What is General Philosophy of Science?

The very idea of a general philosophy of science relies on the assumption that there is this thing called science??as opposed to the various individual sciences. In this programmatic piece I make a case for the claim that general philosophy of science is the philosophy of science in general or science as such. Part of my narrative makes use of history, for two reasons. First, general philosophy of science is itself characterised by an intellectual tradition which aimed to develop a coherent philosophical view of science, qua a part of culture with distinctive epistemic features and a distinctive relation to reality. But, second, this tradition went through some important conceptual shifts which re-oriented it and made it more sensitive to the actual development of science itself. The historical narrative focuses on three such moments: the defining moment, associated with Aristotle, and two major conceptual turns, related to Kant and Duhem. The pressures on the very idea of a general philosophy of science that followed the collapse of the macro-models of science that became popular in the 1960s, the pressures that lay all of the emphasis on fragmentation and not on integration, can be dealt with by a new synthesis within general philosophy of science of the constitutive and the historical, in light of the intellectual tradition that has defined it.     

Extending the Non-extendible: Shades of Infinity in Large Cardinals and Forcing Theories

This is an article whose intended scope is to deal with the question of infinity in formal mathematics, mainly in the context of the theory of large cardinals as it has developed over time since Cantor’s introduction of the theory of transfinite numbers in the late nineteenth century. A special focus has been given to this theory’s interrelation with the forcing theory, introduced by P. Cohen in his lectures of 1963 and further extended and deepened since then, which leads to a development and further refinement of the theory of large cardinals ultimately touching, especially in view of the discussion in the last section, on the metatheoretical nature of infinity. The whole undertaking, which takes into account major stages of the research in large cardinals theory, tries to present a defensible argumentation against an ontology of infinity actually rooted in the notion of subjectivity within the world. This means that rather than talking of a general ontology of infinity in the ideal platonic or in the aristotelian sense of potentiality, even in the alternative sense of an ontology of the event in A. Badiou’s sense, one can argue from a subjective point of view about the impossibility of defining cardinalities greater than the first uncountable one \(\aleph _{1}\) that would correspond to a distinct existence in real world terms or would be supported by a mathematical intuition in terms of reciprocity with experience. The argumentation from the particular standpoint includes also certain comments on the delimitative character of Gödel’s constructive universe L and the influence of the constructive approach in narrowing the breadth of an ‘ontology’ of infinity.     

Moving Molecules Above the Scientific Horizon: On Perrin’s Case for Realism

This paper aims to cast light on the reasons that explain the shift of opinion—from scepticism to realism—concerning the reality of atoms and molecules in the beginning of the twentieth century, in light of Jean Perrin’s theoretical and experimental work on the Brownian movement. The story told has some rather interesting repercussions for the rationality of accepting the reality of explanatory posits. Section 2 presents the key philosophical debate concerning the role and status of explanatory hypotheses c. 1900, focusing on the work of Duhem, Stallo, Ostwald, Poincaré and Boltzmann. Section 3 examines in detail Perrin’s theoretical account of the molecular origins of Brownian motion, reconstructs the structure and explains the strength of Perrin’s argument for the reality of molecules. Section 4 draws three important lessons for the current debate over scientific realism.     

Causal Necessitation and Dispositional Modality

Philosophia - Rani Lill Anjum and Stephen Mumford have recently defended a new kind of modality, which they call ‘dispositional modality’. The key reason to adopt dispositional...     

Prime-trial processing demands and their impact on distractor processing in a spatial negative priming task

A spatial negative priming (NP) paradigm was used where trials were presented in pairs, first the 'prime' and then the 'probe', and where participants responded manually to a target's location. In Experiment 1, three prime-trial types were used: distractor-plus-target, predictable distractor-only, and unpredictable distractor-only, with prime-probe trial onset delays of 2, 5 or 10 s (NP longevity). In Experiment 2, the latter two prime-trials were employed with onset delays of 75 and 750 ms (distractor response activation-inhibition sequence). With the exception of the 10 s onset delay, the spatial NP effect data (NP size, longevity, distractor response activation-inhibition sequence) was the same for all three prime-trial types. Thus, the varying processing demands associated with each of the prime-trial types (e.g., selection, intervening response) did not alter prime distractor processing so that they differentially contributed to the spatial NP process. The three prime-trial types can be used interchangeably, within limits, to study the NP process.     

Carnap, the Ramsey-Sentence and Realistic Empiricism

Based on archival material from the Carnap and FeiglArchives, this paper re-examines Carnap's approach tothe issue of scientific realism in the 1950s and theearly 1960s. It focuses on Carnap's re-invention ofthe Ramsey-sentence approach to scientific theoriesand argues that Carnap wanted to entertain a genuineneutral stance in the realism-instrumentalism debate.Following Grover Maxwell, it claims that Carnap'sposition may be best understood as a version of`structural realism'. However, thus understood,Carnap's position faces the challenge that Newmanraised against Russell's structuralism: the claim thatthe knowledge of the unobservable is limited to itspurely structural characteristics is eitheruninformative or unsustainable.     

Drowning in the Bible and Contemporary Society: Responsibilities of Religious Caregivers

The aim of this study was to research drowning incidents and rescues that are included in the Bible and provide recommendations for how religious caregivers can support psychologically affected victims. Results confirm that the Bible contains six aquatic emergencies. Persons threatened with drowning were saved by an act of God, a human act and acts of human/divine interaction, when, for example, a person was ordered by God to perform an action which resulted in saving people on the threshold of drowning. The drowning casualties were largely individual males and some cases with multiple victims (male and female) as well. The outcomes of the drowning incidents were the survival of most of the casualties whose stories are told in the Bible. One person is reported to have drowned. Drowning incidents occurred at sea and on earth. The types of rescues used were reach-rescue and rescue and survival. The drowning casualties were rescued from land and from ships and boats by human rescuers. Some rescues were achieved by divine miracles.     

Abolishing Platonism in Multiverse Theories

Axiomathes - A debated issue in the mathematical foundations in at least the last two decades is whether one can plausibly argue for the merits of treating undecidable questions of mathematics,...