Predicting without modeling: a critique of Trabasso and Bartolone (2003)

T. Trabasso and J. Bartolone (2003) used a computational model of narrative text comprehension to account for empirical findings. The authors show that the same predictions are obtained without running the model. This is caused by the model's computational setup, which leaves most of the model's input unchanged.     

Perceptual enhancement of contrast by attention

Allocating spatial attention to a visual stimulus or increasing stimulus contrast both enhance neuronal responses. In a recent study Carrasco et al. demonstrated that attention itself changes perceived contrast. Using an elegant experimental manipulation, they showed that the contrast of an attended stimulus was perceived to be higher than when the same stimulus was unattended. This provides evidence that the enhancement of stimulus salience observed in electrophysiological studies creates an enhanced perceptual representation of attended stimuli.     

Trauma histories and attachment styles of members of the International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies

The study is focused on the training, demographics, perceived emotional and physical health, past traumatic experience histories, and attachment styles of mental health professionals in the field of trauma (members of the International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies). While the data set is limited by a low response rate of 20%, the uniqueness of the sample and distinctive themes yield insight into the experience of trauma and its association with attachment style.     

N200, N250r, and N400 event-related brain potentials reveal three loci of repetition priming for familiar names

The authors assessed immediate repetition effects on event-related potentials (ERPs) while participants performed familiarity decisions for written personal names. For immediately repeated familiar names, the authors observed 3 distinct ERP modulations. At 180-220 ms, a posterior N200 effect occurred for names preceded by same-font primes only. In addition, an increased left temporal negativity (N250r, 220-300 ms) and a reduced central-parietal negativity (N400, 300-400 ms) were seen both for same-font and different-font repetitions. In a 2nd experiment, when names were preceded by either their corresponding face or the face of a different celebrity, only the N400 effect was preserved. These findings suggest that the N200, N250r, and N400 effects reflect facilitated processing at font-specific featural, lexical, and semantic levels of processing, respectively.     

Strength of hindsight bias as a consequence of meta-cognitions

Hindsight bias is the tendency of people to falsely believe that they would have correctly predicted the outcome of an event once it is known. The present paper addresses the ongoing debate as to whether the hindsight bias is due to memory impairment or biased reconstruction. The memory impairment approach maintains that outcome information alters the memory trace of the initial judgement, whereas the biased reconstruction approach assumes that people who have forgotten their initial judgements are forced to guess and, in the presence of outcome information, are likely to use this information as an anchor. Whereas the latter approach emphasises the role of meta-cognitive considerations, meta-cognitions are not included in the memory impairment explanation. Two experiments show that the biased reconstruction approach provides a better explanation for empirical findings in hindsight bias research than does the memory impairment explanation.     

The surface—weight illusion: On the contribution of grip force to perceived heaviness

Previous psychophysical studies have shown that an object, lifted with a precision grip, is perceived as being heavier when its surface is smooth than when it is rough. Three experiments were conducted to assess whether this surface-weight illusion increases with object weight, as a simple fusion model suggests. Experiment 1 verified that grip force increases more steeply with object weight for smooth objects than for rough ones. In Experiment 2, subjects rated the weight of smooth and rough objects. Smooth objects were judged to be heavier than rough ones; however, this effect did not increase with object weight. Experiment 3 employed a different psychophysical method and replicated this additive effect, which argues strongly against the simple fusion model. The whole pattern of results is consistent with a weighted fusion model in which the sensation of grip force contributes only partially to the perceived heaviness of a lifted object.