.     

Response-level probability effects on reaction time: now you see them, now you don't

Many reaction time (RT) experiments have tested for response-level probability effects. Their results have been mixed, which is surprising because psychophysiological studies provide clear evidence of motor-level changes associated with an anticipated response. A survey of the designs used in the RT studies reveals many potential problems that could conceal the effects of response probability. We report five new RT experiments testing for response-level probability effects with the most promising of the previous designs-that of Blackman ( 1972 )-and with new designs. Some of these experiments yield evidence of response-level probability effects, but others do not. It appears that response-level probability effects are present primarily in simple tasks with a strong emphasis on response preparation, possibly because participants only expend effort on response preparation in these tasks.     

Words may not be enough! No increased emotional Stroop effect in obsessive-compulsive disorder

Conflicting evidence has been obtained whether or not patients diagnosed with obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) share an attentional bias towards disorder-related stimuli. Some of these inconsistencies can be accounted for by suboptimal stimuli selection. In consideration of the heterogeneity of OCD, we investigated Stroop interference effects for two classes of OCD items (i.e., washing and checking) in 23 OCD patients and 23 healthy controls. In order to cover prevalent OCD concerns, item compilation was based on experts' appraisals. Patients neither displayed greater immediate as well as delayed Stroop interference nor any bias for OCD and subtype-congruent stimuli. On the contrary, for washing-related items, OCD patients, and here especially washers, displayed facilitation relative to healthy controls. Although the present study at first sight refutes the notion of an attentional bias in OCD in contrast to other anxiety disorders, several potential moderators need to be considered before this account is ultimately dismissed. In particular, an attentional bias may only be elicited using visual material that is more attention-grabbing than verbal stimuli. Finally, blockwise instead of random item administration and greater consideration of individual relevance may be crucial prerequisites for the effect to emerge.     

How many hindsight biases are there?

The answer is three: questioning a conceptual default assumption in hindsight bias research, we argue that the hindsight bias is not a unitary phenomenon but consists of three separable and partially independent subphenomena or components, namely, memory distortions, impressions of foreseeability and impressions of necessity. Following a detailed conceptual analysis including a systematic survey of hindsight characterizations in the published literature, we investigated these hindsight components in the context of political elections. We present evidence from three empirical studies that impressions of foreseeability and memory distortions (1) show hindsight effects that typically differ in magnitude and sometimes even in direction, (2) are essentially uncorrelated, and (3) are differentially influenced by extraneous variables. A fourth study found similar dissociations between memory distortions and impressions of necessity. All four studies thus provide support for a separate components view of the hindsight bias. An important consequence of such a view is that apparent contradictions in research findings as well as in theoretical explanations (e.g., cognitive vs. social-motivational) might be alleviated by taking differences between components into account. We also suggest conditions under which the components diverge or converge.     

United we win,divided we fail? Effects of cognitive merger representations and performance feedback on merging groups

Research has shown that cognitive representations of mergers influence intergroup evaluations. This paper extends this research by studying how cognitive representations of mergers (one group, dual identity, and two groups) interact with performance feedback (success and failure) to affect intergroup evaluations. Two competing hypotheses were tested, which made different predictions in case of superordinate group salience combined with subgroup salience after merger failure: The subgroup‐salience‐hypothesis predicts that subgroup salience during a merger generally results in pre‐merger ingroup bias toward the pre‐merger outgroup (i.e., two groups and dual identity). The superordinate‐ salience‐hypothesis predicts that subgroup salience only results in pre‐merger ingroup bias if superordinate group salience is low (i.e., two groups). Both hypotheses predict low levels of ingroup bias after merger success. Study 1 confirmed the second hypothesis using a 3 (merger representation: one group, dual identity, and two groups) × 2 (merger feedback: failure and success) design with interacting groups. Study 2 replicated the results in an adapted minimal group paradigm. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

No evidence for object alternation impairment in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD)

Recent neuroimaging studies have consistently ascribed the orbito-frontal cortex (OFC) a pivotal role in the pathogenesis of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). Cognitive tests presumed sensitive to this region, such as the Object Alternation Task (OAT), are considered important tools to verify this assumption and to investigate the impact of cortical dysfunction on behavior. The aim of the present study was to assess if patients with OCD show enhanced perseveration errors on the OAT relative to healthy controls taking into account several potential moderators, especially comorbid depression and OCD subtype. Thirty-five OCD patients and 18 healthy controls underwent the OAT as well as the Trail-Making Tests (TMT) A and B. In line with prior studies, OCD patients were slowed on both TMT tasks. In contrast, samples performed similarly on the OAT. While the latter finding does not invalidate the assumption that the OFC is affected in OCD, dysfunctions involving this region may be more subtle than often claimed and likely encompass only a small subset of functional domains hosted in the OFC.     

Understanding (in) Newton’s Argument for Universal Gravitation

In this essay, I attempt to assess Henk de Regt and Dennis Dieks recent pragmatic and contextual account of scientific understanding on the basis of an important historical case-study: understanding in Newton’s theory of universal gravitation and Huygens’ reception of universal gravitation. It will be shown that de Regt and Dieks’ Criterion for the Intelligibility of a Theory (CIT), which stipulates that the appropriate combination of scientists’ skills and intelligibility-enhancing theoretical virtues is a condition for scientific understanding, is too strong. On the basis of this case-study, it will be shown that scientists can understand each others’ positions qualitatively and quantitatively, despite their endorsement of different worldviews and despite their convictions as what counts as a proper explanation.