Commentary on Meehl and Waller's (2002) path analysis and verisimilitude

P. E. Meehl and N. G. Waller's (2002) proposed method may not yield unique solutions for model parameters nor unique solutions for model lack of fit. The author argues from a naturalistic-cognitive philosophy of science that science seeks objective knowledge and that hypothesis testing is central to achieving that goal. It is also argued that P. E. Meehl and N. G. Waller's proposal blurs the distinction between hypothesis testing and explorations of the data seeking an optimal model to serve as a prospective inductive generalization. But it is noted that inductive generalizations are never unique and must be tested to eliminate those that reflect subjective aspects of the researcher's methods and points of view.     

Relations among age, visual memory, and resting cerebral metabolism in 40 healthy men

Visual memory, as measured by the Benton Visual Retention Test (BVRT), and resting regional cerebral metabolic rates for glucose (rCMRglc), as measured by positron emission tomography (PET) and [18-F]fluorodeoxyglucose, were examined in 40 very healthy men, aged 21 to 83 years. Age-related differences in visual memory were found but were significantly smaller than differences reported in the general population. This discrepancy is attributable to our rigorous health screening. The age-related differences found in this sample are estimates of the lower limit of population differences unconfounded by disease. Age-related differences on undistracted delayed visual memory were greater than differences on immediate visual memory, suggesting age-related differences in spontaneous elaborative visual information processing. No relation between visual memory and resting rCMRglc was found, supporting the hypothesis that mental abilities are unrelated to resting brain metabolism unless both functions are influenced by disease.     

Stages of Learning Motivation: Development and Validation of a Measure1

Prochaska and colleagues’(e.g., Prochaska, DiClemente, & Norcross, 1992) stages‐of‐change theory was employed in the current study to reconceptualize the assessment of motivation to learn. We used the stages‐of‐change framework to develop and test a multidimensional measure of learning motivation using 3 independent samples. The pattern of relationships among the learning stages and learning criteria provided strong support for the appropriateness of using a stage‐based perspective to frame learning motivation. In addition, hierarchical regression analysis showed that the Stages of Learning Motivation Inventory (SOLMI) explained variance in the criteria (e.g., exam average, class satisfaction) beyond controls and a commonly used measure of learning motivation. Implications for practice and future research are discussed.     

Witness self‐efficacy: Development and validation of the construct

Despite the application of Self‐Efficacy Theory (Bandura, 1977 , 2000 ) to many areas of psychology, there is a lack of research on self‐efficacy in the ability to testify in court. The present study fills this gap by incrementally developing the construct of Witness Self‐Efficacy and establishing its psychometric properties. Study I features exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses yielding a two‐factor Witness Self‐Efficacy Scale (WSES). The two components are Poise and Communication Style. Study II uses a second data collection to show that both WSES domains possess convergent, divergent, and predictive validity relations consistent with those expected using an SET framework. Notably, WSES components predicted perceptions of witness credibility and sentencing outcomes above and beyond witness extraversion, general self‐efficacy, and general self‐confidence. Implications for SET and witness preparation training are discussed. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The unanticipated resilience of trait self-knowledge in the face of neural damage

This paper explores the question of what the self is by reviewing research conducted with both normal and neuropsychological participants. Findings converge on the idea that the self may be more complex and differentiated than some previous treatments of the topic have suggested. Although some aspects of self-knowledge such as episodic recollection may be compromised in individuals, other aspects-for instance, semantic trait summaries-appear largely intact. Taken together, these findings support the idea that the self is not a single, unified entity. Rather, it is a set of interrelated, functionally independent systems. In the process of reviewing neuropsychological findings, an unexpected result emerges: trait self-knowledge appears unusually robust with respect to neural and cognitive damage that render other aspects of self-knowledge dysfunctional in varying degrees.     

When Cross‐Examination Offends: How Men and Women Assess Intrusive Questioning of Male and Female Expert Witnesses

Personally intrusive questioning during cross‐examination has become commonplace. The differential impact of this questioning on female vs. male experts was the focus in this study, thus these questions are referred to as gender‐intrusive questions. The results demonstrated that the female expert was rated as less confident, trustworthy, likable, believable, and credible than the male expert. The male and female experts were both rated as more credible, trustworthy, and believable when subjected to gender‐intrusive questions. Furthermore, the use of these questions left the jurors with a negative impression of the prosecuting attorney and his case. Jury members were more likely to believe that the evidence exhibited the most support for the defense's case when the witness was subjected to gender‐intrusive questioning.     

“Assertion” and intentionality

Robert Stalnaker argues that his causal-pragmatic account of the problem of intentionality commits him to a coarse-grained conception of the contents of mental states, where propositions are represented as sets of possible worlds. Stalnaker also accepts the “direct reference” theory of names, according to which co-referring names have the same content. Stalnaker’s view of content is thus threatened by Frege’s Puzzle. Stalnaker’s classic paper “Assertion” is intended to provide a response to this threat. In this paper, I evaluate Stalnaker’s claim that the causal-pragmatic account of intentionality commits one to a coarse-grained conception of the contents of mental states, and argue that the apparatus laid out in “Assertion” is not sufficiently comprehensive to account for all versions of Frege’s Puzzle.     

Neediness and narcissistic defensive action

Action-prone patients are difficult for most analysts to treat. The author describes patients who act in treatment by pressuring themselves and the analyst to get rid of what is wrong, to change the imperative, life-and-death qualities of need into something else. Viewing neediness in treatment as narcissistic defensive action helps the analyst address the patient's pressured flight away from focusing on the need of the analyst and toward action aimed at riddance. Ghent's (1992, 1993) views on neediness are discussed and seen to be complemented by a view of action as protection against narcissistic vulnerability. Analysts' intolerance, vulnerabilities, and needs with such patients are considered.     

Mark Twain's life‐long fascination with phrenology

Samuel Langhorne Clemens (Mark Twain; 1835–1910), American humorist and writer, followed scientific and medical developments, and relished exposing questionable practices and ideas. In his youth, he pondered how phrenologists were assessing character, and in 1855 he copied sections of a phrenology book and a skull diagram into a notebook. Later, in London, he had two phrenological examinations by Lorenzo Fowler—one without and the other after identifying himself. Following his “test,” which produced contrasting results, he began to ridicule phrenologists and phrenology in Tom Sawyer, Huckleberry Finn, and other works. He underwent at least two more head readings in the United States, and in Eddypus, an unfinished work from 1901 to 1902, he maintained that phrenologists base their insights primarily on how people dress and answer questions. Although now lampooning the craniological tenets of phrenology, Twain never seemed to reject the idea of distinct faculties of mind associated with specialized brain organs.