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Researchers apply individual person fit analyses as a procedure for checking model-data fit for individual test-takers. When a test-taker misfits, it means that the inferences from their test score regarding what they know and can do may not be accurate. One problem in applying individual person fit procedures in practice is the question of how much misfit it takes to make the test score an untrustworthy estimate of achievement. In this paper, we argue that if a person’s responses generally follow a monotonic pattern, the resulting test score is “good enough” to be interpreted and used. We present an approach that applies statistical procedures from the Rasch and Mokken measurement perspectives to examine individual person fit based on this good enough criterion in real data from a performance assessment. We discuss how these perspectives may facilitate thinking about applying individual person fit procedures in practice. 相似文献
263.
Amanda J. Barnier Stefanie J. Sharman Lisa McKay Siegfried L. Sporer 《Applied cognitive psychology》2005,19(8):985-1001
We examined the qualitative characteristics of genuine, imagined, and deceptive accounts of positive and negative childhood events. We investigated whether trained raters could discriminate between these accounts using the Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ; Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988) and the Aberdeen Report Judgment Scales (ARJS; S. L. Sporer, paper presented at the biennial meeting of the American Psychology‐Law Society in Redondo Beach, California, March 1988 ). Participants generated three accounts. The first account was of an event that participants genuinely experienced in childhood. The second account was of an event that participants did not experience, but merely imagined happened in childhood. The third account was of an event that participants did not experience, but wrote a deceptive account to convince someone else that the event really happened in childhood. Half our participants wrote about positive events and half wrote about negative events. Ratings made by two trained judges indicated that genuine, imagined, and deceptive accounts were qualitatively different on both the MCQ and ARJS. Moreover, based on the MCQ and ARJS scores raters could discriminate whether the events had been genuinely experienced. We discuss the theoretical and practical implications of these findings. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献