Modal preferences in creative problem solving

Embodied cognitive science appeals to the idea that cognition depends on the body as well as on the brain. This study looks at whether we are more likely to engage just the brain or enlist the body for complex cognitive functioning such as creative problem solving. Participants were presented with a puzzle based on De Bono's lateral thinking puzzles. The puzzle consisted of rotating and joining two-dimensional shapes to make a three-dimensional one. In one condition, participants were given the choice of either solving the puzzle mentally or through manipulation of the images on a computer screen. In another condition, the subjects had to solve the puzzle first mentally and then report which mode they would have preferred to solve the puzzle. Two more conditions were applied with slight variations. In all conditions, an overwhelming majority of participants chose to solve the puzzle by manipulation, even though there was not a significant increase on performance. It appeared that participants were making a conscious choice for the body to play a feedback-driven role in creative cognitive processing. This strong preference for manual manipulation over just mental representation, regardless of the impact on performance, would seem to suggest that it is our natural tendency to involve the body in complex cognitive functioning. This would support the theory that cognition may be more than just a neural process, and that it is a dynamic interplay between body, brain and world. The experiential feedback of the body moving through space and time may be an inherently important factor in creative cognition.     

How do spatial representations enhance cognitive numerical processing?

Several philosophical theories attempt to explain how actions performed in the world enhance cognitive processing: internalism, active externalism, and cognitive integration. The aim of this paper is to examine whether the use of spatial representations in arithmetic can shed light on this debate. Relying on philosophical analysis, on a discussion of empirical work in the cognitive neuroscience of number, and on a historical case study, I will show that spatial representations of number indicate an integration between internal and external cognitive processes.     

Spatial working memory for clustered and linear configurations of sites in a virtual reality foraging task

Two experiments using an immersive virtual reality foraging environment determined the spatial strategies spontaneously deployed by people in a foraging task and the effects on immediate serial recall of trajectories though the foraging space, which could conform or violate specific organisational constraints. People benefitted from the use of organised search patterns when attempting to monitor their travel though either a clustered "patchy" space or a matrix of locations. The results are discussed within a comparative framework.     

When up-words meet down-sentences: evidence for word- or sentence-based compatibility effects?

Participants were presented with sentences mentioning an entity with a typical location in the upper or lower vertical space (e.g., roof vs. root). Sentences supported or reversed the typical location of the target entity. Sensibility judgments requiring upwards or downwards responses were faster when the response matched rather than mismatched the target entity's typical location. This compatibility effect was independent of whether the sentence context supported or reversed the target entity's typical location. The results, therefore, provide clear evidence for word-based but no evidence for sentence-based simulation processes.     

Eye movements reveal sustained implicit processing of others' mental states

The ability to attribute mental states to others is crucial for social competency. To assess mentalizing abilities, in false-belief tasks participants attempt to identify an actor's belief about an object's location as opposed to the object's actual location. Passing this test on explicit measures is typically achieved by 4 years of age, but recent eye movement studies reveal registration of others' beliefs by 7 to 15 months. Consequently, a 2-path mentalizing system has been proposed, consisting of a late developing, cognitively demanding component and an early developing, implicit/automatic component. To date, investigations on the implicit system have been based on single-trial experiments only or have not examined how it operates across time. In addition, no study has examined the extent to which participants are conscious of the belief states of others during these tasks. Thus, the existence of a distinct implicit mentalizing system is yet to be demonstrated definitively. Here we show that adults engaged in a primary unrelated task display eye movement patterns consistent with mental state attributions across a sustained temporal period. Debriefing supported the hypothesis that this mentalizing was implicit. It appears there indeed exists a distinct implicit mental state attribution system.     

In competitive interaction displays of red increase actors' competitive approach and perceivers' withdrawal

Colors carry meaningful psychological signals. We hypothesized that the color red serves as a powerful cue in competition, affecting both actors and perceivers. Using simplified poker games we investigated the psychological meaning of color in competitive interaction, by examining how the color of chips (red vs. blue or white) used by participants or their competitors affected behavior. Although chip color was objectively unrelated to the chips' value or competitors' strength, perceiving competitors using red chips renders competitors more intimidating, which leads perceivers to withdraw. Furthermore, actors who used red chips felt more dominant, which led them to enhanced competitive approach. Displaying red thus makes actors feel stronger and increases competitive approach; perceivers of displays of red in competitors feel intimidated and withdraw from competing.     

Cross-national differences in older adult loneliness

Loneliness concerns the subjective evaluation that the number of relationships is smaller than the individual considers desirable or that the intimacy that the individual wishes for has not been realized. The aim of this study was to assess variations in levels of late-life loneliness and its determinants across Europe. Data came from the SHARE surveys, Wave 2 (Borsch-Supan et al., 2008), encompassing adults aged 50 years and over in Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland (N = 12,248). Loneliness was measured by a single item derived from the CES-D (depression) scale. Using logistic models, the present authors tested several types of explanations for country differences: differences in demographic characteristics, wealth and health, and social networks. Older adults in the southern and central European countries were generally lonelier than their peers in the northern and western European countries. In the southern and central European countries, loneliness was largely attributable to not being married, economic deprivation, and poor health. Frequent contacts with parents and adult children, social participation, and providing support to family members were important in preventing and alleviating loneliness in almost all countries. To combat loneliness among older adults, the findings suggest both (a) generic approaches aimed at improving social embeddedness and (b) country-tailored approaches aimed at improving health and wealth.     

Evolved cognitive biases and the epistemic status of scientific beliefs

Our ability for scientific reasoning is a byproduct of cognitive faculties that evolved in response to problems related to survival and reproduction. Does this observation increase the epistemic standing of science, or should we treat scientific knowledge with suspicion? The conclusions one draws from applying evolutionary theory to scientific beliefs depend to an important extent on the validity of evolutionary arguments (EAs) or evolutionary debunking arguments (EDAs). In this paper we show through an analytical model that cultural transmission of scientific knowledge can lead toward representations that are more truth-approximating or more efficient at solving science-related problems under a broad range of circumstances, even under conditions where human cognitive faculties would be further off the mark than they actually are.     

License to sin: Self‐licensing as a mechanism underlying hedonic consumption

Hedonic overconsumption is often considered to be caused by impulsive factors. The current paper investigates whether self‐licensing, relying on reasons to justify subsequent gratification, can also be included as a significant contributor to hedonic consumption. Two studies were conducted to investigate whether self‐licensing can account for an increase in hedonic consumption while ruling out impulsive factors such as resource depletion, negative affect, and visceral state as alternative explanations. A pilot study indicated that perceiving oneself as having invested greater effort and thus having a self‐licensing cue did not lead to a decline in self‐control capacity compared with not having a self‐licensing cue. The main study employed the same procedure and established that having a licensing cue did lead to increased snack intake while controlling for impulsive factors. Together, these studies support the notion that self‐licensing is a separate mechanism leading to hedonic gratification independent of impulsive factors. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.