Cognitive and emotional demands of black humour processing: the role of intelligence,aggressiveness and mood

Humour processing is a complex information-processing task that is dependent on cognitive and emotional aspects which presumably influence frame-shifting and conceptual blending, mental operations that underlie humour processing. The aim of the current study was to find distinctive groups of subjects with respect to black humour processing, intellectual capacities, mood disturbance and aggressiveness. A total of 156 adults rated black humour cartoons and conducted measurements of verbal and nonverbal intelligence, mood disturbance and aggressiveness. Cluster analysis yields three groups comprising following properties: (1) moderate black humour preference and moderate comprehension; average nonverbal and verbal intelligence; low mood disturbance and moderate aggressiveness; (2) low black humour preference and moderate comprehension; average nonverbal and verbal intelligence, high mood disturbance and high aggressiveness; and (3) high black humour preference and high comprehension; high nonverbal and verbal intelligence; no mood disturbance and low aggressiveness. Age and gender do not differ significantly, differences in education level can be found. Black humour preference and comprehension are positively associated with higher verbal and nonverbal intelligence as well as higher levels of education. Emotional instability and higher aggressiveness apparently lead to decreased levels of pleasure when dealing with black humour. These results support the hypothesis that humour processing involves cognitive as well as affective components and suggest that these variables influence the execution of frame-shifting and conceptual blending in the course of humour processing.     

Top-down knowledge modulates onset capture in a feedforward manner

How do we select behaviourally important information from cluttered visual environments? Previous research has shown that both top-down, goal-driven factors and bottom-up, stimulus-driven factors determine which stimuli are selected. However, it is still debated when top-down processes modulate visual selection. According to a feedforward account, top-down processes modulate visual processing even before the appearance of any stimuli, whereas others claim that top-down processes modulate visual selection only at a late stage, via feedback processing. In line with such a dual stage account, some studies found that eye movements to an irrelevant onset distractor are not modulated by its similarity to the target stimulus, especially when eye movements are launched early (within 150-ms post stimulus onset). However, in these studies the target transiently changed colour due to a colour after-effect that occurred during premasking, and the time course analyses were incomplete. The present study tested the feedforward account against the dual stage account in two eye tracking experiments, with and without colour after-effects (Exp. 1), as well when the target colour varied randomly and observers were informed of the target colour with a word cue (Exp. 2). The results showed that top-down processes modulated the earliest eye movements to the onset distractors (<150-ms latencies), without incurring any costs for selection of target matching distractors. These results unambiguously support a feedforward account of top-down modulation.     

Scale Imposition as Quantitative Alchemy: Studies on the Transitivity of Neuroticism Ratings

It is common practice in psychology to devise “measurement” procedures by imposing rating scales (e.g., Likert items) onto phenomena and treating the values they produce as quantities. The validity of these procedures goes untested. Validity checks are instead performed on sets of these measurement procedures (i.e., multi-item scales). We present results from three studies suggesting that people cannot be assumed to preserve transitivity when comparing themselves and others on NEO Neuroticism-domain trait items. As transitivity is one of the fundamental axioms of quantitative measurement, these studies challenge the validity of Neuroticism scales at the level of individual scale items.     

How General Do Theories of Explanation Need To Be? *

Theories of explanation seek to tell us what distinctively explanatory information is. The most ambitious ones, such as the DN‐account, seek to tell us what an explanation is, tout court. Less ambitious ones, such as causal theories, restrict themselves to a particular domain of inquiry. The least ambitious theories constitute outright skepticism, holding that there is no reasonably unified phenomenon to give an account of. On these views, it is impossible to give any theories of explanation at all. I argue that both the less ambitious and outright skeptical varieties are committed to a certain context‐sensitivity of our explanatory discourse. And though this discourse is almost certainly context‐sensitive in some respects, it does not exhibit the context‐sensitivity less than fully ambitious theories are committed to. Therefore, all accounts that seek to restrict themselves in scope, including causal accounts of explanation, fail.     

Attributions for Health‐Related Physical Activity

Tenets of Weiner's (1985, 1986 ) attribution theory were examined in the context of being active enough for health benefits, including associations between attributions, emotions, and future expectations. Participants completed questionnaires assessing activity, perceived success/failure to be active enough for health benefits, attributions, emotions, and future expectancy. Perception of being active enough for health benefits was associated with more internal, personally controllable, and stable attributions. Support was found for relationships between perceived outcome and emotions, but not for attributions and emotions. Finally, a positive relationship was found between stability of attributions and certainty of achieving similar future activity outcomes. Given the interest in promoting activity for health, examining attributions for being sufficiently active for health may be considered an important advance.     

The role of inhibition in task switching: A review

The concept of inhibition plays a major role in cognitive psychology. In the present article, we review the evidence for the inhibition of task sets. In the first part, we critically discuss empirical findings of task inhibition from studies that applied variants of the task-switching methodology and argue that most of these findings— such as switch cost asymmetries—are ambiguous. In the second part, we focus on n-22 task-repetition costs, which currently constitute the most convincing evidence for inhibition of task sets. n-22 repetition costs refer to the performance impairment in sequences of the ABA type relative to CBA, which can be interpreted in terms of persisting inhibition of previously abandoned tasks. The available evidence suggests that inhibition is primarily triggered by conflict at selection of stimulus attributes and at the response level. Author Note     

Testing a postselectional account of across-dimension switch costs

In visual search for a pop-out target, responses are faster when the target dimension from the previous trial is repeated than when it changes. Currently, it is unclear whether these across-dimension switch costs originate from processes that guide attention to the target or from later processes (e.g., target identification or response selection). The present study tested two critical predictions of a response-selection account of across-dimension switch costs—namely, (1) that switch costs should occur even when visual attention is guided by a completely different feature and (2) that changing the target dimension should affect the speed of responding, but not the speed of eye movements to the target. The results supported both predictions, indicating that changes of the target dimension do not affect early processes that guide attention to the target but, rather, affect later processes, which commence after the target has been selected.     

Immoral behaviour following brain damage: A review

Despite the apparent sociability of human kind, immoral behaviour is ever present in society. The term ‘immoral behaviour’ represents a complex array of conduct, ranging from insensitivity to topics of conversation through to violent assault and murder. To better understand the neuroscience of immoral behaviour, this review investigates two clinical populations that commonly present with changes in moral behaviour – behavioural-variant frontotemporal dementia and acquired brain injuries. Based on evidence from these groups, it is argued that rather than a single underlying cause, immoral behaviour can result from three distinct types of cognitive failure: (1) problems understanding others; (2) difficulties controlling behaviour; or (3) deficits in the capacity to make appropriate emotional contributions. Each of these failures is associated with damage to different brain regions. A more nuanced approach to the neuroscience of immoral behaviour has important implications for our understanding of immoral behaviour in a wide range of clinical groups, as well as human society more broadly.     

Monitoring and control in multitasking

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review - The idea that conflict detection triggers control adjustments has been considered a basic principle of cognitive control. So far, this “conflict-control...